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ABSTRACT 
 
JOHN C. WATSON: The First Amendment as License and Limitation: 
The Supreme Court Addresses Principles of Journalism Ethics (1947-2005) 
(Under the direction of Ruth Walden) 
 
This is a study of the intersection of law and ethics as they address the professional 
practice of journalism. When the United States Supreme Court had occasion to address 
journalism’s five fundamental ethical principles in cases decided from 1947 through 2005, its 
rulings were supportive of these principles in general, but not universally so, or in all their 
particular applications. In some respects, the Court created a legal basis for rendering some 
principles practical nullities and undermined others so significantly that some ethical 
prescriptions are perhaps less likely to be followed by professional journalists of the 21st 
century and beyond. This study identifies the following as the five principles and directives 
of journalism ethics: tell the truth, respect privacy, report the news, protect sources and 
maintain independence. 
This study has found that in some instances, the Court has denigrated journalism’s 
most cherished principles in deference to other ideals the Court has found more important.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
 
 
 
 
To my mother, Clementine Watson (1926-2004), 
whose first paying job was picking cotton in Alabama, 
whose best paying job was at a factory in New Jersey, 
whose most important job was raising and educating her nine children to make sure 
they never had to pick cotton or work in a factory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
Chapter                                                                                                                           Page 
1.   Introduction ………………………………………………………………………….........1 
            Review of the Literature…………………………………………………………........5 
Law and Morality…………….……………………….…………………………........5 
Imposing Ethical Strictures Via Law…………………………………………….......14 
 Summary and Conclusions.......…………………………....….……….………….....24 
Research Questions……………………………………………….…….……….…...25 
Method and Limitations………………………………………………………….…..26 
Justification………………………………………………………………...…….…..35 
2.   Making Journalism Ethical: Codes, Commissions and Councils …………..………..….38 
 Early Codes of Ethics ..……………………………………………...……………....41 
 Modern Codes of Ethics……………………………..…………………………..…...49 
 Codes and Lawyers…………………………………………………………………..56 
 The Hutchins Commission …………………………………………………..……....67 
 The Warren and Kerner Commissions ……………………………………………....89 
 National News Council ……………………………………………………….……..92 
 Summary and Conclusions ………………………………………………….………98 
3.   Truth and Truth Telling: First Principle and Prime Directive ..……………..………....103 
 Times v. Sullivan: Undervaluing Truth…...…………………………….……….….107 
 Actual Malice and Pragmatic Instrumentalism …………………………………….116 
 vi
 Sullivan’s Progeny ………………………………………………………………...119 
 Expanding Protection of Falsehood ………..……………………………………...125 
 Limiting Protection of Falsehood ………..………………………………………...138 
 Masson v. New Yorker ……………………………………………………………..146 
 Treatments of Truth Beyond Libel …………………………………………..…….152 
 Summary and Conclusions ……………………………………………………..….161 
4.   Privacy: A Matter of Morality, Ethics and Law……………………………...………...168 
 Privacy in Journalism Ethics Codes ……………………………………………..…172 
 Supreme Court Addresses False Light and Appropriation…………………………180 
 Supreme Court Addresses Intrusion ……………………………………...………..185 
 Supreme Court Addresses Rape Victim Privacy ……………………………..........193 
 Supreme Court Addresses Juvenile Privacy ……………………………….........…199 
 Extending the Shield of Privacy …………………………………………………...203 
 Summary and Conclusions ………………………………………………………...219 
5.   Civic Responsibility: A Casualty of Ethical Principle ……………………………..….224 
 Four Ethical Directives to Break the Law………………………………………….225 
 The Moral Duty to Obey The Law ……..……………………………………….....230 
 Ethical Justification for Lawless Conduct …………………………………………237 
 Beyond the Reach of Law …………………………………………………...……..246 
 Within the Grasp of Equity ………………………………………………………...261 
 Obeying the Law: An Emerging Ethical Principle ………………………………...269 
 Summary and Conclusion.…………………………………………………..……...274 
6.   Summary Conclusions and Recommendations ………………………………………..276 
 vii
Theoretical and Philosophical Overview …………………………………………..276 
 Has the Court Imposed Ethical Standards?..………………………………………..281 
 Have Court Rulings Affirmed or Undermined Ethics?..............................................283 
 Has the Court Eroded the Distinction Between Law and Ethics?.............................285 
 What are the Ramifications of Court-Created Ethics?..............................................286 
7.   BIBLIOGRAPHY ……………………………………………………………………..288 
Primary Sources ……………………………………………………………………288 
Secondary Sources …………………………………………………………………293 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction  
 
 For nearly a century, journalism critics have been warning the American news media 
that if they do not practice their craft ethically and with a greater sense of social 
responsibility, they risk having the law impose ethics or other systems of moral control on 
them. One of the most articulate and well-reasoned of these warnings was sounded in 1947 
by the Commission on Freedom of the Press. This privately assembled panel of thirteen 
intellectuals was led by University of Chicago Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins and 
usually is referred to as the Hutchins Commission. It conducted a two-year study of the 
American mass media and issued criticism and warnings in a report titled “A Free and 
Responsible Press, A General Report on Mass Communication: Newspaper, Radio, Motion 
Pictures, Magazines and Books.”1 Similar but less expansive criticism that focused primarily 
on the news media’s handling of their responsibilities to the larger society and warnings 
about government action to remedy irresponsible journalism were made by the Warren 
Commission in 1964,2 the Kerner Commission in 1968,3 and The Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force in 1972.4 
                                                 
1 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (Robert D. Leigh ed., 1947). 
 
2 REPORT OF THE WARREN COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY (N.Y. Times ed. 
1964). 
 
3 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (Bantam Books 1968). 
 
4 THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, Inc., A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND 
TASK FORCE REPORT FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL (1973). 
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 This dissertation seeks to determine whether or to what extent the passage of time 
has proved those warnings to be portents. Clearly the law has not been used to impose 
ethical standards on the news media on a wholesale basis. Unlike many other nations, the 
United States does not have a formal code of journalistic responsibility enshrined in law or 
an agency to oversee the practice of journalism, nor are journalists required to be licensed or 
otherwise accredited. Any such attempt by the government to regulate journalists’ conduct 
undoubtedly would violate the First Amendment. 
 But there have been instances in which the law has been used to require or encourage 
ethical conduct by journalists or to permit punishment of unethical behavior. A classic 
example was a Washington Supreme Court decision in 1997 that allowed a newspaper to 
impose sanctions on a reporter for violating the newspaper’s ethics code provisions that 
promoted objectivity by banning apparent conflicts of interest.5 Perhaps the most publicized 
example occurred in 1991 when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that journalists who break 
promises of confidentiality to sources can be subject to liability under state law.6 When the 
case was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court, that body upheld a jury award of 
$200,000 to the confidential source whose identity had been revealed by the journalists who 
had promised him anonymity. Another example occurred in 1981 when a Washington state 
judge required reporters to sign an agreement to abide by the state’s voluntary bench-bar-
press guidelines for ethical court coverage before he would allow them access to a pretrial 
hearing.7 
                                                 
5 Nelson v. McClatchy, 131 Wash. 2d. 523 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 866 (1997). 
 
6 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 
7 Federated Publications, Inc. v. Swedburg, 633 P.2d 74 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982). 
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 Examples also exist in statutory and administrative law. Most states have retraction 
statutes that limit the damages libel plaintiffs can win if acceptable corrections are published 
by the defendants.8 These statutes provide strong incentives for the news media to follow the 
ethical practice of publishing corrections when errors are discovered. Broadcast regulation 
has included many attempts to legislate ethical journalistic behavior, ranging from Federal 
Communication Commission bans on staging and distorting the news9 to the agency’s rule 
that requires broadcasters to inform callers when their telephone conversations are being 
taped for on-air use.10 
 However, the government on occasion has undermined ethical journalism and even 
refused to impose ethical standards as legal imperatives. The U.S. Supreme Court, for 
example, has refused to permit punishment of media that do not follow the ethically based 
and widespread journalistic practices of withholding the names of sexual assault victims and 
concealing the identities of juveniles who break the law.11 In 1979 the U.S. Supreme Court 
found a Florida law unconstitutional because it sought to mandate balanced coverage of 
political candidates.12 And in a hotly debated libel case that was decided by the Supreme 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 99-2 (1999); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann 12-653.02 (West 1991); N.D. Cent. Code §32-43-
05 (1995). 
 
9 See, e.g., Hunger in America, 20 F.C.C. 2d 143 (1969); WBBM-TV, 18 F.C.C. 2d 124 (1969); Star Stations of 
Indiana, 51 F.C.C. 2d 95 (1975). 
 
10 In re Amendment of Section 1206: Broadcast of Telephone Conversations, 65 P&F Rad. Reg. 2d 444 (1988). 
 
11Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 
12 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1979). 
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Court in 1991, Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,13 the Court refused to rule that 
any and all deliberate alterations of direct quotations constituted knowing falsification.14 
 Such examples of efforts to use the law to require or promote ethical behavior by the 
news media seem to indicate that, at least to some extent, the consequences foretold by the 
Hutchins Commission and other journalism critics have come to pass. But the degree to 
which journalism law and ethics have been conjoined by judicial fiat is not known. 
Accordingly, the core purpose of this dissertation is to determine the extent to which this 
merger has occurred. To that end, this study will review the Supreme Court rulings handed 
down since the Hutchins Report warnings to identify and examine instances in which the 
Court has ruled on legal issues that implicate ethical standards of journalism. Some of these 
rulings punish, mandate or protect journalism practices that are matters of ethical principle. 
Some have made rights of access to information dependent on acquiescence to ethically 
based preconditions, or penalized deviation from ethical standards or allowed deviations 
without legal sanctions. In order to determine the extent to which Court rulings have 
imposed, affirmed or undercut fundamental ethical principles of journalism, this study 
analyzes Court rulings that address the fundamental ethical principles as established and 
promoted in ethics codes created by news media organizations themselves. 
 The following review of the literature relevant to the issues examined in this study is 
provided as an orienting background and to demonstrate how this dissertation contributes to 
a greater understanding of these issues. 
 
                                                 
13 501 U.S. 496 (1991). 
 
14 The Court has ruled since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), that knowing falsification or 
reckless disregard for the truth constitutes actual malice, which is the standard of fault the Court requires public 
official plaintiffs and public figure plaintiffs to prove before they may prevail in libel lawsuits. 
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Review of the Literature  
 The scholarly literature that informs this study crosses disciplines and has been 
categorized for review in two segments: (I) writings on the legal philosophies and theories 
that focus on the connection between law and morality, and (II) studies that examine some 
aspect of the larger issue of how law has imposed ethical strictures on journalism practices. 
Law and Morality 
 This dissertation’s examination of the law’s effect on journalism ethics enters the 
realm of legal theory and requires grounding in natural law doctrine and legal positivism 
before moving to other related and often derivative theories that address the relationship 
between law and morality or law and ethics. Among the central tenets of natural law 
doctrine are the assumptions that law is naturally preexisting in the proper conceptions of 
what is right and wrong, that people in a state of nature untainted by dishonesty or other 
base drives would follow these principles, and that legislators and judges must rediscover 
these principles by rational processes. Legislation or court rulings that purport to be law but 
that are subsequently determined to be immoral are not law and are invalid. Natural law 
devotees accordingly assume that valid law is moral and that there is a necessary link 
between law and moral values.15 Legal positivists, however, insist on maintaining a 
separation of the two, yet concede that in practice law is a coercive force often imbued with 
a moral element.16 Judges who administer the law, according to the positivists, should do so 
without making moral value judgments. 
                                                 
15 See generally M. J. DETMOLD, THE UNITY OF LAW AND MORALITY (1984). 
 
16 See generally POSITIVISM TODAY (Stephen Guest ed., 1996). 
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 Positivism defines law as rules of behavior actually enacted and administered by 
duly designated authority. The validity of these laws is determined by verifying whether 
they have come into being through the proper process. This process, even when properly 
followed, can produce immoral or amoral law, according to positivism. It is therefore 
necessary to avoid the presumption that law and morality are necessarily linked lest bad 
laws remain unchallenged.17 
 Proponents of journalism ethics usually assume a stance compatible with the 
positivist position on the relation of law to morality and also insist on maintaining a clear 
distinction between practices that are legally permissible and those that are ethical.18 Law 
and ethics are normative systems that affect how journalism is practiced, but law delineates 
minimums of behavior while ethics establish behavioral ideals that journalists should strive 
toward, according to journalism ethicists Jay Black, Sandra Davidson and others.19 Merging 
journalism ethics and journalism law, blurring or eliminating the distinction between them, 
arguably could cause confusion about how journalism should or must be practiced and 
whether its norms are those established by lawmakers or journalists. 
 However, legal theorist Samuel Enoch Stumpf, whose writings often reflect natural 
law doctrine, would disagree with the journalism ethicists who claim that law sets minimum 
standards of behavior and ethics strive for better. In a book published in 1966 Stumpf asked 
rhetorically: 
                                                 
17 Id. at ix. 
 
18 JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 14 (2nd ed. 1995); Sandra Davidson, Media Liability 
Cases Raise Legal and Ethical Questions, MEDIA L. NOTES, Winter 1998, at 1, 2. 
 
19 BLACK ET AL., supra note 18, at 14; Davidson, supra note 18, at 2. 
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Does the concept of law necessarily imply a concern with only the minimum 
standards of behavior, leaving to morality the task of making men moral? 
Historically this question has been answered for the most part in the negative. 
. . . Whether the law will be used narrowly [to set minimums] or widely [for 
moral standards] is not a matter of the meaning or nature of law but a 
consequence of a society’s decision about its use. . . . [I]n the United States 
the law has gradually absorbed many areas of behavior which were previously 
considered the proper province of morality.20 
 
 Stumpf argued that law is often a codification of morality and ethics and that there is 
a necessary connection between law and moral values. “[T]hose who fashion the law, for the 
most part, believe that the substance of law is either required by moral considerations or at 
least by the general welfare of the community.”21 When court edicts confirm society’s moral 
and ethical values, the public considers these laws to be most valid, Stumpf reasoned. Legal 
theorist James Fitzjames Stephen agreed with Stumpf about the necessary connection 
between law and morals: “The main subject with which law is conversant is that of rights 
and duties, and all the commoner and more important rights and duties presuppose some 
theory of morals.”22 
 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in its role as the final arbiter of the validity of 
American law, “cannot avoid confronting from time to time this moral dimension of law.”23 
Stumpf defined that moral dimension as the part of a court’s ruling that rests on arguments 
and conceptions of what is proper, right, good, and desirable as opposed to what is 
improper, wrong, bad or undesirable. “The moral element in an opinion has the effect of 
                                                 
20 SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LAW 233-34 (1966). 
 
21 Id. at 234. 
 
22 James Fitzjames Stephen, The Doctrine of Liberty in Its Application to Morals, in MORALITY, HARM, AND 
THE LAW 31 (Gerald Dworkin ed., 1994). 
 
23Id. at 6. 
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contrasting an action, a given conduct, or a particular law as it ‘is’ with what it ‘ought to be’ 
in terms of moral as compared with legal standards,” Stumpf wrote.24 
 And in a statement reminiscent of the warning the Hutchins Commission made to 
journalists, Stumpf observed that “if men do not perform voluntarily their moral obligations 
these obligations must be enforced by the law.”25 Although this statement is most often cited 
with reference to criminal law, it appears equally relevant in civil lawsuits and 
administrative regulation cases that involve news media practices. 
 Nonetheless, Stumpf cautioned society to maintain a clear distinction between law 
and morality if it hopes to remain free, open, and susceptible to democratic change. “There is 
the constant danger that if the association of law with morality is too close, then the law will 
become the substitute for our moral standards; and if the law is our moral standard, we have 
lost the possibility of a moral criticism of the law.”26 Such a loss would be particularly costly 
when the laws at issue deal with free speech and free press issues because it is the speech that 
is considered wrong, immoral, or unethical that most often needs protection. 
 This fundamental issue of the relationship between law and morality is also addressed 
by the various instrumentalist theories of law that define laws as tools “devised to serve 
practical ends, rather than general norms laid down by officials in power [or by] secular 
embodiments of natural law.”27 Pragmatic instrumentalism, a uniquely American theory of 
law that Cornell Law School Professor Robert Samuel Summers introduced in the early 
                                                 
24 STUMPF supra note 20. 
 
25 Id. at 234. 
 
26 Id. at 219. 
 
27 ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 20 (1982). 
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1980s,28 takes issue with some principles of natural law theory and legal positivism yet 
shares the positivists’ view of law as a coercive force and echoes their insistence on a “sharp 
separation between law and morals. Otherwise, or so the positivists believed, there would be 
confusion and uncertainty about what the actual law was . . . . A sharp separation of law and 
morals was also thought to facilitate the pointed criticism of law,” Summers wrote.29 
 Pragmatic instrumentalism, as defined by Summers, examines the nature of law, the 
theory of law making by courts and legislatures, the interpretation and application of law, 
and the “study of law as a complex reality.”30 This legal theory provides a framework for 
this study’s examination of legal treatments of ethical issues affecting the practice of 
journalism. 
 Although Summers’ theory of pragmatic instrumentalism lacks an extensive 
historical background, is not as widely recognized as legal positivism or natural law 
doctrine, and has not achieved their status,31 it pulls together the writings of eleven 
prominent American legal theorists dating from the early 1900s.32 It is particularly relevant 
to this dissertation because the American theorists’ ruminations about the nature and 
purposes of legislation and adjudication became influential around the same period as the 
                                                 
28 Id. 
 
29 AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY xv (Robert Samuel Summers & Arthur L. Goodhart eds., 1992). 
 
30 Id. at I. 
 
31 See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, The Need for a Theory of Legal Theories: Assessing Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 
69 CORNELL L. REV. 988 (1984). 
 
32 The major philosophers and legal theorists Summers identified as pragmatic instrumentalists are Joseph 
Walter Bingham, Felix S. Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, John Dewey, Jerome Frank, John Chipman Gray, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Karl N. Llewellyn, W. Underhill Moore, Herman Olliphant, and Roscoe Pound. 
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Hutchins Commission began its work, according to Summers, who also identified 
commission member Harold D. Lasswell as a pragmatic instrumentalist.33  
 The theory’s precepts help explain how and why law might seek to impose 
journalism ethics or otherwise affect them. These precepts are drawn from sociological 
jurisprudence, legal realism, and pragmatism, and generally conclude that law exists 
primarily as a means to achieve particular social goals directly or indirectly. Moral and 
ethical behavior may be among these goals. Pragmatic instrumentalism is also a sociological 
study of law that questions whether courts can provide value-free adjudication as envisioned 
by the early positivists. 
 Cornell Law School Professor Michael S. Moore, in a critical assessment of 
Summers’ theory published in the Cornell Law Review, said pragmatic instrumentalism 
shunned earlier theories of mechanical jurisprudence and legal formalism that interpreted 
statutes by relying on their plain meaning without reference to the motivation of the 
legislators.34 The instrumentalists “ignored any preexisting meaning (ordinary or otherwise) 
of legal standards, and instead assigned such standards a meaning in light of the desirable 
consequences attainable by that assignment.”35 Accordingly, pragmatic instrumentalists 
condemned adjudication that applied the philosophical precepts of natural law. Moore’s 
criticism included the observation that legal theorists Karl Llewelyn and Jerome Frank, 
whom Summers identified as pragmatic instrumentalists, “sometimes seemed to argue that 
legal decisions are nothing but value judgments, that the existence of legal rules makes no 
                                                 
33 SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 22. 
 
34 Moore, supra note 31, at 1007. 
 
35 Id. 
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difference to legal decision making except in the rhetoric employed after the fact to 
rationalize a decision reached on other grounds.”36 
 Pragmatic instrumentalism was not merely influential as the Hutchins Commission 
completed its work but was dominant and a “colossal influence” in America, according to 
Summers’ account. 
Americans also came to think of law as a means to social goals – as a body of 
social instruments to be used by legal architects to combat the Great 
Depression, . . . to construct the regulatory state and the welfare state. . . . 
And most of the legal profession conceded that not only the legislatures made 
law. Courts made law too.37 
 
Summers also asserted that during the 1930s and 1940s pragmatic instrumentalism “was our 
most influential theory of law in jurisprudential circles, in the faculties of major law schools, 
and in important realms of bench and bar. Many of its tenets continue to be influential in the 
1980s.”38 Moore, despite his criticism, agreed with Summers “that the ideas of the 
pragmatic instrumentalists heavily influenced our contemporary legal theory.”39 Summers 
credited the influence of pragmatic instrumentalism with the philosophical readjustment of 
the Supreme Court in the 1930s that began to accord constitutional validity to social 
engineering and regulatory legislation that it previously had found unconstitutional.40 
Calling the readjustment a victory of “instrumentalism over formalism,” Summers saw the 
influence extend through the 1940s and change the Court’s interpretation of statutes from a 
                                                 
36 Id. at 1009. 
 
37 SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 275. 
 
38 Id. at 11. 
 
39 Moore, supra note 31, at 1011. 
 
40 SUMMERS, supra note 27, at 276. 
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plain-meaning approach to an effort to determine the intended purposes of the individual 
laws. This influence permeated the law school textbooks and law reviews as well, Summers 
argued. The influence waned somewhat in the 1950s, but there was a resurgence in the 
1980s, he wrote.41 
 The preceding discussion of legal theories and philosophies outlines the evaluative 
and prescriptive concepts that will be crucial to this dissertation. Natural law and legal 
positivism are the two major philosophical approaches to study the relationship between law 
and morality. Natural law’s presumption that laws are necessarily moral may help explain 
the outcome of a clash between law and ethical canons of journalism because, as a 
prescriptive philosophy, it has the potential to affect how judges may decide such conflicts. 
 For example, some members of the U.S. Senate expressed concern about the 
influence of natural law doctrine in 1991 during confirmation hearings for Supreme Court 
Justice Clarence Thomas because he had previously espoused a belief in natural law. The 
senators were concerned that such a belief in a higher natural moral authority would affect 
how Thomas would interpret the Constitution.42 Natural law also provides a perspective for 
this study’s evaluation of legislation that affects journalism practices. 
 Positivism, which developed largely as a rebuttal of natural law theory, concentrates 
on the actual operation of law. Positivism recognizes the frequent infusion of morality into 
the making and administration of law but condemns the practice. It thereby provides this 
study with a basis for recognizing and critically evaluating the moral component of U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings that seek to protect or penalize journalism practices that involve 
                                                 
41 Id. at 277. 
 
42 Linda Greenhouse, Etching a Portrait of Judge Thomas, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1991, at 1. 
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ethical issues. Positivism recognizes that law can be moral or immoral and the fact that a 
law’s embedded moral code conflicts with the moral or ethical code of journalism does not 
mean the legal code should necessarily prevail to supplant or otherwise alter the journalists’ 
code. 
 Pragmatic instrumentalism, however, provides the primary theoretical framework for 
this study because it focuses on and acknowledges that social and moral goals are sought by 
law, a perspective that is essential to this study’s assessment of whether, or to what extent 
ethical standards have been converted into legal imperatives. Pragmatic instrumentalism 
recognizes that law is largely made by courts and questions whether courts can adjudicate 
without making value judgments. Its influence was prominent during the late 1930s and 
1940s as the idea of socially responsible journalism gained widespread currency through the 
Hutchins Commission, which included pragmatic instrumentalist Harold D. Lasswell. This 
legal philosophy made a resurgence during the 1980s as journalism ethics and socially 
responsible journalism were hotly debated in courts and other public arenas. Among the 
more recent prescriptive iterations of this philosophy is the work of Richard A. Posner, who 
advocates pragmatic adjudication in constitutional cases, an approach to law that encourages 
judges to consider how their rulings will affect society.43 It is a legal philosophy that is 
driven by policy considerations and finds no necessary connection between law and 
morality while recognizing that both operate on the same spheres of human behavior. First 
Amendment scholar Matthew D. Bunker has succinctly indicated how the philosophy is 
implemented. “Pragmatic adjudication . . . eschews precedent for precedent’s sake, 
                                                 
43 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 737 (2002); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999); Richard A. 
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic 
Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996). 
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preferring to identify case-by-case results that will improve social conditions rather than 
worship at the altar of stare decisis,” he wrote.44 
 
Imposing Ethical Strictures Via Law 
 A search of the existing literature that addresses the legal imposition of ethical 
strictures on journalism practices has not revealed any single published work that matches 
the scope and focus of this dissertation. There are law review articles, case notes, journalism 
trade magazine articles and studies that discuss court rulings or administrative agency edicts 
in cases that involve journalism ethics, but they generally treat a single case or a small group 
of cases. A substantial number of researchers have addressed the larger issue of mass media 
ethics. In fact, there is a scholarly journal devoted to this research stream,45 but studies of 
the intersection of journalism ethics and the law are limited. No one has published a 
thorough analysis of United States Supreme Court rulings from 1947 through 2005 to assess 
how the Court has resolved legal disputes that addressed the ethical practice of journalism, 
or whether it has converted ethical standards into legal imperatives, or in some sense 
affirmed or undermined ethical standards in journalism. David S. Allen, however, has 
published an endorsement of purposefully combining law and ethics in First Amendment 
adjudication.  
 Writing about the First Amendment and discourse theory in Communication Law 
and Policy in 1999, Allen called for the merger of law and ethics to improve journalism.46 
                                                 
44 MATTHEW D. BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH 163 (2001). 
 
45 J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS. 
 
46 David S. Allen, Merging Law and Ethics: Discourse Legal Theory and Freedom of Expression in Hurley, 4 
COM. L. & POL’Y 403 (1999). 
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Allen’s article focused primarily on a Supreme Court decision that overturned a 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruling that would have required a private 
organization to allow gay and lesbian pride advocates to march in a holiday parade in 
Boston.47 He complained that the ruling failed to protect the right of a disempowered group 
to participate in the public marketplace of ideas. Allen called the ruling a rejection of 
discourse legal theory and the precepts of Jurgen Habermas.48 Allen argued that “discourse 
theory, by connecting law and ethics, carves out a more protective standard for 
disempowered groups.”49 Allen ultimately addressed an issue also raised in this study, the 
role the law plays in shaping journalism ethics. “Discourse theory refuses to separate law 
from ethics and recognizes the importance of the courts, and government, in aiding in the 
creation of a just society.”50 By unanimous vote, the Court said a Massachusetts law that 
forced the private group to allow the gay activists to march in its parade would violate the 
group’s First Amendment rights. Habermas would condemn that finding, according to 
Allen, because “Habermas sees the media as being entitled to constitutional protections only 
when fulfilling a discursive mission.”51 
 Other scholars specifically sought to determine whether ethical standards of 
journalism have become legal imperatives or otherwise have been affected by Court rulings. 
In separate works, scholars Elizabeth Blanks Hindman, Brian C. Murchison, Jeff Storey, W. 
                                                 
47 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 
48 See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
1981). 
 
49 Allen, supra note 46 at 405. 
 
50 Id. at 430. 
 
51 Id. at 414. 
 
 16
Wat Hopkins, Laurence Alexander, and Don E. Tomlinson have addressed that issue 
directly in a limited manner or indirectly in an expansive manner. Hindman’s study was the 
most extensive, covering 1931 through 1996, but focused only on U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in relation to the social responsibility theory of the press, a valuable but indirect 
approach to the issue of journalism ethics.52 Hindman addressed the intersection of 
journalism ethics and high court rulings when she wrote, “Supreme Court decisions 
articulated, if sometimes indirectly, connections between legal and moral responsibility.”53 
 Hindman’s study was an effort to determine if, when, and how the Supreme Court 
applied social responsibility theory in cases involving the mass communication media. 
Social responsibility theory posits that the press has a moral and ethical duty to do what is 
right, proper, and good for society. If those duties are fulfilled, the press earns rights that are 
assured and protected by law.54 This theory was advanced and popularized by the Hutchins 
Commission. By using this theory as a framework for her study, Hindman’s work was, in 
many respects, a study of mass media ethics and law. 
 Hindman cited instances in which the Court created media case law through rulings 
that were based on the moral principles of social responsibility, but the justices did not 
overtly state the moral or ethical premises they were rejecting or enforcing.55 This covert 
application and infusion of moral principles she addressed reflected what Stumpf referred to 
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in an assessment of judge-made law: “The conclusion is unmistakable – that a moral 
element permeates the judicial process.”56 
 Hindman indicated that individual justices on the Supreme Court shared the Hutchins 
Commission’s conclusion that press freedom was conditioned on the media meeting their 
social responsibilities – that with freedom come obligations to society – and that at times the 
media had “engaged in practices which the society condemns.”57 Hindman, however, did not 
detect any consistent definition or application of the theory of social responsibility in the 65 
years of Supreme Court opinions she studied but concluded that the Court had applied 
variants of the concept in making some rulings in media cases. The principle of social 
responsibility was adopted at varying times by conservative and liberal justices alike, but 
each camp applied it differently, she wrote. 
[D]uring the Warren Court era, social responsibility was equated with liberal 
goals, primarily, providing equal opportunity. However, toward the end of 
the time period studied, the media’s social responsibility came to mean acting 
morally. . . . In both definitions, the media had responsibilities, but the 
character of those responsibilities changed significantly.58 
 
 Hindman argued that the Supreme Court, in many instances, was building a model of 
responsible media behavior by protecting some practices and exacting a toll for others. This 
model, carrying the imprimatur of the Court, came to be seen as the proper model not only 
by the lay public, but by journalists themselves, she said. “By setting limits on media 
behavior and expounding on the media’s role in society, the Court influences notions of 
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media responsibility held by the public and by media practitioners.”59 In reaching that 
conclusion Hindman raised the issue of whether journalism standards of conduct should be 
determined by the government through its courts, by the general public, or by journalists. 
 A 1994 law review article’s title, “Sullivan’s Paradox: The Emergence of Judicial 
Standards of Journalism,” indicated that indeed such standards had been created by U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings.60 The text, however, was confined to rulings in New York Times v. 
Sullivan and its progeny that arguably established newsgathering norms and dealt with a 
myriad of libel issues.61 This article and study, which were the work of a team of journalism 
and law professors led by Brian C. Murchison as part of the 12-year Iowa Research Project, 
concluded that the Sullivan ruling allows and encourages judges to decide how journalists 
should practice their craft as professional purveyors of truth. In this manner, justices and 
lower court judges have been creating professional norms for journalists, the article argued. 
“[T]he Sullivan rule has spawned a de facto set of judge-made standards that covers all 
aspects of journalistic behavior.”62 The article ultimately condemns the Sullivan rule for 
imposing a legal standard for libel that is actually a “permissive norm.”63 
 Courts have moved purposefully into the practice of creating norms for journalists, 
attorney and former journalist Jeff Storey wrote in a 2001 law journal note. After analyzing 
a new journalism ethics code developed by the Gannett media corporation against the 
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backdrop of court rulings on a variety of journalism practices, Storey concluded that the 
courts “have taken it upon themselves to define [journalism] norms like ‘responsibility’ and 
‘fairness.’”64 
 W. Wat Hopkins also addressed journalism norms while examining libel standards 
in a 1985 monograph65 that assessed the effects of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.66 He examined ten years of court rulings since 1974 when the Supreme 
Court determined that negligence was the minimum standard of fault that a private plaintiff 
must prove in order to prevail in a libel lawsuit.67 Hopkins’ study, in part, was a discussion 
of who should determine the standards for good, right, and proper journalism. Establishing 
such standards became essential once the Court ruled that libel plaintiffs must prove that 
journalist defendants failed to follow standard journalism practices. “Who will determine 
what the proper standard of professional conduct is within any medium?” Hopkins asked.68 
Will it be the public as a jury using the “reasonable person” standard? Or will it be 
journalists using a “journalistic malpractice” standard? Hopkins favored the latter course. 
His study did not explicitly examine the link between the Court’s legal standard and an 
ethical standard but did so by implication. 
 Other scholars have directly addressed the issue of ethical standards that have been 
transformed by court edict into legal imperatives, but most have done so on a limited basis 
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as Alexander did in 1996.69 Alexander’s research dealt primarily with three federal court 
rulings in 1991 and 1992 against journalists and other mass communication practitioners 
who had been sued for actions that involved ethical principles.70 His study, published in the 
Newspaper Research Journal, dealt with ethical issues involving source confidentiality, 
altered quotes, and dangerous advertising. Alexander recognized that “there has always been 
some commingling of ethics and law. In many instances, the legal limitations have defined 
the ethical territory – when the law stopped, the ethics of editors and news managers took 
over.”71 Alexander expressed concern that the role of the professional journalist was being 
usurped by the courts in at least three areas: source confidentiality, the use of quotes, and 
accepting advertising. He concluded that the courts’ increased recognition of causes of 
action based on ethical claims threatened to increase litigation against the news media. 
 Alexander’s examination of confidentiality focused on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., which allowed a news source who had been promised 
confidentiality to recover civil damages from newspapers that intentionally broke their 
promises of confidentiality to him.72 The ruling was the first in which a court allowed 
recovery for such a claim against journalists, and an ethical matter previously left to 
journalists’ discretion was thereby converted into a legal issue, Alexander wrote.73 “By 
removing the First Amendment barrier for aggrieved news sources to sue for breach of 
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promise, the court can effectively force journalists to perform in an ethical manner by 
keeping their promises of confidentiality or face the consequences in court.”74 
 When source confidentiality was exclusively an ethical issue, journalists could 
decide with legal impunity when it was proper to renege on the promised confidentiality, 
Alexander explained. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the journalists decided that the subject 
matter disclosed in confidence was less newsworthy than the fact that the disclosures had 
been offered to the press in an effort to undermine the political campaign of an opponent. 
Although the decision to disclose the source in this case was widely condemned by 
journalists and scholars, some journalism ethicists found there was sufficient cause to 
warrant breaking the promise of confidentiality.75 But the Court, by countenancing the 
resulting lawsuit, provided a penalty that could arguably influence the choice journalists 
make when next faced with such an ethical choice. 
 Similarly, until the libel ruling in Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.,76 
journalists could consider altering quotations as solely an ethical issue and remain confident 
of being immune to legal sanctions for their decisions in most instances, Alexander argued. 
Although some journalists consider quotation marks to be a signal or promise to the reader 
that the words of a news source are being reprinted verbatim, Alexander and others have 
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observed that this promise is often broken.77 Quotations are routinely altered slightly to 
correct grammar or to clarify their meaning. Journalism’s ethical purists disapprove of the 
practice and say that when alterations are deemed necessary, a paraphrase should be used 
instead of wording girded by quotation marks. The Supreme Court ruled in Masson that a 
jury would decide when an altered quotation became libelous, and thereby made an ethical 
issue a legal matter that would sometimes penalize journalists, Alexander contended. 
 Alexander also cited the Soldier of Fortune cases as examples of ethical problems 
that became legal matters. Although these are primarily commercial speech cases, they are 
included in this review of journalism ethics studies because they raise questions about the 
media’s potential for inflicting harm on the public, an ethical issue that journalists also 
confront. These cases were lawsuits filed against Soldier of Fortune magazine because it 
published advertisements placed by people who held themselves out to be killers for hire. 
The ads led to contract murders in two cases, Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.,78 
and Eimann v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc.79 In a third case, Norwood v. Soldier of 
Fortune Magazine, Inc.,80 the plaintiff was shot but survived. In Braun, the most recent of 
the cases, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a $4.3 million award against the 
magazine. “Prior to [Braun], courts had been reluctant to impose liability on publishers for 
this category of advertising,” Alexander wrote as he explained why a $9.4 million award 
had been overturned in Eimann.81 The Norwood case was settled out of court.82 
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 Tomlinson and Alexander agreed that deciding whether to accept such ads was an 
ethical decision which the press should make. Tomlinson’s article was written before the 
Braun ruling was handed down and while the press was still relatively protected from civil 
liability for harmful ads. He criticized the press for presuming this protection meant it did 
not have to grapple with making proper ethical judgments about its potentially harmful 
behavior. “Using law as a justification for conduct which is morally irresponsible is morally 
irresponsible in itself,” Tomlinson wrote.83 
 Tomlinson was referring to the capacity of law to induce journalists to equate legally 
permissible conduct with ethically responsible conduct.84 He argued that the proper ethical 
decision in the Soldier of Fortune cases would have been to refuse the ads once it became 
apparent that they caused catastrophic harm. He nonetheless concluded that the proper 
solution should not be derived from law but through better ethical decision making by 
publishers.85 
 Each of the scholarly works reviewed in this section implicitly or explicitly revealed 
how law is invoked sometimes by those seeking redress for injury caused by unethical 
journalism. But as Alexander pointed out in his discussion of Cohen v. Cowles, it is more 
common that ethical transgressions are handled by the profession with little perceptible relief 
for the aggrieved. “At most there would be some concern within the journalism community . 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
82 Don E. Tomlinson, Where Morality and Law Diverge: Ethical Alternatives in the Soldier of Fortune Cases, 6 
J. OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS 69, 70 (1991). 
 
83 Id. at 69. 
 
84 Hindman also refers to the tendency of law to define ethical journalism, HINDMAN, supra note 52 at 1. 
 
85 Tomlinson, supra note 82, at 79, 80. 
 
 24
. . about the propriety of journalists violating [an ethical standard],” he wrote.86 Media critics 
have often observed that expressions of “concern” are generally journalists’ only reaction 
when one of their own behaves unethically. Some scholars have claimed it is an inadequate 
response while others have said it is preferable to intervention by law or any other external 
mechanism proposed by some early journalism critics. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 As the scholarly works reviewed in this section have demonstrated, inquiries into the 
intersection of law, morality and ethics are longstanding. They predate the existence of the 
United States and the First Amendment of its Constitution. The preceding review of the legal 
theories developed around this issue indicated a perhaps inevitable clash between the two 
systems of influencing human behavior. Writings about natural law and positivism indicated 
how the merger of law and morality creates confusion about which system should determine 
which practices are good and proper. Some authors have indicated that if law prevails, 
society would benefit, while others claim that when law trumps morality, catastrophic 
limitations on freedom may follow. Still other theorists said the merger is inevitable because 
legal rulings are always value-laden moral judgments. The instrumentalist theories accept the 
merger and claim law accordingly functions as a tool of society to achieve the ends it desires. 
 This review of the scholarly studies of court rulings in cases involving the ethical 
practice of journalism indicates that, unlike this study, nearly all have examined individual 
cases and discrete ethical principles instead of a series of cases and an array of principles 
over a long period of time. One scholar conducted a more expansive examination of court 
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rulings in this area but focused on the more broadly defined social responsibility of 
journalists instead of the specific ethical or moral values embodied in professional codes of 
ethics. The review of the literature indicates a need for this study’s long-term assessment of a 
large number of cases and this study’s focus on specific ethical principles. This dissertation 
advances the dialogue about the propriety of the intersection of law and morality and the 
effect on the practice of journalism and the parameters of press freedom. 
  
Research Questions 
 As indicated earlier, the goal of this dissertation is to determine whether journalism 
ethics and the law have been merged and whether or to what extent ethical standards of 
behavior have been imposed on the news media or undermined by Court rulings. To this end, 
this study will analyze relevant Supreme Court rulings in cases since the publication of the 
Hutchins Report in 1947. 
 To achieve its overall goal, this study will address the following research questions: 
1. To what extent has the U.S. Supreme Court imposed ethical standards on 
the news media in what this study identifies as the primary or fundamental 
areas of concern addressed by press critics and journalism codes of ethics: 
truth, privacy and civic responsibility. 
2. Have Court rulings tended to affirm or undermine the ethical values and 
practices promoted by journalism codes of ethics, or do they impose or 
suggest other values and standards of practice? 
3. Have Court rulings eroded the distinction between law and ethics by 
establishing legal parameters for acceptable journalism practices? 
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4. What are the ramifications for press freedom if the government, through 
Supreme Court rulings, assumes a role in defining, enforcing, condoning, or 
otherwise sanctioning journalism values and defining what qualifies as an 
ethical journalism practice? 
 Method and Limitations 
 This is a qualitative, critical analysis to determine whether, or to what extent, the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of cases that address core values of American journalism has 
transformed ethical standards into legal imperatives or practical nullities. This study 
postulates that this transformation occurs when the Court adds its influential imprimatur to 
values enshrined in journalism codes or undermines these values by penalizing or denying 
legal protection to journalists who perform in accord with them. 
 Only U.S. Supreme Court rulings and opinions are examined here because the Court 
is the ultimate authority on the constitutionality and hence the enforceability of any law that 
significantly affects the functioning of the American press. This study does not address 
efforts by executive and legislative bodies to impose ethics on the news media unless those 
issues arise in Supreme Court cases. The initial determination of which Court rulings were to 
be considered in this study was based on their inclusion in any volume of the Media Law 
Reporter.87 Cases were excluded if they did not addresses journalism ethics issues, as will be 
defined shortly by this study, and as indicated by the Media Law Reporter Classification 
Guide. Excluded were those that focused primarily on advertising issues, circulation, the 
awarding or transferring of broadcast licenses, restricting monopolies, and other issues not 
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directly related to the ethical gathering and dissemination of news. These exclusions are 
identifiable under the Classification Guide headings and subheadings: “15. Commercial 
speech/advertising;” “II. Regulation of Media Distribution;” “IV. Media Ownership.” The 
cases selected for the most detailed analysis were those that prompted judicial consideration 
of issues that addressed the core values this study identifies as the primary concerns or 
fundamental principles of journalism ethics: truth and truth telling, respect for privacy, 
independence, news gathering, and protecting sources. The final three principles are analyzed 
as issues affecting journalists’ civic responsibility.88 These five areas of concern encompass 
values this study has found to be recurring themes in published journalism criticism and the 
major journalism codes of ethics dating from seminal pronouncements in 1923 to the latest 
revisions in effect in 2005. These fundamental principles are identifiable in the Classification 
Guide headings and subheadings: “I. Regulations of Media Content, 5. Prior restraints, 8. 
Fair trial, free press, 11. Defamation, 13. Privacy, 17. Copyright, 20. Broadcast media 
regulation, 22. Student media regulation;” “III. Newsgathering, 35. Authority to gather news, 
38. Access to records, 40. Access to places, 42. Access to people, 44. Statutory right of 
access, Restraints on Access to information, 55. Press Accreditation, 60. Forced Disclosure 
of Information, 65. Criminal or tortious newsgathering. 
 In addition to Court rulings, the argumentative briefs filed by the litigants and the 
amici curiae briefs filed in these cases are also primary source material for this study. These 
briefs usually focused directly on the practical consequences of a Court ruling and often 
assess the ethical values and free press principles raised by the cases. 
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 Cases decided since 1947, the year the Hutchins Report was issued, were identified in 
the Media Law Reporter using the criteria and processes explained above and then located 
for analysis in U.S. Reports. All of the citations to Supreme Court decisions refer to the text 
of the official Supreme Court reporter. This text was relied on to determine if the passage of 
time has validated the Hutchins Report’s warning that the government might impose ethical 
reforms on journalists if journalists did not do so on their own.  
 The Hutchins Report is an important part of this study because it is widely credited 
with providing impetus for the ongoing efforts to make the practice of journalism more 
ethical and socially responsible. The report also was the product of a period in American 
history when the prescriptive legal theory of pragmatic instrumentalism was at the peak of its 
influence and encouraged the use of law to achieve social ends. Pragmatic instrumentalism, 
as explained earlier, is part of the theoretical framework for this dissertation. 
 Changing concepts of social responsibility and public criticism of journalism’s 
shortcomings have impelled the evolution of American journalism codes of ethics from the 
seminal Canons of Journalism developed for the American Society of Newspaper Editors in 
the early 20th century to the highly detailed ethics guidebook created by The New York Times 
in the early 21st century. Despite periodic shifts in emphasis and the expansion of values 
espoused by the various codes over the course of nearly a century, this study identifies five 
fundamentals of journalism ethics that are common to nearly all of them: truth, privacy, 
independence, news gathering, and protecting sources. These fundamental principles 
encompass important ethical concerns but do not address them all. It is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation to analyze the interaction of law and every ethical principle embodied in 
every journalism code. This study is limited to analyses of Court rulings that engage any of 
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the five fundamental principles. These principles are identified here as fundamental based on 
a variety of factors, including their prominent placement in seven of the most influential 
journalism ethics codes dating from 1923 until 2005; their appearance as recurrent themes 
addressed in journalism ethics treatises and textbooks; their inclusion as points of criticism 
addressed by the Hutchins Report, the Warren Commission Report, the Kerner Commission 
Report, and the Twentieth Century Task Force report. These fundamental principles 
encompass the ethical values that were most consistently among the first five addressed in 
journalism codes since 1923 and continued to be included prominently in codes that were in 
effect in 2005.89 The seven codes relied on most to identify these fundamental principles are 
the 1923 Canons of Journalism,90 codes adopted by the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors (ASNE),91 Radio-Television News Directors Association (RTNDA),92 Society of 
Professional Journalists (SPJ),93 Associated Press Managing Editors (APME),94 The New 
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York Times Company,95 and the Gannett Corporation’s Newspaper Division.96 None of these 
seven codes ranks the fundamental principles of journalism exactly as this study does, but all 
consistently indicated these principles were among the most important. The treatises and 
textbooks consulted to identify these principles included titles published as early as 1924 and 
as recently as 2001. Among them were the classic The Ethics of Journalism,97 Good News,98 
Journalism Ethics: A Reference Handbook,99 Groping for Ethics in Journalism,100 the 1993 
and 1999 editions of Doing Ethics in Journalism A Handbook with Case Studies,101 
Journalism Ethics: Philosophical Foundations for the News Media,102 Don’t Shoot the 
Messenger,103 and The Elements of Journalism.104 
 The first of these fundamental principles is truth or truth telling. It encompasses a 
devotion to accuracy and a commitment to never intentionally or negligently misstate facts. It 
also imposes an affirmative obligation on journalists to gather and report newsworthy 
information unless some countervailing principle or consideration would counsel otherwise. 
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In essence, the truth and truth-telling principle creates an affirmative duty to publish the 
news. The duty to tell the truth necessarily requires seeking the truth, which is identified 
among the five fundamental ethical principles also as news gathering.105 
 All seven written journalism ethics codes relied on by this study address or enshrine 
truth or truth telling at the top of the documents. The opening sentence in the Canons of 
Journalism, for example, establishes the affirmative duty to seek out and publish the news as 
it states, “The primary function of newspapers is to communicate to the human race what its 
members do, feel and think.”106 The Canons do not mention the accuracy component of the 
truth principle until the fourth enumerated principle, which says, “By every consideration of 
good faith a newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be excused for lack of 
thoroughness or accuracy within its control or failure to obtain command of these essential 
qualities.”107  
 Similarly, the preamble of the code adopted by SPJ in September 1996 advocates 
“seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of events and issues.”108 The 
SPJ code lists first among its principles and standards of practice: “Seek Truth and Report 
It.”109 Likewise, the preamble to the most recent iteration of the RTNDA code of ethics, 
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which was adopted in September 2000, urges its members to “seek the truth, report it fairly 
and with integrity. . . .”110  
 Although the 52-page ethics guide published by The New York Times in 2003 does 
not overtly address the truth principle until page 7, it does so in the first paragraph of the 
enumerated duties on the page titled, “Our Duty to Our Readers.” The final paragraph on this 
page returns to the truth principle as it states, “Staff members who . . .  knowingly or 
recklessly provide false information for publication betray our fundamental pact with our 
readers.”111 Gannett’s code places truth and truth telling in the first two sentences of its 
statement of ethical principles: “We are committed to: Seeking and reporting the truth in a 
truthful way. We will dedicate ourselves to reporting the news accurately, thoroughly and in 
context.”112 Truth and accuracy are addressed initially in Article IV of the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors’ statement of principles and again in Article VI.113 Truth telling 
appears early and as an important value in the preamble to the Associated Press Managing 
Editors Code of Ethics while accuracy is prominent in the first sentence of specific reference 
to a journalism principles.114 The second sentence says: “Truth is [the good newspaper’s] 
guiding principle.”115 
 The second concept identified by this study as a fundamental principle of journalism 
ethics is privacy. Strictures against invasions of privacy are prominently and repeatedly 
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addressed in each of the seven codes and many books and reports that assess journalism 
practices. Repeated references to privacy within these works indicate the principle’s 
importance as well as its amorphous definition. Many of these references did not use the 
word “privacy” or its variants, but nonetheless referred to privacy interests. This study 
defines these interests as matters that if publicly disclosed or discussed would cause 
emotional distress including embarrassment or shame, or expose a person to potential 
emotional or physical harm. The 1923 Canons of Journalism addressed the privacy principle 
under the headings of “Fair Play” and “Decency” and somewhat vaguely caution that a 
“newspaper should not invade private rights or feelings without sure warrant of public 
right.”116 An ethics handbook developed for the Society of Professional Journalists in 1993 
grappled with the parameters of the privacy principle by referring to a sampling of the 
privacy provisions of newspaper codes from across the United States. These indicated that 
privacy was often at issue when a non-public person was involved: “[P]rivate citizens . . . are 
frequently surprised, and sometimes upset, when they are approached by reporters or find 
themselves written about. This is especially true in tragic situations.”117 The handbook 
continued with references to “a rape victim or a witness in possible danger” and a “person’s 
mental or physical infirmities, sexual preferences or the like.”118 Another excerpt referred to 
“stories and pictures that have the potential to be offensive to great numbers of readers.”119 
Privacy concerns, as reflected in these excerpts, are addressed under the heading, “Minimize 
Harm,” in the Society of Professional Journalists’ ethics code that was in effect in 2005. It 
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advises journalists to: “Be sensitive when seeking interviews or photographs of those 
affected by tragedy or grief. Recognize that private people have a greater right to control 
information about themselves than do public officials.” It concludes that “only an overriding 
public need can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy.”120 
 The final three concepts identified in this study as fundamental principles of 
journalism ethics are independence, news gathering, and protecting sources. They are 
addressed as frequently and prominently as truth and privacy in the codes and ethics 
literature, and are grouped together in this study as matters of civic responsibility. These are 
also the principles this study has found most dependent on expansive readings of the First 
Amendment for legal protection and ethical justification.   
 The independence principle encourages journalists to pursue the truth and make news 
judgments that are not coerced or motivated by personal, business, or governmental interests. 
Independence and the ethical directive to gather news and disseminate it are principles that 
are essential to the basic watchdog function of American journalism. Protecting sources is 
similarly important to the watchdog function because sources, whether confidential or 
attributed, are indispensable to news gathering. This study identifies these three principles as 
the most dependent on First Amendment protection because in following these principles, 
journalists sometimes purposely reject their civic responsibility and become subject to legal 
penalties. The term “civic responsibility” does not appear in any of the codes consulted for 
this study, but the concept as defined here is embedded to some degree in all of them and is a 
central concern of much of the published press criticism. On the most basic level, civic 
responsibility refers to the journalists’ duty to comply with the law or break it as a matter of 
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moral or ethical principle. It broadly addresses matters of public policy. Code provisions that 
urge reporters to conceal or reveal confidential sources even when served with court 
subpoenas, for example, are addressing a matter of civic responsibility. It is a principle that 
deals with the journalists’ obligations to the duly constituted authority structures of the body 
politic. 
 Concepts identified here as fundamental principles of journalism often overlap and 
merge in the codes. News coverage of a rape trial, for example, may raise ethical issues 
covered by the truth telling and privacy principles, as well as civic responsibility. The 
journalistic behaviors and practices covered by the five fundamental ethical principles clearly 
overlap in many Supreme Court cases treated here. Those rulings will be analyzed using each 
applicable principle as a framework. 
  
Justification 
 As journalists’ interest in and dedication to the ethical practice of their profession 
waxed, waned, and altered focus during the twentieth century and the early years of the 
twenty first century, public criticism of and dissatisfaction with the morality of journalistic 
practices also rose and fell, but never fully abated. It would be unreasonable to presume that 
in a highly politicized democratic society this dissatisfaction would not be manifest in some 
manner. This dissertation is important because it seeks to determine whether that 
dissatisfaction has been expressed or remedied in U.S. Supreme Court rulings on issues that 
involve the ethical practice of journalism. While the First Amendment is a powerful barrier 
to government intrusions into the operations of the press, it does not provide absolute 
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protection, and not every government action that affects the press can be construed to violate 
its freedom. 
 The preceding review of the scholarly literature in this area reveals that other studies 
have examined how law has addressed the ethical practice of journalism, but most often they 
reviewed one case or a small category of cases. None has sought to analyze Supreme Court 
rulings rendered since the Hutchins Report for specific instances in which fundamental 
ethical principles of journalism were converted into legal imperatives or otherwise affected 
by these Court edicts. Some studies have interpreted legal edicts as moral treatments or 
ethical imperatives, as this study seeks to do, but they have done so on a smaller, more 
restricted basis. 
 A review of the scholarly literature that focuses on the intersection of law and the 
ethical practice of journalism has not revealed any study that analyzed Supreme Court rulings 
from 1947 through 2005 that addressed specific principles of journalism practices. This study 
will do that in the hopes of determining whether journalism ethics are being established by 
Supreme Court justices instead of by journalists. Such government intrusion would raise 
concerns about whether the free press guarantee of the First Amendment is being 
circumvented. This study provides an expansive view of the interaction of law and 
journalism ethics over nearly six decades and identifies trends that may help chart the future 
of journalism practices. 
 This chapter introduced and provided an overview of the study. The second chapter is 
a historical review and analysis of the extra-legal mechanisms used in the effort to upgrade 
the ethical practices of journalists. These mechanisms include codes of ethics and news 
councils. The chapter necessarily examines the work of the Hutchins Commission and 
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includes a review of scholarly critiques of its effects on American press practices. This 
chapter also briefly examines the criticism and suggestions for improvement of journalism 
made by the Warren Commission, the Kerner Commission, and The Twentieth Century Fund 
Task Force in their respective critical reports on the press to promote the ethical, socially 
responsible practice of journalism. The chapter includes an assessment of the National News 
Council’s efforts to provide a semblance of enforcement of ethical standards in journalism 
and concludes with an examination of trends exhibited by a sampling of journalism ethics 
codes dating from 1910. The subsequent chapters will analyze how U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in press cases since 1947 have affirmed or undermined journalism’s fundamental 
ethical principles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
Making Journalism Ethical: Codes, Commissions, and Councils 
 
 When Senator Alan Simpson publicly berated radio journalist Nina Totenberg in 
1991 for publicizing Anita Hill’s allegations of sexual harassment against U.S. Supreme 
Court nominee Clarence Thomas, he “brandished his copy of [a journalism code of ethics] as 
though it were a crucifix,” wrote a Washington Post reporter.1 In that singular act, the 
Republican from Wyoming simultaneously demonstrated the worth of the codes and their 
fundamental weakness. Their worth was in providing Simpson with a professional standard 
for judging Totenberg’s conduct. Their weakness was the fact that his verbal assault was the 
most severe sanction she was likely to face, if indeed she had violated any ethical principle.  
 These twin issues of worth and weakness have been recurring themes for journalism 
practitioners, their critics, and media scholars who have sought to improve the profession. 
Codes of ethics were devised to improve the quality of American journalism and temper its 
excesses, and therein lay their worth. But they were widely resisted and generally denied 
enforcement power, even by those who admitted there were major flaws in the means 
employed to identify, gather, and disseminate news. The resistance was often grounded in 
fears that enforcement would cost the press some measure of freedom and ultimately prove 
destructive to the profession. 
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 This chapter is a chronological examination of the direct, subtle, and failed attempts 
at enforcement. It covers the extra-judicial efforts of journalists, as well as private and 
government-appointed commissions, to identify journalism’s moral and professional failings 
and craft remedies for them. As a foundational prelude to this dissertation’s central purpose, 
examining high court rulings that address journalism ethics issues, this chapter reviews a 
variety of journalism practices that were particularly problematic during selected periods of 
history. This review looks at the non-judicial corrective and enforcement mechanisms 
suggested or actually employed.  
 The chapter begins with an assessment of the seminal attempts of journalists to 
address unsavory press practices and elevate the standards of practice in their field by 
adopting codes of ethics. This assessment then moves to the Hutchins Commission Report 
and the major scholarly critiques of this privately assembled panel, which was arguably the 
single most influential effort to reform the practice of journalism. Some of the concerns 
raised by the Hutchins Commission in the 1940s were echoed in government reports issued 
by the Warren and Kerner commissions in the 1960s and in the privately funded report of 
The Twentieth Century Fund in the 1970s. These reports also are reviewed here as part of an 
assessment of how these panels may have influenced refinements in journalism practices, 
affected the development of codes of ethics, and prompted the creation of the National News 
Council as an institutionalized monitor and scold for the press. 
 American journalists have engaged in self-evaluation and other campaigns to improve 
themselves since they were colonists in the 18th century.2 By the middle of the 19th century 
these efforts had progressed to the point that at least one group of journalists, the Missouri 
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Press Association, was calling for professional schools of journalism and ethics codes to 
establish and maintain professional-level standards for the press.3 One of the association’s 
leaders even proposed a list of ethical guidelines in 1876, according to journalism historian 
Stephen A. Banning.4 Nonetheless, scholars usually cite the adoption of the Canons of 
Journalism in 1923 by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) as the start of the 
first major undertaking to professionalize and establish ethical guides for newspeople.5 The 
canons served as the template for a host of ethics codes adopted by newspapers and 
journalism associations throughout the 1920s. Indeed, Sigma Delta Chi, an organization of 
journalists later known as the Society of Professional Journalists, adopted the canons as its 
own in 1926. 
 Codes of ethics have been the tool most widely used by the professional media to 
improve journalism practices, though their effectiveness has been questioned frequently. The 
systematic development of ethical standards for journalism, as indicated by the creation of 
codes, was spurred by the public expression of concerns about issues of professionalism and 
self-evaluation at the start of the 20th century. This ongoing effort to upgrade journalism 
through codes and other mechanisms is reviewed here chronologically in the general time 
frames that saw surges in this type of activity. The review begins around the start of the 20th 
century and moves through the Progressive Era, the Jazz Age, and the early 1930s. It 
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continues into the 1940s, the immediate post-Hutchins Commission Report years from 1947, 
and into the 1950s. This review moves into the mid-1960s through the 1970s, a time frame 
referred to here as the “activist period” because it spans the Civil Rights movement, the anti-
Vietnam War movement, the Watergate scandal, and widespread public dissatisfaction that 
prompted efforts to improve press practices. This review ends with what this study calls the 
“new millennium period” from the late 1990s into the 21st century, which saw significant 
changes in the approaches to setting ethical guidelines for journalists. This study’s analysis of 
the evolution of written codes of ethics then gives way to an extended treatment of the efforts 
of Hutchins Commission, the Warren and Kerner commissions, and the National News 
Council to identify, criticize, and correct journalism’s lapses. 
 
Early Codes of Ethics 
 Ethical considerations that engaged journalists during the aforementioned time frames 
did not seem essential to the press of the American colonial period. This may have been so 
because newspapers were usually the funded creations of politics, dedicated to furthering the 
aims of various political factions and defeating their opponents. Service to the general public 
was an inferior ethical priority to these early publications, or as Robert S. Fortner indicated in 
a 1978 study, perhaps that service was just perceived differently.6  
[I]n the formative years of the nation’s history the press was perceived to be 
ethical – or moral – to the extent that it upheld its responsibility to be a 
corrective influence on government. . . . The press was to seek liberty, truth 
and virtue; to do so was to be, ipso facto, ethical.7  
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Public service defined in this manner was an intended byproduct of newspaper criticism of its 
political opposition. Journalist-critics would reveal truths that would help readers make better 
political choices. It is significant that in these early years when bias was a fundamental tenet 
of journalism, truth was already a revered principle. Truth remains the profession’s 
paramount ethical value centuries later, even though partisan bias was cast down long ago 
and replaced by objectivity as a fundamental value. 
 Political control of newspapers diminished in the 1830s with the advent of the penny 
press and increasing reliance on advertising as the primary source of funding.8 By the early 
1900s, newspapers no longer depended heavily on political partisanship for their survival and 
were free to criticize government policy and practice irrespective of the party in power and 
defend the public from injustice from every quarter. The reliance on advertising as the 
primary funding source meant newspapers had to maintain high circulation to attract paying 
advertisers. This required appealing to a larger pool of readers, many of whom were less 
educated than the typical newspaper subscribers of earlier eras and unwilling or unable to 
spend more than a nominal amount for the newspaper. Many were attracted by 
sensationalism and other engaging styles of news presentation, including the “new 
journalism,” which featured advocacy and writing styles that mimicked classic and popular 
literature. The new journalism also embraced a gory, adventure-novel approach to crime 
reporting. By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, however, there was a 
burgeoning movement away from this style of journalism and toward professionalism and a 
system of ethics. 
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 “This period may have been the high water mark of journalism ethics, paralleled 
perhaps only by post-Watergate self-analysis [of the 1970s],” observed journalism ethicists 
Jay Black and Jennings Bryant.9 But the ethics of this period, they explained, were directed 
inward and focused on moral responsibility to the community of journalists. This sense of 
responsibility to the profession is borne out by the wording in the early journalism 
associations’ codes, but statements professing responsibilities and duties to the public and the 
society as a whole are equally obvious in those codes.10 
 The Kansas Editorial Association adopted a code of ethics in 1910, which was the 
first developed for a journalism organization, and it indicated that political bias had been 
soundly rejected in favor of objectivity: “News is the impartial report of the activities of 
mind, men and matter which do not offend the sensibilities of the more enlightened people.”11 
A decade later concerns about journalists’ conduct had moved higher on the public agenda, 
and codes of ethics began to proliferate amid criticism of bad journalism practices. “A great 
deal of media criticism existed in the 1920s as thoughtful journalists recognized public 
disaffection with media excesses, and called for commitments to journalism’s professional 
status,” observed Black and Bryant.12 
 Mounting public outcries against urban newspaper sensationalism, fakery, and 
articles about crime and sex that appealed to the readers’ senses instead of their intellect 
prompted calls for the creation of journalism schools and college courses to teach the 
discipline and advanced the quest for professionalism. The call and move toward 
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professionalism in journalism were evident across the United States from the early 1900s and 
into the Jazz Age of the 1920s. Journalism Bulletin, the predecessor of the scholarly 
Journalism Quarterly, was founded during this period and called for “the establishment of 
professional schools to raise the dignity and status of journalism,” wrote Clifford G. 
Christians, Quentin J. Schultze, and Norman H. Sims in an article published in 1978.13 
 That public backlash also prompted unprecedented numbers of journalists, at their 
individual newspapers and as members of press associations, to achieve and ensure 
professional levels of performance by developing codes of ethics during the Jazz Age.14 The 
term “jazz journalism” was coined to identify some of the unsavory press practices that 
enjoyed a heyday in urban centers at the turn of the century. The codes developed during this 
period expressly rejected these practices. The Canons of Journalism, for example, swore off 
news accounts that provided “incentives to base conduct, such as to be found in details of 
crime and vice.”15 They also insisted, “Headlines should be fully warranted by the contents of 
the articles they surmount.”16 Similarly, the Oregon Code of Ethics for Journalism declared, 
“Through this code we desire to take a position against so-called sensational practice.”17 
 Nonetheless, press critic Bruce Evensen discounted the press reform activities of the 
Jazz Age as improperly motivated and therefore of little true moral worth.18 He cited as an 
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illustrative example the American Society of Newspaper Editors’ failure to use its newly 
created Canons of Journalism to discipline a prominent member, Denver Post editor and co-
owner Fred G. Bonfils, for glaring violations. The relevant canons said: “A journalist who 
uses his power for any selfish or otherwise unworthy purpose is faithless to a high trust;” and 
“Freedom from all obligations except that of fidelity to the public interest is vital.”19 Bonfils 
was implicated in a conflict of interest that allowed him to enrich himself by dropping his 
newspaper’s coverage of the Teapot Dome political scandal. Bonfils threatened to sue if 
ASNE took any action against him. After a period of negotiation, he was allowed to resign 
from ASNE without sanction. An effort to empower the association to enforce the canons 
created a groundswell at its annual convention in 1929 but ultimately failed. ASNE’s 
constitution was reworked in 1932 to allow the expulsion of members for misconduct, but 
violation of the canons was not specifically mentioned as the type of misconduct that would 
warrant dismissal.20 
 From the outset, the final full sentence in ASNE’s Canons of Journalism openly 
announced that the association lacked authority to enforce its guidelines but expressed hope 
that violators would “encounter effective public disapproval or yield to the influence of a 
preponderant professional condemnation.”21 Evensen explained ASNE’s reluctance to impose 
other sanctions as a function of its members’ realization that if they used the canons to 
discipline each other, they could suffer a competitive disadvantage because non-member 
newspapers were not similarly encumbered. Evensen recounted the arguments of ASNE 
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members who claimed that a newspaper’s primary mission was to make money and ethics 
had no bearing on its ability to do so. “Men who saw themselves as ‘gentlemen of the press’ 
may have passionately debated professionalism during the Jazz Age in the spirit of great 
reformers,” Evensen wrote, “but in the end it was a language limited by the logic of the 
marketplace.”22 
 Journalists failed to have the public perceive them as professionals in the 1920s 
because they would not police themselves, according to Evensen’s article, which cited 
studies indicating that the public expected professionals to enforce their codes of conduct 
instead of waiting and hoping for voluntary compliance. The Kansas Code of Ethics, which 
was adopted by the Kansas Editorial Association in 1910, was among a handful that 
suggested enforcement by firing. “No reporter should be retained who accepts any courtesies, 
unusual favors, opportunities for self gain, or side employment from any factors whose 
interests would be affected by the manner in which his reports are made,” the code said.23  
 Enforcement apparently has been a recurring concern from the earliest discussion of 
journalism ethics through the creation and subsequent revisions of ethics codes. The 
Arbitrator, a Jazz Age periodical, promoted journalism ethics but suggested that law be used 
to install and police them.24 One six-page article in The Arbitrator also suggested that a 
“public literary defender” be elected to monitor press practices and that commissions be 
created to impose sanctions such as fines for wayward journalism. Nelson Antrim Crawford, 
a journalism scholar of the time, said, “[S]uch suggestions are obviously absurd,” but he did 
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not similarly demean a suggestion that journalists be licensed by state boards as a means of 
maintaining enforceable high standards.25 
 Christians, Schultze, and Sims claimed external controls were rejected by Jazz Age 
journalists because they believed they had a duty to their profession and not to the public or 
society at large.26 Accordingly, proponents of ethical reform during this time frame sought to 
achieve these ends voluntarily, without goads, on their own, and without outside help. By the 
mid-1930s, agitation for improved standards in journalism had quietly stalled. ASNE’s 
adoption of punitive sanctions in 1932 for improper behavior by its members may have been 
journalists’ last significant self-policing action during that decade.  
 As the 1920s and 1930s gave way to the 1940s, according to journalism historian 
Margaret Blanchard, “press critics had moved from the Progressive ideal of having the press 
reform itself from within to the New Deal view of having the press reformed from without – 
by the federal government.”27 She cited press critic Will Irwin’s proposal for legal 
intervention to improve journalism as indicative of the mounting calls for government 
involvement in press conduct during the New Deal years as concerns about service to the 
public became paramount. Legal intervention into the monopoly business aspects of 
journalism was the primary thrust of Irwin’s proposal, but the suggestion eased the way for 
consideration of laws that affected ethical issues as well. 
 Leon Nelson Flint, writing in 1933 on the use of law and licensing to enforce ethical 
norms in journalism, saw the former as impractical, but the latter was deemed worthy of 
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some consideration.28 Through the 1930s and into the 1940s, the public became so 
disenchanted with journalists’ behavior that government intervention, which appeared to be 
producing positive results when applied to other social problems of the time, apparently did 
not seem like a bad idea to many. Even Morris L. Ernst, an attorney for the American 
Newspaper Guild, which represented newspaper reporters, called for extensive government 
intervention into newspaper operations.29 His suggestions were geared primarily to the 
business aspects of the press but influenced popular discourse on journalism ethics. 
 Blanchard said the implementation of Ernst’s suggestions was thwarted to some 
degree by the release of the Hutchins Commission Report in 1947, which condemned a 
number of unethical, common press practices and found the press’s effort to reform itself 
sorely deficient. The report acknowledged the noble intent of the early ethics codes but found 
them largely useless and unenforceable as it praised the few that had provisions allowing the 
expulsion of malefactors or the imposition of other sanctions.30 Although the Hutchins 
Commission Report is perhaps the best remembered effort to reform journalism in the 1940s 
and is considered a highlight of the revived interest in higher standards for journalism, it did 
not start this era’s revival of press-reform activity. Journalism reform had fallen off the 
public agenda after the frenzy of activity at the start of the century, but it resumed in the mid-
1940s before and after the Hutchins Report was issued.31  
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Modern Codes of Ethics 
 This revival was manifest in activity by a number of journalism associations, perhaps 
none more significant than Sigma Delta Chi, currently named the Society of Professional 
Journalists, and a nascent group of broadcast journalists, which would become the National 
Association of Radio News Directors. A majority of the Sigma Delta Chi Committee on 
Press Ethics was inspired in 1949 to ask the full membership to add enforcement powers to 
the ethics code it had adopted more than two decades earlier. “[T]he weakness of codes is 
their lack of enforcement powers,” the majority said in an explanatory statement quoted in 
Editor & Publisher.32 The committee wanted the organization to consider the proposal at the 
national convention scheduled for later that year. Members would have voted on whether to 
create an impartial review board to consider claims of ethical violations brought against its 
members and empower it to use expulsion as a penalty, but “the proposal was tabled and 
referred to a committee for further study,” according to the magazine.33 When Sigma Delta 
Chi finally did revamp its code of ethics more than two decades later, the proposal was 
absent. A non-punitive enforcement provision had taken its place. 
 For broadcast journalists working during the 1940s revival, the most significant 
activity may have been the approval of a package of resolutions at the founding of the 
National Association of Radio News Directors in 1946. This was the precurser to the Code of 
Standards for radio journalism that was adopted in 1947. The resolutions sought to curb the 
sensationalism that had become common in radio news as well as the practice of allowing 
advertising to meld into and affect news reports. The resolutions accordingly said radio news 
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reports “should remain within the bounds of good taste;” news should be an autonomous unit 
at radio stations; and the news director “should be directly responsible only to his journalistic 
principles and ideals, and to the general manager of the station.”34 
 The Code of Standards refined NARND’s early resolutions to establish a sense of 
social responsibility. “The news director’s first responsibility is to the people,” the code said. 
It further sought to build a firewall between advertisers and the news by insisting, 
“Commercials should be separated definitely from the news context and NARND 
recommends that a different voice be used.”35 When the group held its national convention in 
1950, it was well on the way to becoming the Radio Television News Directors Association 
(RTNDA) because of the rise of television. But in revising its code the group remained true 
to the founding principles and sought to establish clear lines of demarcation between news 
and commentary, as well as to eliminate unnecessary racial labeling in news reports. On this 
latter point the revised code said, “The race, creed or color or previous status of an individual 
in the news should not be mentioned unless it is necessary to the understanding of the 
story.”36 
 Significant alterations appeared when the code was recast in 1966. 37 Among them 
were a name change to the RTNDA Code of Broadcast News Ethics, recognition of conflicts 
of interests as a high-priority problem, recognition of a duty to respect human dignity and 
privacy rights, a directive to “actively censure and seek to prevent violations of these 
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standards,” and provisions to control journalists’ conduct during trial coverage. The last 
provision was added to the code the same year as the U.S. Supreme Court released its ruling 
in Sheppard v. Maxwell,38 which sharply criticized the conduct of journalists covering the 
murder trial of Dr. Sam Sheppard. The caution about racial labeling remained largely intact 
in that revision. RTNDA next updated its code in 1973. At that time, lessons from the 
burgeoning women’s liberation movement caused the code’s timeworn references to 
“newsmen” to be changed to “journalists.” The strident enforcement and censure provision of 
the prior code survived the updating as did the provision limiting racial identifications and 
calling for responsible trial coverage and courtroom conduct. RTNDA was part of a massive 
movement that erupted nationwide in the 1970s to update journalism ethics codes. 
 Just as the journalism community had been galvanized into a frenzy of self-
improvement activity by widespread and often justified public criticism of its practices in the 
early 1900s, history repeated itself in the early and mid-1970s.39 As before, another type of 
“new journalism” had arisen with interpretive advocacy and literary elements at the fore. 
Journalists of the 1970s faced the same pressures as their fellows in the early 1900s, but 
arguably there was more threatening public and government-based criticism from activist, 
special interest groups as well as the administration of President Richard M. Nixon and his 
vice-president, Spiro T. Agnew. Unethical newsroom practices had proliferated amid efforts 
to maintain newspapers’ historically high profit margins and the transformation of television 
news into a profit-making venue that was often run as an entertainment enterprise. In 
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response, journalism codes of ethics were created, debated, and updated at an unparalleled 
rate during the 1970s across the United States by press groups and in individual newsrooms.40  
 The revival prompted Sigma Delta Chi, the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ), 
which had been using the Canons of Journalism it copied from ASNE in 1926, to create its 
own professional standards in 1973. The new SPJ standards included an enforcement 
provision of sorts that said, “Journalists should actively censure and try to prevent violations 
of these standards, and they should encourage their observance by all newspeople.”41 This 
enforcement provision, as weak as it was, was rare among the codes drafted by national press 
associations. The great bulk of them rejected enforcement. Conversely, individual newsroom 
codes, just as they had in the early 1900s, largely made adherence a condition of continued 
employment. Nonetheless, the SPJ code of ethics was one of the most progressive and widely 
imitated pronouncements of journalism standards of the period.  
 In 1975, two years after the SPJ revisions, ASNE revamped the Canons of Journalism 
and renamed them the “ASNE Statement of Principles,” as the association altered its 
approach to setting journalism standards. The opening statement in the old canons described 
the document as a “means of codifying the sound practice and just aspirations of American 
journalism.”42 ASNE’s new opening statement described the document “as a standard 
encouraging the highest ethical and professional performance.”43 While the earlier provisions 
openly admitted a lack of enforcement power and indicated what “should” be done, the 1973 
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version did not mention enforcement at all but did include one statement of what journalists 
“must” do. “Pledges of confidentiality to news sources must be honored at all costs,” it said.44 
National codes of this era were uniformly hortatory and did not provide enforcement of any 
consequence. 
 SPJ revised its code in 1984 and again in 1987. The latter revision, however, 
jettisoned the enforcement clause that had been added in 1973. Journalism professor Richard 
P. Cunningham, who had worked with the National News Council and was the reader 
representative at the Minneapolis Tribune, criticized the omission. “As the pressure on the 
press appeared to diminish in the ’80s the Society, with the encouragement of its legal 
advisers, canceled the enforcement clause,” he wrote.45 The 1987 code instead provided: 
“The Society shall — by programs of education and other means — encourage individual 
journalists to adhere to these tenets.”46 When SPJ’s code was revised again in 1996, the 
statement that most resembled an enforcement clause said journalists should “expose 
unethical practices of journalists and the news media.”47 
 ASNE’s 1975 Statement of Principles, which was an ethics code in the form of a 
conceptual statement of working principles, became the common template for journalism 
codes of the late 1980s, through the final decade of the 20th century, and into the start of the 
new millennium. They largely eschewed specific behavioral strictures that were typical of the 
codes written from the early 1900s through the early 1980s. Until the ASNE model began to 
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dominate, codes of ethics usually were laundry lists of behaviors that were prohibited or 
encouraged. Journalism professor and ethicist Ralph Barney, who helped write a major 
revision of the SPJ code in the early 1990s, has been a longtime critic of detailed codes and 
advocate of abstract guiding principles and has been quoted saying these detailed codes “are 
almost insulting for thoughtful people, but they are useful for ignorant people.”48 Fellow 
scholar Clifford G. Christians criticized those older codes for being incomplete, bereft of 
“solid theoretical foundations,” and thereby fostering ad hoc decision making. “By default 
we promote situationalism, become less decisive about right and wrong, more easily 
accommodated to expediency,” he wrote.49 Christians’ most damning observation, and the 
claim that is most relevant to this study, is that law might be usurping the role of ethical 
guidelines. 
The overall trend is toward legalization. Not everyone, obviously, reduces the 
moral to the legal; but lacking a complete set of principles we have de facto 
allowed the law to provide our constraints. The blatantly illegal is clearly 
unethical in most systems, yet all authorities uniformly distinguish legal 
requirements and ethical obligations. That distinction has virtually 
disappeared in practice.50 
 
He called for a “renewed emphasis on ethics as a discipline and a normative science of 
conduct” to allow journalists to regain control of the determination of what is right, moral, 
and ethical for their profession.51 
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 The older traditional journalism codes, which specifically identified proper and 
unacceptable practices, were once considered viable means of improvement. Scholars of 
journalism ethics were now advocating statements of allegiance to abstract moral principles. 
Some critics, particularly Christians, claimed codes that lacked a theoretical foundation 
undermined consistent ethical behavior and might, in effect, abandon the field to the 
strictures of law. 
 Journalism ethicists Jay Black and Ralph Barney expressed a preference for a “more 
general and abstract consideration of ethics and morality” that offered “a far greater hope for 
improving the media than any considerations of ethics codes might offer.”52 In addition to 
this preference for abstract principles, the authors expressed a deeper dissatisfaction with 
ethics codes: 
They have few if any teeth; they are both unenforced and unenforceable. They 
are incumbent upon members [of professional organizations] only, and the 
only sanction that can be applied against a member is expulsion from 
membership, sometimes a small penalty. The codes tend to be bland 
statements drawn up in response to public disenchantment with media 
operations. At best, they are a stopgap of semiserious self-regulation in the 
hope that somehow their platitudes will satisfy both public critics and 
government’s temptation to regulate.53 
 
Black and Barney argued in a 1985 article that ethics codes were of some use to the novice 
journalist but were essentially worthless to veterans and “probably should be relegated to 
framed wall hangings for any journalists who have advanced beyond their internships.”54 The 
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authors criticized the ineffectiveness of codes and claimed their impotence was intentional 
because the media did not want to create any trouble for themselves.55  
 
Codes and Lawyers 
 Internal and external pressure for press reforms waned during the late 1980s, and 
activism diminished. Many critics claimed that concerns about law caused the dilution of 
ethics codes as they were revised and updated. Nearly all journalism associations’ codes of 
ethics in effect during this period recommended enforcement by peer pressure, though some 
individual newspapers indicated that their journalists who did not follow their codes would 
face disciplinary action. The strong disciplinary stance embodied in the RTNDA code 
remained unique for a while among the major press associations, but it was softened in 1987 
in accord with the advice of RNTDA lawyers who said the association could be sued if the 
enforcement provision was actually invoked. The revised clause said members should 
“[a]ctively encourage observance of this Code by all journalists.”56 The change was hailed 
and condemned simultaneously. A member of the ethics committee, writing in the RTNDA 
Communicator, praised the 1987 version’s less strident enforcement provision. “[A] 
voluntary membership association cannot act as a prosecutor of its members. This is 
especially true in a First Amendment business such as ours, in which any spectre of official 
censure creates serious problem,” Jeff Marks wrote.57 Journalism professor John M. Kittross 
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referred to the new enforcement provision as a “wishy-washy pledge” and said, “[O]ne of the 
hallmarks of a profession is a code of ethics and teeth with which to enforce it.”58  
 When the Society of Professional Journalists rewrote its Code of Ethics in 1996, it 
followed the ASNE statement-of-principles model, as did many codes developed at the end 
of the 20th century. It focused on guiding principles such as: “Seek truth and report it” and 
“Minimize harm.” Codes of this genre leave it to individual journalists to apply the stated 
principles to the specific facts of an ethical dilemma immediately before them. Journalists 
must decide on a case-by-case basis what behavior would best comport with the ideals 
embodied in those principles. This format for ethical guides is a framing mechanism that 
avoids enforcement issues by largely avoiding specific references to prohibited behavior. The 
1995 incarnation of the Associated Press Managing Editors (APME) Code of Ethics proved 
to be an exemplar of this format as it stated: “The good newspaper is fair, accurate, honest, 
responsible, independent and decent. Truth is its guiding principle.”59 Rare specific strictures 
did not condemn bad behavior but used advisory language such as, “The newspaper should 
not plagiarize words or images.”60 During the two years that APME spent debating the code, 
efforts were made to inject specific directives about practices and words of condemnation for 
lapses. But, as a trade magazine reported in the midst of the discussions, the association’s 
lawyer opposed that type of language because it could prove troublesome if a member were 
sued for behavior at odds with it.61 APME’s wording was a distinct departure from the 
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approach embodied in this passage in the 1923 Canons of Journalism: “By every 
consideration of good faith a newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be excused 
for lack of thoroughness or accuracy.”62 That level of strident advocacy of proper behavior 
remained in press association codes to some degree as late as the 1973 version of SPJ’s ethics 
code, which said: “There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness.”63 Although 
the 1980s generally saw codes infused with merely advisory statements, the code developed 
by the Public Radio News Directors Incorporated (PRNDI) in 1984 was a notable exception. 
It included specific directions such as: “All errors of fact, bias, or omission must be corrected 
immediately,” “Honor legitimate requests to hold or embargo newsworthy material provided 
in advance,” and “Require all news employees, independent contractors, producers, editors, 
talent, aides, and volunteers under member direction to adhere to these standards. And upon 
acceptance of these standards, members should advance them by personal action.”64 PRNDI’s 
assertive ethical stance may be attributable to its unique status. It has all the trappings of an 
association of professionals such as RTNDA or SPJ, but its code functions more like those 
developed by individual news organizations, which generally have been more strident and 
specific than associations in their ethical pronouncements and codes. 
 Professor John M. Kitross was among a large number of scholars who complained 
during that period about the influence lawyers and the law were having on journalism’s 
written ethical standards. “One should always consider advice from lawyers, but never 
should allow them to do your thinking,” he advised. “What good is an association or 
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profession that avoids the possibility of a lawsuit, but loses its purpose and principles?” he 
asked.65 Lawyers became increasingly involved with journalism’s ethical issues during the 
1980s and were pivotal in structuring written ethical codes or, as some claimed, suppressing 
them. Veteran newsman and journalism professor Philip Meyer, writing in 1987, commented 
on the intrusion of lawyerly concerns into journalism ethics. “Newspaper lawyers have 
sometimes advised their clients against maintaining any kind of written ethical standards. A 
libel plaintiff seeking to prove malice might use a departure from the written code as 
evidence of malicious intent,” Meyer wrote.66 This apprehension that codes would be used 
against their creators in the legal arena was widespread and led one scholar to claim that it 
had created a “chilling effect on journalistic codes of ethics.”67 Critics claimed abandoning 
written codes under that rationale could leave some journalists ethically adrift. Meyer 
complained that it was “sacrificing a major moral advantage for a minor tactical benefit.”68 
 As a result of nearly two decades of press associations toeing the legal line with the 
wording of their codes of ethics, a 2001 law journal note that reviewed the codes concluded, 
“There is little in the codes of conduct written by national journalism organizations that can 
hurt the press in court.”69 As the 20th century drew to a close, the apparently widespread 
belief in the 1980s that ethical codes posed a legal risk to journalists was being questioned 
but not wholly abandoned. Veteran media attorney and SPJ counsel Bruce W. Sanford said in 
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a 1994 article that, as far as he knew, no libel plaintiff ever advanced his case by pointing out 
that a journalist had violated a written code of ethics.70 He nonetheless advised the authors of 
codes to avoid stating hard and fast rules. Sanford was quoted nearly a decade later similarly 
saying, “[P]laintiffs’ lawyers try to use codes against news organizations or reporters but it 
doesn’t work.”71 Conversely, veteran media attorney John Bussian, a lobbyist for the North 
Carolina Press Association, said there is a real risk that codes will be turned against 
journalists in court. “[Codes] can become a roadmap to proving the media defendant’s 
liability,” he said.72 Journalism ethics expert Bob Steele of the Poynter Institute for Media 
Studies questioned some of the most respected media lawyers in the Uinited States about the 
dangers ethics codes presented to journalists in court and found the issue was still being 
debated in 2003. Nonetheless, lawyers on both sides said any written code should address 
generalities instead of specifics or absolutes.73 Sanford still insisted: “Codes are not very 
helpful if they are watered down and so general as to be meaningless. Sometimes specifics 
are instructional.”74 
 National Public Radio’s code-like approach to setting ethical standards in 1995 
produced a guidebook with a unique blending of the de rigueur general statements of 
principle with extensive, specifc explanatory notes. For example, in the chapter titled 
“Fairness Accuracy & Balance,” the NPR guidebook elaborated on the principle of truth 
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telling by explaining, “Journalists seek the truth, both the facts and the ‘truth behind the 
facts.’” It went on to advocate objectivity as a value but explained quite specifically: “[W]e 
prefer to speak of it in terms of ‘fairness, accuracy and balance.’ Objectivity as it has been 
traditionally defined refers to the demand that journalists keep their personal biases, emotions 
and other ‘subjective factors’ out of their reporting.”75 
 By 2000, ethics codes promulgated for individual newsrooms were following the 
trend toward generalities and were more commonly titled codes of conduct or codes of 
professionalism and ethics. They were much less strident than the newsroom codes written 
thoughout most of the 20th century and closely mirrored the generalized statements of 
principles of the press association codes. But the two most recent and perhaps the most 
influential newsroom codes, those created for the Gannett newspapers in 1999 and The New 
York Times in 2003, embodied a rededicated focus on specifics. They embraced absolutes 
and liberally used explanatory examples as the NPR guidebook had in 1995. 
 Gannett even used the assertive, imperative language of the earliest journalism ethics 
codes, eschewing “should” and “ought” for “will.” After setting forth a foundation principle 
such as, “Seeking and reporting the truth in a truthful way,” the Gannet code proclaimed: 
“We will be honest in the way we gather, report and present news. . . . We will keep our 
word.”76 Notwithstanding the widely accepted lawyerly premise that ethics codes should 
avoid absolutes and statements of specifics, Gannet often went into specific detail about how 
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the principles were to be implemented. When it addressed using unnamed sources, for 
example, one bulleted item said:  
Make clear to sources the level of confidentiality agreed to. This does not 
mean each option must be discussed with the source, but each party should 
understand the agreement. Among the options are: a. The newspaper will not 
name them in the article; b. The newspaper will not name them unless a court 
compels the newspaper to do so; c. The newspaper will not name them under 
any circumstances. All sources should be informed that the newspaper will not 
honor confidentiality if the sources have lied or misled the newspaper.77 
This was followed up with a caution: “Do not make promises you do not intend to fulfill or 
may not be able to fulfill.”78 While Gannett’s code seemed to fly in the face of conventional 
lawyerly advice on the wording of ethics codes, it was not unmindful of the law. The 
provisions quoted above were clearly framed to prevent the consequences suffered by two 
Minnesota newspapers after they were successfully sued by a confidential source whose 
identity they revealed.79 They also appeared cognizant of the narrow U.S. Supreme Court 
majority ruling in a consolidated opinion covering cases in which three journalists 
unsuccessfully sought to resist subpoenas and protect confidential sources.80 
 The New York Times’ Code of Conduct for the News and Editorial Departments was 
titled “Ethical Journalism” and filled more than 50 pages. Its directives were so specific and 
plentiful, it included an index to help employees navigate through them. It did not mince 
words about enforcement. After explaining the high value placed on the publication of 
truthful information and condemning plagiarism, for example, it bluntly stated: “We will not 
                                                 
77 Id. 
 
78 Id. 
 
79 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 
80 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 
 63
tolerate such behavior.”81 It also forthrightly addressed one aspect of the conflict of interests 
issue that proved so troublesome during the 1980s and 1990s; it said New York Times 
journalists were free to vote but added, “Journalists have no place on the playing fields of 
politics.” Just as the wording of provisions in its Gannett counterpart showed awareness of 
potential legal consequences for unethical behavior, the Times code took pains to ward off a 
repeat of the 1998 Chiquita e-mail scandal82 that had badly damaged the reputation of 
Gannett’s Cincinnati Enquirer and cost it $10 million to settle the civil claims made by 
Chiquita. It said its staff “must obey the law in pursuit of news . . . [and] may not purloin 
data,” and it specifically included “databases and e-mail or voice mail messages” as it 
explained the term “data.”83 The code also made an uncommon distinction between what the 
law would allow but what the Times would forbid as unethical. “Staff members may not 
record conversations without the prior consent of all parties to the conversation. Even where 
the law allows recording with only one party aware of it, the practice is a deception,” the 
code said.84 
 When the Times’ code was publicized in January 2003, there was criticism of its hard 
line stance on some issues, but Bob Steele praised the document, saying, “The New York 
Times’ standards are tough, and they should be.” He also complimented the code for its 
“specific guidance.”85 
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 Despite the perception of ethics codes as a means of implementing ethical journalism 
practices, their effectiveness has not been determined. As codes of ethics proliferated across 
the industry through the 1970s and 1980s, their effectiveness and worth were debated in 
scholarly and professional circles at an unprecedented rate. A study published in Journalism 
Quarterly in 1984, for example, indicated that codes of ethics did not directly influence 
whether a journalist would behave ethically or unethically.86 It concluded that codes are 
primarily symbolic efforts to demonstrate that a news organization is making a serious effort 
to behave in a “professional, accountable manner.”87 A study published two years later in the 
Journal of Mass Media Ethics reported that “the extent of unethical behavior [among 
journalists] is disturbing” but observed that newspapers with written codes of ethics “were 
more likely to take a stricter view of what constitutes an ethics violation than newspapers 
without codes.”88 It nonetheless indicated that the news media were actively enforcing ethical 
conduct within their newsrooms by firing or otherwise punishing those who violated the 
codes but generally did not inform the public of the enforcement.89 Without such disclosures, 
the ability of enforcement to increase public confidence was arguably lessened. 
 Journalism scholar Edmund B. Lambeth advocated rigorous adherence to ethical 
principles that transcended the notions of a socially responsible press that gained currency in 
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the wake of the Hutchins Commission Report.90 He defined journalism as “a craft with 
professional responsibilities.”91 Like Black and Barney, he eschewed the type of codes of 
ethics that proliferated during the 1970s and 1980s, and urged the promotion of ethical 
behavior through an eclectic system of journalism ethics that “reflect working principles 
rather than mere platitudes or ossified collections of dos and don’ts.”92 
 No study has conclusively confirmed the effectiveness of journalism ethics codes, but 
many scholars and practitioners have insisted that they need enforcement powers. Even the 
vaunted Hutchins Commission Report apparently considered codes a potentially effective 
tool for press reform and self-control but treated them with disdain after recounting the 
ineffectiveness of ASNE’s Canons of Journalism, which contained an enforcement 
mechanism, in the Fred G. Bonfils scandal.93 
 The Hutchins Commission considered enforceable codes of ethics created by 
journalists a means of improving press performance only because it saw them as instruments 
of self-correction that did not put press freedom at risk. However, when self-correction 
failed, other means had to be considered. “[T]he maxim holds good that self-correction is 
better than outside correction, so long as self-correction holds out a reasonable and realistic 
hope, as distinct from lip service to piously framed paper codes.”94 The commission 
attributed the failure of codes to journalists’ unwillingness to substitute a socially responsible 
definition of constitutional press freedom for the archaic libertarian notion that constitutional 
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freedom included the privilege to behave badly. The Hutchins Commission found that press 
attitude unacceptable and concluded, “Today, this former legal privilege wears the aspect of 
social irresponsibility.”95 
 The Hutchins Commission Report imprinted this social responsibility theory of the 
press on the public consciousness. The commission was not the originator of this theory but 
apparently articulated it better than any who had come before. A major tenet of the social 
responsibility theory, according to many scholarly interpretations, holds that journalists’ 
rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are linked to if not dependent on 
their responsibility to further the best interests of the larger society instead of the limited 
interests of their profession. This conditioning of rights upon responsibilities provided a 
philosophical foundation for converting journalism standards of practice into legal 
imperatives.  
 Critics of the theory have claimed it sacrificed press freedom and moved toward 
authoritarianism. “The underlying assumption of social responsibility is that moral and 
ethical commandments dictate journalistic excellence (even if authoritarian control is needed 
to uphold such laws) instead of the individual reasoned choices of reporters and editors,” 
wrote Scott Lloyd in the Journal of Mass Media Ethics.96 Clifford G. Christians, writing in 
the Journal of Communication, also found fault with the social responsibility theory and 
claimed, “[P]rinciples based on this ideology remain undefined and its ethical sophistication 
limited.”97 
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The Hutchins Commission 
 The socio-political environment created in the United States by World War II led to 
the formation of the Hutchins Commission in 1942 and unavoidably affected the direction 
and content of the report it issued. It was a privately funded effort to address the need for 
ethical standards of conduct in the news media although the commission’s study and report 
covered other mass media as well. Since its release in 1947, the report has had a substantial 
effect on the implementation of ostensibly progressive media practices and often has framed 
discussions of press freedom and press responsibility. The report was not the sole cause of 
the emergence of these issues and the development of these trends in professional practice, 
but they became more widespread or were discussed more often after the report addressed 
them. Many subsequent changes in mass media practices reflect concerns and suggestions 
made in the commission’s discussions of press freedom and its explication of the press’s 
duties. 
 The 13-member commission98 was formed and funded by Henry R. Luce, editor-in-
chief of Time magazine. Encyclopedia Britannica also contributed funding. The panel was 
led by Robert M. Hutchins, chancellor of the University of Chicago, and conducted its 
studies of the mass media from early 1944 through 1946. Luce was alarmed by the 
monopolization of the American news media by a few conglomerates, the power of the mass 
media as recently demonstrated by the role propaganda played in Adolf Hitler’s rise to power 
in Nazi Germany, and the indiscriminate melding of news and entertainment by news organs. 
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Luce complained that the newspapers of his day were anathema to a democratic society 
because they filled their pages with sensationalism and vulgarity, according to media scholar 
Stephen Bates.99 
 Luce’s assessment of the press was in accord with that of Harold Lasswell, a political 
scientist best remembered for his studies of mass communication, but who also served on the 
Hutchins Commission. Bates revealed that eight years before the commission issued its 
report and warning, Lasswell had publicly suggested legislation as a remedy for journalists’ 
excesses.100 This notion that the law was a viable means of making journalists practice their 
craft ethically was not limited to scholars from outside the field and was not uncommon 
among some journalists of the 1940s and earlier. H. L. Mencken, while editor of the 
American Mercury, is reported to have expressed a lack of faith in the ability of journalists to 
perform ethically without the coercion of law and to have dismissed codes of ethics as 
useless and “moonshine.” Journalism Professor Leon Nelson Flint, in a journalism ethics 
casebook published in 1925, quoted Mencken as saying:  
“If American journalism is to be purged of its present swinishness and brought 
up to a decent level of repute . . . it must be accomplished by the devices of 
morals, not by those of honor. That is to say it must be accomplished by 
external forces, and through the medium of penalties exteriorly inflicted. 
Perhaps the most practicable of those forces is legislative enactment. . . .”101 
 
 In a similar vein more than two decades before the Hutchins Commission Report was 
issued, Walter Lippmann avoided advocating the legal imposition of ethics but nonetheless 
warned, “If publishers . . . do not face the facts and attempt to deal with them, some day 
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Congress, in a fit of temper, egged on by an outraged public opinion, will operate on the 
press with an ax.”102 
 Commission member Edward Hocking, a Harvard philosophy professor, favored 
government intervention to impose ethics on the news media. Bates quoted a 1945 
conference speech in which the professor argued: 
 “[T]he government has final responsibility for the work of the press 
insofar as the press presents to citizens the truth without which they 
cannot make responsible political judgments. . . . We cannot leave to 
private agencies alone the ultimate responsibility for the service of 
news – for this essential phase of public education in our world today 
[is] . . . a public service so vital that it cannot be left to the caprice of 
the marketplace; the government must step in.”103 
 
 Commission member Zechariah Chafee Jr., a Harvard professor who developed a 
solid reputation as a free press champion, provided counterpoint to Hocking’s advocacy of 
government controls on the news media. Chafee opposed Hocking’s efforts to turn moral 
responsibilities into legal duties, but by the time the Hutchins Commission completed its 
study and issued its report, the two scholars’ positions had moved toward each other. Their 
accommodation was illustrated by a statement Bates attributed to Chafee: “‘[T]oo much 
social control over the media of communication may destroy freedom, . . . [yet] mere 
emphasis on competitive freedom . . . may lead to increasing disproportions of power to the 
point where freedom is destroyed.’”104 
 The Hutchins Commission began its work during an era when newspaper owners 
openly refused to don the restraints of self-imposed ethics and did not hesitate to declare that 
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they were businessmen producing a commodity and owed nothing to society at large except 
the delivery of a newspaper in exchange for payment, Bates said. Blanchard described it as a 
time when newspaper owners were acutely protective of the proprietary rights of their 
businesses and insisted that the First Amendment should protect those interests as surely as 
it protected editorial content from prior restraint.105 
 Their claim to exemption from the government controls that other businesses were 
subject to flowed from an interpretation of the First Amendment that canonized the press as 
the only private business specifically referred to in the Constitution. Among the exemptions 
newspapers sought through this line of reasoning was freedom from laws protecting the 
unionization of employees and restraining the formation of monopolies.106 
 The administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, aided by a series of U.S. 
Supreme Court rulings, had made many aspects of newspaper operations subject to 
government regulation. These rulings undermined the newspapers’ proffered interpretation 
of freedom of the press, Blanchard explained. “Freedom of the press was being defined as 
the right of the people to obtain information necessary for survival in a rapidly changing 
world, not as a right of publishers to operate without consideration of the people’s needs.”107 
 The commission fielded a number of radical proposals for government control of the 
press that were ultimately rejected by the panel, Bates reported. Among the most extreme 
was an idea advanced by commission member Beardsley Ruml, a businessman who was 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and chairman of the H.R. Macy’s 
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Corporation. He recommended that a federal agency be formed to regulate newspapers. 
Bates described the proposal as a “licensing scheme for the press” that would have created 
an agency akin to a Federal Communications Commission for the print media.108 Lasswell 
similarly suggested direct government intervention in the form of a public utilities 
commission to diversify editorial content in communities dominated by one newspaper.109 
Commission member Archibald MacLeish, a poet and Librarian of Congress, proposed that 
the government ensure a diversity of editorial voices by forcing newspapers to serve as 
common carriers.110 A commission staff member suggested authorizing criminal 
prosecutions against newspapers that knowingly published false information.111 
 Chafee successfully opposed each of these proposals while acknowledging that the 
problems they addressed must be tended to. He insisted that the solutions must be less 
destructive of freedom. The remedy the commission’s summary report proposed for many of 
these problems was the formation of a non-governmental agency to monitor the press. “After 
lengthy, probing discussions, [the commissioners] had concluded that the law was a blunt 
and easily abused instrument, one that should be used only as a last resort,” Bates wrote.112 
 The commission can be credited with foreshadowing, if not directly inspiring, the 
creation of a variety of means of monitoring and improving the practice of journalism. These 
means included local, regional, and state press councils; the National News Council, which 
endured for 11 years; and the hiring of ombudsmen at significant numbers of newspapers 
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around the United States. These all can be traced to the commission’s call for the news media 
to police themselves and engage in mutual criticism to establish and maintain socially 
responsible standards of professional conduct through peer pressure.113 Professionalism was 
among the goals the report urged the press to pursue, and it was one of the reasons the report 
endorsed the inclusion of a broad liberal arts component in journalism education. Such an 
education would also give reporters a larger world view and an ability to place events in a 
larger context and recognize their significance. It would also increase journalists’ 
competence, independence, and effectiveness. This educational trend grew after the Hutchins 
Report was issued and now has been institutionalized by the Accrediting Council on 
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Education at nearly every major school or 
department of journalism in the United States.114 
 The public journalism or civic journalism movement that began in the mid-to-late 
1990s can be traced to the commission’s assertion that the press is an essential element of a 
functioning democracy. Public and civic journalism advocates seek to make journalism 
nurture democracy and reconnect the populace to public life.115 In a similar vein, the 
commission’s report invigorated the decades-old trend among media scholars to theorize 
about the media’s role in maintaining the uniquely American style of democracy. 
 In an effort to expand the realm of expression protected by the First Amendment, the 
commission advocated the inclusion of virtually all mass communication media in the 
definition of the press insofar as rights and responsibilities were concerned. Radio, television, 
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and the movies were part of the press, the report indicated, and these media eventually were 
accorded many of the same free speech rights as newspapers and books.116 The emergence of 
diversity as an ethical issue for the media also can be traced to the report’s 
recommendations.117 The report’s concern about the effects of concentrated ownership of the 
mass media continues to be echoed in contemporary media criticism.118 Federal laws that 
were ratified decades later to prevent a single entity from owning the electronic and print 
media in one market would have been praised by the commission.119 Other trends such as the 
widespread industry practice of publishing corrections, the proliferation and legitimization of 
media criticism from within the media,120 the continued inclusion of social responsibility 
themes in media codes of ethics,121 and other directives designed to improve mass media 
behavior also can be traced to the commission’s recommendations. Its insistence that 
advertising be separated from news, if not implemented throughout the media, has at least 
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fostered a widespread view that such commingling is unethical and contributed to the 
widespread trend of labeling advertising as such when it might appear to be news. Among the 
most successful trends supported by the commission’s suggestions were the organization of 
non-profit institutions to communicate with the public to augment educational needs not 
served by traditional media and the creation of academic-professional centers of advanced 
study, research, and publication in the field of communication. Among these are the Pacifica 
Foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, the Freedom Forum, and the Poynter Institute for 
Media Studies. 
 Many of the aforementioned trends also have been fostered by other notable sources, 
such as some early journalism codes of ethics and published works of journalism criticism 
that predate the commission, but they are fundamentally in accord with the commission’s list 
of the things society requires of the press.122 The commission said the press should present:  
 1) “A truthful, comprehensive, and intelligent account of the day’s events in a context 
which gives them meaning.”123 This idea is anchored to the notion that the press should not 
fabricate information and should rely on credible, authoritative sources for the information it 
disseminates. Opinion should be clearly identified as such and not presented as fact. Facts 
alone can misrepresent the truth, the commission advised. Its report accordingly spread and 
legitimized to some extent the trend toward interpretive reporting and putting news in context 
with the appropriate background instead of perpetuating the limited stenographer’s approach 
to journalism that purported to simply present facts in an objective fashion. 
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 2) “A forum for exchange of comment and criticism.”124 The commission cannot be 
credited with initiating the institutionalized practice of publishing of letters to the editor and 
the creation of op-ed pages or the point-counterpoint format of public discussion in the mass 
media, but it noted the social worth of these practices that add more voices to those routinely 
presented by the media. Advocacy of these types of input arguably led to their perpetuation 
in the current incarnations as on-line responses, telephone call-in features for newspaper 
readers as well as radio and television audiences. Views and information that run counter to 
the mainstream also should be included in the news pages and other media sites not devoted 
to advocacy, according to the report. Here was where the report recommended that the media 
serve as common carriers. This was not meant in the legally restrictive sense of common 
carriers, which are compelled to provide universal access, but in accord with the principle 
that more voices should be enabled to participate in public discussion. Also, sources of 
information should be identified so the consumer can make judgments about their worth or 
usefulness. These concepts are embodied in the current notions of fairness and balance that 
sometimes supplement or supplant objectivity as ethical values in journalism. 
 3) “The projection of a representative picture of the constituent groups in the 
society.”125 The commission recognized that information provided by the mass media affects 
an audience’s judgments about people, particularly minorities or others with whom they do 
not have sufficient contact for making personal assessments. As a result, projections of these 
groups must be accurate lest the media contribute to a perversion of judgments. Media 
images that are repeated and emphasized must be representative and reflect the humanity 
common to all people that will nurture understanding and respect, the commission’s report 
urged. These principles and values have been expressed in media stylebooks and operating 
guidelines for decades as part of a continuing effort to eliminate stereotyping and assure 
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diversity in personnel and news copy orientation. This impetus to accurately represent all of 
America’s constituent groups in the media is an underlying motivation and rationale for 
affirmative action hiring and promotion in the media. This course of action ideally allows 
members of these constituent groups to help paint the pictures that appear in the media and 
influence media owners’ decisions that affect how these groups are portrayed. 
 4) “The presentation and clarification of the goals and values of the society.”126 With 
this provision the commission identified the mass media as some of the most powerful 
educational tools and assigned them the responsibility of informing the public about such 
American values as free speech and equality as defined by the U.S. Constitution. News 
events should be presented, where appropriate, in a manner that indicates how these values 
and others germane to the American way of life are adhered to or deviated from by 
newsmakers. “The Commission believes in realistic reporting of the events and forces that 
militate against the attainment of social goals as well as those which work for them,” the 
report said. This principle was most visibly embodied for a time in the morality codes 
developed for comic books, motion pictures, and television.127 
 5) “Full access to the day’s intelligence.”128 A modern industrialized democracy 
requires that all of the people have access to as much of the latest information as possible 
even if they do not make use of it all, the commission said. The information should be 
available for whenever the consumers decide to use it to assert their right and power to make 
decisions for themselves, thereby giving substance to the democratic value of government by 
consent. This rationale has been the basis for the news media’s efforts to secure ever wider 
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legal rights of access to information about the operation of the government and other matters 
of public interest and concern. 
 Although the Hutchins Commission did not create the social responsibility theory of 
the press, it expounded and justified the concept better than those who had previously 
addressed the issue and those, like the members of the Warren and Kerner commissions, who 
addressed the concept afterward.129 The commission's report reflected the popular, but now 
questioned though not wholly discarded, conviction that the press and other mass media can 
be controlling influences on the public's attitudes and behavior. It was an understandable 
conviction in light of the contemporary example provided by the apparent effects of Adolf 
Hitler's propaganda machine on the German public from the late 1930s onward. Given their 
belief in the awesome power of the press, the commission members apparently felt 
compelled to urge that such a powerful social force be used responsibly and directed away 
from evil or selfishly profitable ends and toward goals that would benefit the public. 
  Complicating matters was the commission's apparent faith in the American New 
Deal government's ability to engineer solutions to social problems by making other powerful 
elements of society, such as the business community, function more responsibly. It was a 
complication because the U.S. Constitution championed freedom of the press from 
government control even when the government was viewed favorably as a powerful ally in 
the commission’s effort to redirect an irresponsible press. This conflict over the role of the 
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government in the reformation of the press emerged as a major issue in the discussion of 
press responsibility and freedom.130 
 The problems inherent in the commission’s avowed mission to improve the press and 
safeguard its freedom have continued to plague efforts to create standards of behavior for the 
press. There always appears to be a risk of repression whenever judgments of right or wrong 
are made about the press. Indeed it was the New Deal business reforms that ultimately forced 
the press to accept that the First Amendment did not bestow upon it complete immunity from 
all forms of government regulation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1937 that the 
Amendment did not place the press beyond the reach of laws of general application.131 
 Issues of media freedom, responsibility, and legal accountability often came to the 
fore in the ensuing interpretations of the Hutchins Commission Report. A common 
interpretation had the commission asserting that press freedom is conditional, that failure to 
exercise that freedom responsibly could lead to its suspension or destruction. An example of 
this is the report’s assertion that “[a] man who lies, intentionally or carelessly, is not morally 
entitled to claim the protection of the First Amendment.”132 This philosophy was embedded 
in state laws for many decades in some states where the courts imposed strict liability for 
libelous, false statements of fact. Its death knell was sounded in 1964 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court nationalized libel law in its New York Times v. Sullivan 133 ruling and extended First 
                                                 
130 See, e.g., Robert E. Dreschel, Media Malpractice: The Legal Risks of Voluntary Social Responsibility in 
Mass Communication, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 237 (1989); Everette E. Dennis, Internal Examination: Self-Regulation 
and the American Media, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 697 (1995); ELIZABETH BLANKS HINDMAN, RIGHTS 
VS. RESPONSIBILITIES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MEDIA (1997). 
 
131 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937). 
 
132 HUTCHINS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 30, at 87. 
 
133 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
 79
Amendment protection to even careless or negligent false statements when the plaintiff was a 
public official. 
 Despite its view that factual errors published by the media did not warrant First 
Amendment protection, the commission recognized that libel law curtailed freedom of the 
press and, therefore, sought other remedies for those defamed. It suggested the 
institutionalization of a right of reply for the injured party as an alternative to libel lawsuits. 
The report expressly rejected legislative solutions, but not judicial remedies for the problem 
of knowingly published falsehoods. It supported right-of-reply statutes and claimed there was 
no constitutional barrier to such laws.134 The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed and in Miami 
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, struck down a Florida right-of-reply statute.135 
 Scholars who have studied the Hutchins Commission Report on Freedom of the Press 
have made a variety of assessments of it. While most agree that it was seminal to the 
development of modern news media mores and conceptions of press freedom and 
responsibility, some have questioned its worth. Stephen Bates appears to be the most critical 
of the report, its effects, and the men who compiled it. His 1996 assessment of the report, 
“Realigning Journalism with Democracy,”136 will serve as the point of departure in the 
following comparison of various other scholars’ views. Bates faintly praised the report as a 
landmark in the history of press criticism and an impassioned indictment of the mass media. 
But he broadly demeaned it by labeling it “a flawed success as an analysis” and a 
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“magnificent failure” as a call to action.137 The press was unreceptive to the report, he 
claimed, and it was, therefore, a “reformist flop” that “influenced academic thinking about 
journalism but not journalism itself.”138 
 Margaret Blanchard, however, had made a different assessment in an earlier study.139 
She indicated that some prominent members of the press were quite receptive to the report 
and its call to action was heeded in some quarters. She, unlike Bates, found the report to be 
important to the industry and credited the Hutchins Commission with laying the groundwork 
for many of the changes in the practice of journalism that emerged decades later. 
 Blanchard, Bates, and other scholars noted that some elements of the press heaped 
harsh criticism upon the report and its authors immediately after it was issued. Opponents of 
the  report “outnumbered and outshouted” its supporters, according to Bates’ assessment.140 
He cited the antagonistic responses of Editor & Publisher and Journalism Quarterly as 
examples of the tenor of press reaction. Blanchard also cited the two publications but said 
their take was not typical. Complimentary responses, like those published by The Guild 
Reporter and the Nieman Reports, were more common, she wrote.141 Blanchard also observed 
that the tenor of the response varied among the various segments of the press and often 
depended on whether the response was intended for in-house consumption by other members 
of the press or whether it was directed to the general public. In-house criticism was generally 
harsher, Blanchard said, although not uniformly so. The journals of the working press, such 
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as The Guild Reporter, the Nieman Reports, and Sigma Delta Chi’s Quill generally praised 
the report’s recommendations, Blanchard explained. She also observed that while the tenor of 
the press response to the report’s recommendations varied, it was more consistently critical 
when it addressed the composition of the commission and the quality of its workmanship. 
 Bates’ assertion that the report did not affect journalism is contrary to Blanchard’s 
finding that it had a positive impact on the newspaper industry. She supported her assessment 
by citing activities to improve the press that were initiated in the months and years 
immediately following publication of the report. Among these were the inauguration of CBS 
Views the Press and the Associated Press Managing Editors beginning a program of written 
critiques of the Associated Press service, which eventually produced the Red Book and 
improved reporting and writing.142 The report also affected and improved newspapers and 
journalism in general by providing editors with a philosophical framework for reform and the 
basis for defining a new role for the press, Blanchard said.143 
 Jane S. McConnell agreed with Blanchard on the worth of the Hutchins Report and in 
her 1997 study called its central principles “the cornerstone for one of the major normative 
theories of the press of the mid-twentieth century.”144 That theory was popularized by 
Theodore Peterson in 1956 as the social responsibility theory of the press.145 He credited the 
Hutchins Commission with doing a great deal to make social responsibility a new, integrated 
theory instead of an appendage to the traditional libertarian theory of the press. Unlike Bates, 
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who said the Hutchins Report did not affect journalism, Peterson said some aspects of social 
responsibility had made their way into journalism practices. Bates and Peterson were in 
accord in typifying the press response to the report as generally negative, but Peterson and 
other scholars insisted that the press was not hostile to what he saw as the report’s primary 
assumption – that the press has social responsibilities.146  
 Jerilyn S. McIntyre saw the Hutchins Report moving beyond social responsibility. In 
a 1979 study, she said the commission developed the idea of press accountability, which she 
defined as a term that “subsumed responsibility and implied standards for a systematic 
survey of press performance.”147 In some respects, her observations about the commission’s 
report presaged those Bates made nearly two decades later questioning the worth of the 
report. McIntyre and Bates made several similar observations about the commission and its 
report, although his criticisms were sharper. She said the report was not a landmark in a 
practical sense because the mechanisms for carrying out its recommendations were not 
immediately established.148 Bates similarly found fault in the commission’s failure to 
immediately set up a press council to review media performance.149 McIntyre acknowledged 
the report’s influence as a philosophical statement of the importance of press responsibility 
just as Bates did. She seemed to be saying in less pointed language what Bates said in 1996: 
the report influenced thinking about journalism but not the practice of journalism.150 
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 However, in a study published in 1987,151 McIntyre’s position was clarified, or 
perhaps even changed, to the point that it was decidedly at odds with Bates’ observations on 
several points. For example, on the first page of “Repositioning a Landmark: The Hutchins 
Commission and Freedom of the Press,” she said the themes and recommendations of the 
report had indeed affected the professional practice of journalism and academic training for 
it.152 She also seemed to add to or refine her judgment about the “landmark” status of the 
report. Whereas her previous assessment had said the report was not a landmark in the 
practical sense, her subsequent assessment found it to be a “landmark attempt to develop 
policy for the agencies of mass communication.”153 
 McIntyre’s 1987 study also displayed a closer alignment with McConnell’s 
assessment when she wrote that the ideal of accountability had become a major normative 
concept in media ethics since the Hutchins Report was issued. She was again in step with 
McConnell when she asserted that this concept of press accountability was intended as a 
guide to policy and a practical proposal to deal with specific social conditions.154 McIntyre’s 
insistence that the report was a practical proposal is central to the difference she had with 
Peterson and others who identified the commission’s definition of social responsibility as a 
philosophical paradigm. McIntyre said instead that the commission was making a practical 
proposal to guide policy and not merely engaging in a philosophical colloquy akin to 
Peterson’s discussion of social responsibility. McIntyre described the enduring legacy of the 
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Hutchins Report as its ability to draw “attention to the connection between the continuing 
problems of mass communication in a modern democratic society.”155 She nonetheless 
concluded as she had in her prior study that the commission may have failed to articulate 
“immediately workable solutions” to the problems with the press.156 
 The social responsibility theory of the press, while not providing the solutions some 
sought, was generally recognized as one of the Hutchins Report’s major contributions to the 
continuing discourse about the mass media. When Blanchard revisited the report in a 1998 
article, she called the responsibility notion idealistic and said the commission’s vision of a 
responsible press did not meet the needs of the press or the public.157 In this second look at 
the report, Blanchard focused on its recommendation that the media provide greater access 
for more voices and its presumption that this would be more socially constructive than the 
1940s trend of media monopolization and concentrated ownership that she claimed might 
preclude a true diversity of viewpoints and sources of information. The proliferation of the 
Internet in the 1990s provided greater access and diversity, just as the colonial press provided 
what she described as the paradigm for the commission’s vision. But she concluded that 
communication on the Internet had not proved to be socially constructive because it consists 
of college-educated people communicating with each other and isolating themselves from 
group interaction and from those parts of society that do not have the financial means to gain 
access to the conversation. She accordingly suggested that much of the commission’s 
concept of press responsibility should be jettisoned and replaced by a new approach that is 
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better grounded in contemporary reality and recognizes that new technology’s tendency to 
individualize and Balkanize communication is more socially harmful than the old shibboleth: 
media concentration. 
 Blanchard’s 1998 assessment of the report concurred at times with those published by 
Bates and McIntyre in that all three identified the commission as elitist in some respects. 
Bates repeatedly condemned the commission’s elitism.158 McIntyre identified nearly all of the 
members as “connected in some way with a rather small circle of elite Eastern 
universities.”159 She wrote about the commission’s proclivity to suggest that the press be 
repaired by elites or expert authorities.160 She disagreed, however, with Bates’ claim that the 
commission was an ivory tower collection of academics. McIntyre said its members were 
“dedicated to the public service ideals that had taken hold among intellectuals from the 
Progressive era onward.”161 
 Bates referred to the commission as the “professoriate” because so many of its 
members were academics.162 Four were social scientists and none was a journalist, but several 
had experience “in or near journalism,” Bates said.163 He and others found fault with the 
commission’s failure to include at least one journalist on its roster and said that failure 
contributed to the ineffectuality of the report because journalists’ world view differed from 
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that of the academic intellectuals.164 Bates and Peterson agreed that the commission had an 
unflattering view of the general public, and accordingly, Bates said, it suggested recourse to 
the university elite to solve several of the problems it identified in the press.165 The public 
was seen as lethargic, loath to use reason, unlikely to compel the press to solve its problems, 
and unlikely to defend the press against encroachments on its freedom.166 
 The Hutchins Commission Report has to be considered in any study of the tension 
between efforts to improve journalism practices and press freedom because of its effort to 
rejustify the free press rights enjoyed by the print media and extend them to all the mass 
communication media. It is perhaps best known and often criticized for its affirmation of the 
theory that free press rights are conditioned on the responsible exercise of those rights in 
pursuit of public service. The commission described its report as an inquiry into the current 
and prospective freedom of the press. It concluded that the free press was not in any 
immediate danger of extinction, but the continuation of irresponsible practices would cause 
that freedom to be eroded by a government that would be forced to intervene.167 This 
amounted to a warning to the media that if they did not clean up their act they would lose the 
freedom to perform it. By articulating this theory of press responsibility, the report added the 
press itself to the roster of villains that threatened the free press. This roster previously had 
been dominated by government, but the report cast government as an instrument of the public 
will. It said a public outraged by irresponsible press practices would compel its government 
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to take action against the press.168 This idea of press responsibility encompassed a vision of 
press freedom and the First Amendment that was newly emerging in that period of American 
history. As Blanchard noted, the commission was not alone in making this anti-libertarian 
assessment. She said the Supreme Court had begun “to define the First Amendment as the 
right of the people to obtain information necessary for survival in a rapidly changing world 
and not as a right of publishers to operate without consideration of people’s needs.”169 
Libertarians had construed freedom of the press to be an absolute bar against government 
interference in press operations. As Peterson observed, freedom of expression under social 
responsibility theory was not an absolute right as it was under libertarian theory. The right to 
free expression had to be “balanced against the private rights of others and against vital 
social interests.”170 Based on the premise that only a responsible press warranted protection, 
the commission indicated that First Amendment rights were conditional. 
 History has shown that the press does not always behave responsibly as a matter of 
course but may do so when held accountable for irresponsible behavior. History has also 
shown that accountability often comes at the expense of freedom. This was the major 
dilemma the Hutchins Commission struggled with because freedom of the press is a 
fundamental principle of the U.S. Constitution. The commission advocated self-imposed 
accountability as a stopgap against the threat of government intervention, which was 
considered the worst solution because it would cause loss of freedom. Responsibility has 
come to be equated with accountability and enforcement. Just as enforcement presumes a 
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power to impose sanctions, the exercise of power presumably limits the freedom of whatever 
is subjected to it. The commission proposed self-regulation with the public’s participation in 
a press monitoring agency whose only enforcement power would be peer pressure and the 
clout of public opinion. Press responsibility and freedom would be ensured through voluntary 
review by practitioners and their clients, the commission hoped. It proved to be a dashed 
hope. 
 Historians may eventually interpret the Hutchins Report as a formal rejection of the 
belief in the marketplace of ideas theory of free expression. As some scholars have observed, 
the report rejected the idea that the primary purpose of a free press is the search for truth and 
substituted a social role. The idealistic notion that truth would emerge victorious from a 
public arena where a variety of truths were pitted against each other was set aside by the 
report’s more pragmatic instrumentalism. A gullible or distracted public might be 
dangerously misled before truth would emerge, according to this more contemporary take, 
and the press had to be redirected without relying on the public and the marketplace to 
perform some self-righting function that might be beyond their capacity. 
 More than a half-century after the Hutchins Report was released to the public, mass 
media scholars and practitioners have not reached consensus on its worth and effects. As 
noted earlier, journalism historian Margaret Blanchard concluded that the report “provided a 
philosophical framework for reform” of the news media and “provided the goals for future 
aspirations.”171 But Stephen Bates judged the report to be flawed and a failure.172 Media 
commentator Everette Dennis observed that the document was “holy writ” to some because it 
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“scoped out and posed solutions for . . . public communication years ahead of its time.” He 
also noted that in some quarters the report was considered to be “the work of impractical 
dreamers (or worse) who meddled where they shouldn’t have and whose ideas are best 
forgotten.” Nonetheless, Dennis recognized the Hutchins Report as a historically important 
artifact that “has lived on in the minds of those who care about fair, ethical, and responsible 
media.”173 Journalism scholar Elizabeth Blanks Hindman has credited the commission with 
formulating the social responsibility theory of the press174 although other scholars have found 
evidence that the theory had been bandied about in journalism ethics discussions for at least 
two decades before the commission was formed.175 
 
The Warren and Kerner Commissions 
 Since its articulation in the Hutchins Commission Report, social responsibility has 
emerged as a fundamental philosophical framework for judging and guiding the performance 
of the mass media. An appeal to social responsibility was inherent in the Warren 
Commission’s 1964 assessment of press behavior in the immediate aftermath of the 
assassination of President John F. Kennedy176 and the Kerner Commission’s criticism of the 
press in 1968 for failing to report properly on the African-American communities in the 
United States.177  
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 President Lyndon B. Johnson created the Warren Commission with the appointment 
of Earl Warren, chief justice of the United States, as chairman of the President’s Commission 
on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was charged with investigating 
Kennedy’s assassination and the ensuing murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassination 
suspect. The Warren Report, as those findings came to be known, included criticism of press 
practices in the coverage of Oswald and a claim that the press contributed to the 
circumstances that led to his death. Journalists were faulted for publicizing misinformation 
and details of the case that attorneys claimed would have jeopardized Oswald’s ability to 
receive a fair trial. Overzealous journalists were said to have undermined police efforts to 
keep Oswald safe, though the police were also heavily criticized. “The Commission believes, 
however, that a part of the responsibility for the unfortunate circumstances following the 
President’s death must be borne by the news media,” the report said.178 In a section titled 
“Responsibility of News Media,” the Warren Commission cited “a regrettable lack of self-
discipline by the newsmen” and suggested that “the demand for information must be 
tempered by other fundamental requirements of our society.”179 It also called for the creation 
of codes of professional conduct but explicitly indicated that this was not a job for journalists 
alone; the government and the people also should play a role. “The burden of insuring [sic] 
that appropriate action is taken to establish ethical standards of conduct for the news media 
must also be borne, however, by State and local governments, by the bar and ultimately by 
the public.”180 
 The Kerner Commission was also created by President Johnson. Formally titled The 
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, it was formed in 1967 to examine the 
causes of the riots and disorder that ignited a number of major urban centers across the 
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country in the summer of that year. Ohio Governor Otto Kerner was named chairman of the 
11-member panel, which issued a report filled with criticisms and suggestions to the press 
that were eerily reminiscent of those made in the Hutchins Report, but not nearly as 
expansive. 
 Chapter 15 of the Kerner Report’s 17 chapters was devoted entirely to “The News 
Media and the Disorders” and focused on the news media’s coverage of the disorders as well 
as the profession’s long-term treatment of racial minorities. The report is best remembered 
for its overall conclusion that the United States was becoming two societies: one black, one 
white, separate and unequal. But in Chapter 15 the commission concluded “the news media 
have, we believe, contributed to the black-white schism in this country.”181 Journalism was 
faulted for failing to tell the stories of the black experience in America and accordingly was 
found to have disserved its majority audience as well as the minorities who also were its 
audience. The report condemned the white press that “repeatedly, if unconsciously, reflects 
the biases, the paternalism, the indifference of white America. This may be understandable, 
but it is not excusable in an institution that has the mission to inform and educate the whole 
of our society.”182 
 The Kerner Report recommended hiring, training, and promoting blacks into 
positions that would add integrity and depth to coverage of black communities. It called for 
the creation of a privately funded Institute of Urban Communications to provide this training 
and to monitor news media performance in these areas of deficiency. The institute would 
praise or condemn the media as warranted, just as the Hutchins Commission had suggested in 
its call for a private panel to monitor journalism practices. These suggestions are often cited 
as the origin of the minority journalism training programs at Columbia University and the 
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Maynard Institute for Journalism Education.183 The Kerner Commission went to great pains 
to state it was not calling for any infringement on press freedoms, but it did insist on press 
responsibility, just as the Hutchins Commission had more than two decades earlier. 
  
National News Council 
 The Hutchins Commission’s broad endorsement of social responsibility in 
journalism included a specific call for the creation of a private body to monitor the press. It 
recommended that a news council be formed “independent of the government and the press 
to appraise and report annually on media performance.”184 It was not until August 1, 1973, 
however, that the National News Council was formed with funding provided primarily by 
The Twentieth Century Fund and the Markle Foundation. 
 The immediate impetus for the council was a task force report that had been 
commissioned to address the concerns expressed by the trustees of The Twentieth Century 
Fund for “preserving the freedom of the press and improving its performance.”185 
Accordingly, in 1971 The Twentieth Century Fund Task Force was charged with exploring 
the feasibility of a press council in the United States that would monitor the performance of 
the news media. “The Members of the Task Force devoted considerable thought to the 
sanctions the council should be able to apply before coming to the realization that . . . 
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‘sunlight is the most powerful disinfectant’. . . . The council would rely only on publicity to 
lend force to its findings,” wrote the fund’s director, M. J. Rossant.186 
 The council came into existence during one of the recurring periods in American 
history in which the press doubted its ability to remain free. The political climate of the 
1970s was rife with suspicion of the press and fears that press freedom was under increasing 
threats of government suppression. Veteran journalist Ronald P. Kriss, who worked through 
the period as senior editor of Time magazine, described it as a time when the media were 
under attack by the White House and the courts. Television stations’ licenses were at risk 
“unless they scrubbed out of their news programs all the ‘elitist gossip’ and ‘ideological 
plugola’ fed to them by the networks,” Kriss said. Across the nation “subpoenas were being 
issued wholesale to reporters,” and “judges were applying gag rules to more and more 
trials.”187  
  There were indications that this was a time when there was little reason to expect the 
free press would be protected by an American public who had scant respect for it. A Harris 
Poll found that public confidence ratings for news in magazines, newspapers, and television 
at that time were so poor that only advertising and organized labor were ranked lower.188 
Liberals, radicals, and conservatives alike were threatening reprisals against what they 
perceived as the news media’s blatant, widespread bias against their positions and in favor of 
their respective opposition. 
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 “A free society cannot endure without a free press and the freedom of the press 
ultimately rests on the public understanding of, and trust in its work,” the task force said in 
the opening page of its report.189 To foster this public understanding, the report called for a 
private, independent, national mechanism for handling complaints about the accuracy and 
fairness of news reporting. It was to be available to the public as well as journalists 
themselves, who were often their own most ardent critics. The council was also to report on 
matters that threatened press freedom, but that function was largely obscured by its role as a 
monitor of press practices.190 Indeed, the name originally suggested by the task force for the 
council was “Council on Press Responsibility and Press Freedom.”191 
 The report anticipated that some journalists might see the council as a mechanism for 
inciting greater public hostility toward the press or for curtailing its freedom through 
criticism. To the contrary, the report insisted, the council was designed “to make press 
freedom more secure by providing an independent forum for debate about media 
responsibility and performance, so that the debate need not take place in government hearing 
rooms or on the political campaign trail.”192 The council was to be an alternative to costly and 
time-consuming litigation. 
 The council functioned for eleven years, applying and perhaps establishing ethical 
criteria for journalism through a program of periodic review and constructive public 
criticism. With public criticism as its only enforcement tool, the council was opposed or 
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ignored by large and influential news media institutions from its inception until its demise in 
1984.193 The council included journalists and non-journalists, and fielded complaints from 
people who found fault with the way news was gathered or presented. The council initially 
focused only on complaints made against the national print news media, but it gradually 
revised its procedures so that it also covered the electronic media and initiated investigations 
on its own. It required complainants to promise not to use any of the council’s findings or 
pronouncements in any subsequent legal action. It investigated 227 complaints and 
determined whether they were justified. In making these determinations, the council did not 
use any particular journalism ethics code as a guide to judging journalists’ actions. Its 
determinations were worded in a style that mimicked appellate court decisions; they included 
explanations and rationales for the findings, used the term “upheld” when a complaint was 
found valid and even included concurring and dissenting opinions by individual members of 
the council.194 Council findings were initially distributed by the Associated Press, but for 
most of the council’s existence the findings were printed in The Columbia Journalism 
Review. 
 Norman E. Isaacs, an experienced journalist who led the National News Council for 
six years, insisted there was an urgent need for the council to help journalists establish 
professional standards in the late 1970s and into the 1980s because the public had no reason 
to appreciate the worth of a free press and would be loath to defend it against the onslaught 
of criticism from government officials. He accordingly concluded that journalism ethics were 
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important to the country as a whole. “[T]he only way democracy can work successfully is 
through a value system that puts honorable public service in the reporting of events as 
accurately as possible, interpreting them honestly and analyzing them fairly. That kind of 
journalism can win back the confidence of the citizenry,” he wrote.195 
 From 1976 until 1982 the National News Council achieved its highest level of 
effectiveness, according to chroniclers of the organization’s work.196 That was because it was 
the period when Isaacs was its chairman. Isaacs had been editor of the Louisville Courier-
Journal and the Louisville Times, a contributor to and leader of the Columbia Journalism 
Review and president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. During his tenure, the 
council criticized or praised the major news organizations in accord with its findings, and the 
council gained some respect as a protector of free-press principles despite the fact that few 
knew it existed.197 After Isaacs left the post, the council’s problems with media support, scant 
public awareness, and insufficient funding moved from the background to the foreground, 
forcing it into a spiraling decline that culminated in the council’s executive board vote on 
March 22, 1984, that dissolved the organization.198 
 The conditions that prompted the creation of the National News Council — a 
fundamental lack of public trust in the news media and the perceived erosion of support for 
press freedom — remained unabated at the council’s death and appeared to worsen in some 
respects during the next decade. In the mid-1990s, some high-profile journalists began to 
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publicly mourn the news council’s death and campaigned for its resurrection.199 Television 
journalist Mike Wallace, a fixture on the CBS news magazine, 60 Minutes, galvanized the 
brief movement with a speech at Harvard in 1995 and followed up some months later by 
writing an article on the issue for a prominent trade magazine.200 The effort to revive the 
council caused a number of trade magazines to print articles exploring the idea, but it revived 
opposition as well. An article in Editor & Publisher indicated support from the president of 
the Society of Professional Journalists,201 and the American Journalism Review202 reported 
substantial public support for the news council idea. Editor Joseph Lelyveld of The New York 
Times reiterated his paper’s opposition to the council.203 A year later, little was written about 
Wallace’s suggestion as the movement to revive the National News Council had apparently 
quietly ended. 
 Some of the concerns that suppressed the writing of journalism ethics codes and 
softened the strictures of many codes that were written also were raised in opposition to news 
councils. New York Times editor A.M. Rosenthal, for example, criticized the National News 
Council in 1981, claiming that by fostering public and professional scrutiny and criticism of 
the press to make it function more professionally, it was easing the way for government 
                                                 
199 As early as 1991 some intellectuals and practicing journalists had suggested recreating the National News 
Council. See, e.g., EVERETTE E. DENNIS & JOHN MERRILL, MEDIA DEBATES, ISSUES IN MASS COMMUNICATION 
(1991); Debra Gersh, Resurrect the National News Council? EDITOR & PUBLISHER, May 8, 1993, at 12; John 
Hughes, Could a Press Council Improve Journalism? CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 17, 1994, at 19. 
 
200 Mike Wallace, Why My Mind Has Changed About the Value of a National News Council, Speech Delivered 
for Goldsmith Awards Ceremony at the Joan Shorenstein on Press, Politics and Public Policy, Harvard 
University (Mar. 9, 1995) available at http://www.news-council.org/archives/95wal.html (last visited March 17, 
2006); Mike Wallace, The Press Under Fire, QUILL, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 20. 
 
201 M.L. Stein, Revive the News Council? EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Mar. 29, 1997, at 8. 
 
202 Alicia C. Shepard, Going Public, AM. JOURNALISM REV., April 1997, at 29. 
 
203 Evan Jenkins, News Councils: The Case for and Against, COL. JOURNALISM REV., March/April 1997, at 39. 
 
 98
restrictions on the free press. “Peer pressure can lead to regulatory pressure,” Rosenthal 
warned.204 Just as the specific strictures of an ethics code might be used against a journalist at 
trial, news council decisions could similarly be cited in a courtroom effort to discredit a 
journalist’s actions, former wire service editor Clay Haswell claimed in a debate about 
councils.205 Codes and councils came to be seen as threats to press freedom. 
 Agitation for a national news council appeared to have been laid to rest at the end of 
the 20th century, but a tiny number of state and regional news councils continued to function, 
although not always for very long. Foremost among them is the Minnesota News Council, 
which was founded in 1971, two years before its nationwide counterpart, and still survives.206 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Since the earliest days of the American republic, journalists have been periodically 
pressured by their peers and the public to improve their professional performance. During the 
past century, internal and external criticism has prompted the creation of a limited variety of 
mechanisms to establish and maintain ethical professional standards for the practice of 
journalism. Ethics codes have been the most enduring and widely used of these, despite the 
fact that their efficacy has been questioned from the outset and never proved. Approaches to 
ethics codes have varied with the social, political, and legal climate of the periods that 
produced successive calls for press reform, but debates about the worth and dangers of codes 
have been a constant accompaniment.  
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 Enforceable codes have been the means of improvement suggested most often, but 
not exclusively, by those outside the profession; they have been opposed most often by those 
within. Journalists have never widely agreed to allow anyone, even themselves, to compel 
ethical or professional behavior. As a result, the only codes that consistently claimed any 
enforcement power were those produced for individual newsrooms and treated as conditions 
of employment. The codes produced by professional associations of journalists historically 
have articulated the highest ideals but carried no compelling power beyond the assumption 
that peer pressure is the best way to serve those ideals without diminishing or even 
threatening journalists’ constitutionally endowed freedom.  
 Journalists and some free press advocates have had a long-standing fear that 
enforceable ethics codes or codes that specifically defined professional standards of practice 
would serve as a blueprint or precedent for the eventual imposition of legal limitations on 
press freedom. That fear, which is not without a basis in America’s legislative history, has 
counseled against putting codes in writing and caused written codes to be expressed so 
vaguely at times that they provided little guidance or merely implied the existence of 
standards. The latter approach was devised to allow press defense lawyers leeway to 
maneuver around written codes or discount them as fleshless hopes if they were used by 
opponents in court to show how far journalists had strayed from professional standards and 
ethical practices. 
 No single demand for professional standards, press reforms, or systematic criticism of 
the press has had as much influence on journalism discourse and practice as the Hutchins 
Commission Report. Two government commission reports, issued by the Kerner and Warren 
commissions as they addressed other issues, criticized particular press practices and offered 
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corrective suggestions, but their influence pales dramatically in comparison with the 
Hutchins Commission Report. That document was not the first or the last to call for 
professional-level training for journalists, higher standards for gathering and disseminating 
news, and systems of self-correction, or to recognize a social responsibility to the public. The 
report warned the press that if it did not exercise its First Amendment rights in a socially 
responsible manner, the law would be empowered by public dissatisfaction to force the press 
into socially responsible behavior by curtailing its rights.  
 The Hutchins Report’s proposal for a non-governmental news council to field the 
public’s complaints about the press and encourage socially responsible practices through peer 
pressure lay fallow for more than a quarter of a century. When the National News Council 
experiment was eventually tried, it ended in failure after eleven years. That experience was 
an indication that not even a purely private joint effort by journalists and the public to 
encourage ethical behavior by means no more coercive than public criticism could generate 
continuing widespread support among journalists. The fears that attended the creation of 
ethics codes attached to the news council as well. Notable among them was the apprehension 
that councils were forerunners to the imposition of legal strictures on journalism’s freedoms. 
It is ironic that codes and news councils were initially conceived as a means of warding off 
government efforts to regulate journalists into moral propriety but came to be feared as an 
entrèe to government regulation. 
  The proliferation of the social responsibility theory of the press, as espoused 
by the Hutchins Report, may well prepare the public to accept or even ask for legal controls 
on the press because it is an instrumentalist concept. This may help explain why press 
defense lawyers have been so fearful of written codes. Ethics codes for any profession are 
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based on notions of social responsibility. Codes are premised on a determination that a 
particular field of endeavor is so important to the public that society must require high 
standards of performance. Those who crafted journalism ethics codes and proposed news 
councils understood that credible journalism was necessary to create the informed electorate 
that is so essential to a properly functioning democracy. Accordingly, high standards of 
journalism had to be established. And if journalists did not set and abide by them on their 
own, pragmatic instrumentalist theory says the people and the law they craft to serve them 
would do the job by default. Journalism standards crafted by non-journalists, according to 
some scholars, are likely to differ from those journalists would set for themselves.207 Lawyers 
and jurists have been crafting journalism standards for years, according to veteran attorney 
and journalism advocate Lee Levine. 
I have for a long time bemoaned the fact that the legal standards that comprise 
the laws of libel and invasion of privacy, and now the law of newsgathering, 
have been crafted in a manner that often displays a breathtaking ignorance of 
the realities of daily journalism. The result has been that journalistic conduct 
is governed, in a very real sense, by rules crafted not by news professionals, 
but by lawyers and judges -- rules that make little or no sense, that create all 
the wrong incentives, and that are too often based, not on careful 
consideration of professional standards, but on a kind of judicial hysteria 
emanating from the facts of a particularly egregious case.208  
 
In many instances, judges’ criticisms or affirmations of journalism standards have been 
grounded in the Hutchins Report’s take on the social responsibility of the press. Although the 
report is specifically mentioned in only two U.S. Supreme Court opinions,209 the analyses in 
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the following chapters of this dissertation finds the concept frequently in rulings dealing with 
truth, privacy, and other fundamental principles of journalism ethics. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Truth and Truth Telling: First Principle and Prime Directive 
 
 The canon of truth telling is fundamental to American journalism and is perhaps the 
profession’s universally embraced ethical principle. Virtually every American code of 
journalism ethics and statement of ethical principles enshrines truth telling as a preeminent 
value. When the Hutchins Commission completed its landmark study of mass media in the 
United States and issued its influential report on press responsibility in 1947, it too lauded the 
value of truth telling. When it compiled a list of what society required of the press, a “truthful 
account” of the day’s events was foremost. “The first requirement is that the media should be 
accurate,” the report said. “They should not lie.”1 Nearly a half century later, when 
journalism ethicists Jay Black, Bob Steele, and Ralph Barney formulated guiding principles 
for the Society of Professional Journalists, they began the list with: “Seek truth and report it 
as fully as possible.”2 
 Truth telling is also the issue most frequently at the heart of rulings made by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in cases that deal with matters that are also addressed by the principles of 
journalism ethics. With few exceptions, the Court’s rulings involving truth telling were made 
in libel cases because a libel complaint in the United States necessarily includes an allegation 
that a reputation-damaging publication is not true. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 which 
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is widely considered the most important libel ruling handed down by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, the axiomatic value of truth telling was undermined when the Court crafted a rule of 
law to protect The New York Times from liability for publishing statements that were not true. 
The new rule decreed that public officials who sue for libel must prove the defamatory 
statement was published with actual malice. That meant the publisher knew the statement 
was false or published the statement with a reckless disregard for whether it was false. A 
series of subsequent cases extended the rule to public figures who sue for libel.4 
 The ruling in Sullivan was generally hailed by the major news media in 1964 as a 
benefit to journalism, and none immediately saw it as a threat to one of the profession’s 
fundamental principles. Newsweek magazine, for example, called the ruling “a decision that 
greatly strengthens American journalism.”5 Time magazine saw the ruling not only as a boon 
for journalism, but a victory for the people as well. “The decision granted the U.S. citizen 
dramatic new immunity in the exercise of his classic right to sound off against his chosen 
leaders,” the magazine said.6 A Washington Post editorial similarly praised the ruling but 
also addressed the ethical issues of fairness and truth telling, which were implicated in the 
ruling. The editorial’s tone nonetheless seemed hopeful. “Among private citizens and the 
media which serve them, these opinions will be read with a new sense of the responsibility 
that our system imposes upon citizens themselves, and the media through which they speak, 
for fairness and restraint and for conformity to the truth in the presentation of public issues.”7 
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7 Criticizing Public Servants, WASH. POST, March 10, 1964, at A16. 
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 An examination of the Sullivan ruling is integral to the larger purpose of this study, 
which seeks to determine whether the Supreme Court’s legal edicts are creating a judicial 
version of a code of ethics for journalists. The case is also crucial to this chapter, which 
focuses on U.S. Supreme Court rulings that address truth-telling issues and determine 
whether they bolster or undermine the value that journalism ethics assigns to truth. This 
study does not equate ethics with law but recognizes both as societal constructs that assign 
values to human behaviors as a means of identifying them as proper or improper, and right or 
wrong. Though clearly not synonymous, law and ethics share the goal of encouraging proper 
behavior and discouraging that which is not. 
 Truth-telling behaviors have been vital issues in the American law of libel since truth 
was deemed to provide an absolute legal defense to the tort.8 By making libel a tort 
compensable by money damages, the law was positioned to function as an affirmation of the 
ethical value assigned to truth telling. By permitting the imposition of such legal sanctions on 
those who do not tell the truth, libel law affirmed and underscored the value of truth. Libel 
law has empowered the truth with the ability to ward off the legal imposition of money 
damages for reputation-damaging statements. Since the Sullivan ruling, however, falsehood 
is also sometimes protected. In cases involving public plaintiffs, falsehood that is not known 
to be false or is not the result of a reckless disregard for the truth, is treated as the legal 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
8 Truth did not become an absolute defense to libel on any particular day but did so gradually through a series of 
court rulings and legislative enactments across the country. When the U.S. Constitution was ratified, the English 
common law had been grafted onto American common law, and truth was already well established as a defense 
to civil libel, according to Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a 
Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1964). The landmark criminal libel trial of newspaper printer John 
Peter Zenger (Attorney General v. John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s State Trials 675 (1735)) in colonial New 
York was a seminal case in the American colonists’ break from the English common law tradition of not 
allowing truth as a defense to criminal libel. New York, Virginia, and Massachusetts were among the first to 
allow truth as a common law defense. Statutes followed in the early 1800s, and New York ultimately embodied 
the defense in its constitution. See generally CLIFTON O. LAWHORNE, DEFAMATION AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 
(1971); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING THE BEST MEN (1986). 
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equivalent of truth and is accordingly endowed with the equivalent ability to provide 
protection from liability. In short, falsehoods that are published without actual malice are as 
free of liability as the truth is. With Sullivan and its progeny, the Court established one 
standard of care for journalists attempting to tell the truth about a private person and a 
second, lesser standard for statements about public officials and figures. Under the Sullivan 
standard, if journalists publish false, defamatory statements about a private person as a result 
of negligence, they are liable. To incur liability to a public person, the law says the journalist 
must have knowingly or recklessly published the false defamatory statement. This study has 
not found any journalism ethics code that makes such distinctions. 
 Unlike the Court’s rulings in Sullivan and its progeny, journalism codes of ethics and 
statements of ethical principles have been consistently more stringent in assigning culpability 
for failures to tell the truth. The 1975 code of ethics adopted by the Society of Professional 
Journalists, for example, said, “There is no excuse for inaccuracies or lack of thoroughness.”9 
The Supreme Court, as this study will demonstrate, has accepted some excuses. 
 This chapter begins with a two-part examination of the genesis, rationale, and impact 
of the Court’s ruling in Times v. Sullivan. It examines the ruling as a statement of legal 
precepts that further political and social goals and enhance the constitutional guarantee of a 
free press. The second part of the examination is an attempt to determine whether the Court’s 
pursuit of these values and goals produced a ruling that is inimical to the high value 
journalism ethics codes assign to truth seeking and truth telling.  
 This discussion of the Court’s pursuit of social goals in the Sullivan ruling is guided 
by the theory of pragmatic instrumentalism, which claims that social engineering and other 
                                                 
9 Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Ethics, reprinted in PHILIP MEYER, ETHICAL 
JOURNALISM 253 (1987). 
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moral or social concerns may be an unavoidable component of court rulings and an important 
motivation for them. The discussion also assesses the potential practical impact of the actual 
malice rule that was imbedded in American libel law by the Sullivan decision. The actual 
malice rule created two distinct legal standards of care for attempts to tell the truth and two 
standards of culpability for failures to do so. Journalism ethics recognizes but one. 
 From the ruling in Sullivan, this chapter moves to a three-part consideration of the 
truth-telling canon in the ensuing line of libel cases that expanded or limited the legal 
principles that Sullivan established. The next section of this chapter examines cases in which 
the Supreme Court addressed truth-telling values outside the libel arena. 
 
Times v. Sullivan: Undervaluing Truth 
 Truth telling is an essential function of journalism, which is defined here as fact-
based mass communication presented in a news medium. Fact-based commentary is included 
in that definition. Some Court rulings examined here were made in cases in which journalists 
were not parties, but the rulings address issues covered by journalism ethics. The ruling in 
Sullivan is the perfect example. No practitioners of journalism as defined above were 
involved in the publication of the libelous statements that were at issue in the case. It was the 
performance of The New York Times’ advertising staff, not its journalists, that generated the 
legal controversy, but the ruling has always been applied to journalism and the truth-telling 
issues addressed by journalism ethics. 
 Neither the Sullivan ruling nor any other Court opinions examined here reveal an 
overt effort to undermine or bolster journalists’ avowed devotion to truth or any other ethical 
principle. Nonetheless, the Court has made legal pronouncements that intrude, perhaps 
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unavoidably, into areas this study identifies as matters of journalism ethics. The Court has 
often explained these rulings as efforts to protect the free press rights established by the U.S. 
Constitution to enable the press to perform its proper role in the maintenance of the 
American system of democracy. These excursions into journalism ethics were arguably 
motivated by the Court’s need to reach and resolve legal issues. But they also can be 
explained generically as judicial activism to serve social goals, or for the more specific 
purposes of this study, they can be interpreted as exercises in pragmatic instrumentalism as 
defined by Robert Samuel Summers.10 
 Summers, a Cornell law professor whose theory of pragmatic instrumentalism was 
introduced in 1982, postulates that court rulings and other embodiments of law are tools 
“devised to serve practical ends.”11 He sees law as a means to achieve particular social goals 
directly or indirectly, and he questions whether any court adjudicates without interjecting 
value judgments. Judges, according to pragmatic instrumentalist theory, determine the result 
or social effect they want cases to have and then dress their rulings in the legalisms necessary 
to support and justify them. Viewed through this theoretical framework, the ruling in Times 
v. Sullivan can be seen as much an expression of the Supreme Court’s commitment to 
achieving racial integration and social justice as it was a reaffirmation of American free press 
principles. 
 In pursuing social justice, the Court declined plaintiff L. B. Sullivan’s invitation to 
decide the case in a manner that would have affirmed the value journalism ethics ascribe to 
truth. It also declined the opportunity to promote this aspect of social responsibility in the 
                                                 
10 See generally ROBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY (1982). 
 
11 Id. at 20. 
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press – a goal endorsed by the Hutchins Commission with the proviso that the press reform 
itself with codes of ethical behavior without interference by courts or other arms of 
government. A socially responsible press is one that hews closely to the truth-telling 
principle, according to the commission. And such a press presumably would not have two 
government-sanctioned standards of truth telling – one rigorous and the other considerably 
less so. 
 The publication that ultimately led to the landmark ruling in Times v. Sullivan was a 
paid advertisement placed in The New York Times to solicit support in the battle to achieve 
racial integration and social justice in Alabama. The case landed at the Supreme Court’s 
doorstep because the ad contained reputation-damaging statements that were not true, and 
Alabama’s highest court found that failing to be a sufficient reason to make the newspaper 
liable for monetary damages. 
 Sullivan, an elected city commissioner in Montgomery, Alabama, filed a libel lawsuit 
against The New York Times after it published a full-page advertisement on March 29, 1960, 
that claimed Montgomery police officers had misused their authority and that government 
officials were persecuting Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the Civil Rights Movement 
then under way in Alabama. Sullivan claimed the advertisement damaged his reputation 
because he was the city’s commissioner of public affairs and therefore in charge of the police 
department. The ad listed supporters and participants in the movement and bore the title 
“Heed Their Rising Voices.” Its ten paragraphs of text stated that thousands of black students 
were conducting non-violent demonstrations in an effort to secure the civil rights extended to 
all Americans by the U.S. Constitution. These students’ efforts were being met by “an 
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unprecedented wave of terror,” according to the ad.12 It also claimed that in Montgomery, 
“truckloads of police armed with shotguns and tear-gas ringed the Alabama State College 
Campus.” The ad later said: 
[T]he Southern violators have answered Dr. King’s peaceful protests with 
intimidation and violence. They have bombed his home almost killing his wife 
and child. They have assaulted his person. They have arrested him seven times 
for “speeding,” “loitering” and similar “offenses.” And now they have 
charged him with “perjury” — a felony under which they could imprison him 
for ten years.13 
 Sullivan had laid out a claim of libel per se under Alabama law. The newspaper’s 
most effective defense would have been truth, but that defense was unavailable because the 
ad’s statements were not scrupulously true. Alabama law allowed truth as a defense only if 
the statements at issue could be proven true in all their particulars.14 Supreme Court Justice 
William Brennan’s opinion in the case observed early on, “It is uncontroverted that some of 
the statements contained in the two paragraphs are not accurate descriptions of events which 
occurred in Montgomery.”15  
 Brennan cited at least eight factual misstatements in the ad’s ten paragraphs. 
Alabama’s Supreme Court found Sullivan’s libel claim had been sufficiently proven and 
accordingly affirmed a jury award of $500,000 in damages. Central to the Alabama ruling 
was its high court’s reliance on prior U.S. Supreme Court statements in seven cases 
indicating that the Constitution did not protect libelous publications.16 Brennan, however, 
                                                 
12 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 257. 
 
13 Id. at 257-58. 
 
14 Id. at 267. 
 
15 Id. at 258. 
 
16 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 
43, 48 (1961); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 
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observed that none of those cases approved the use of libel laws to punish criticism of public 
officials’ official conduct and that “libel can claim no talismanic immunity from 
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First 
Amendment.”17 Brennan saw the lawsuit as providing a government official the means to 
punish those who had criticized his job performance. This view apparently was not altered by 
the fact that falsity tainted the particular criticism at issue. 
 Sullivan’s attorneys saw the case as a potential threat to the value of truth and a 
person’s ability to protect his reputation. This was reflected in a brief they filed with the 
Court after it agreed to hear the Times’ appeal from the Alabama Supreme Court. That brief 
framed the issues in a manner that supported the journalism canon of truth telling. The 
question Sullivan’s attorneys said the Court had to decide was: “Does a newspaper 
corporation have a constitutionally guaranteed absolute privilege to defame an elected city 
official in a paid newspaper advertisement so that the corporation is immune from a private 
common law libel?”18 
 Deeper within the brief, Sullivan’s attorneys hammered away at the potential damage 
a Times victory could inflict on the value of truth: 
If the Times prevails, any false statement about any public official comes 
within this protected category. . . . The constitution has never required that 
states afford newspapers the privilege of leveling false and defamatory “facts” 
at persons simply because they hold public office. The great weight of 
American authority has rejected such a plea by newspapers.19 
                                                                                                                                                       
(1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 348-49 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 
(1942); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 715 (1931). 
 
17 Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-69. 
 
18 Brief for Respondent at 1, Sullivan (No. 39). 
 
19 Id. at 22-23. 
 
 
 
112 
After dwelling on the need to preserve the value of truth and a single standard for it, the brief 
attempted to head off apparent efforts by the Times and several supportive groups to entwine 
the case with the social justice issues that were at the heart of the Civil Rights Movement. 
Rulings the Court had made in the decade leading up to the Sullivan case helped the 
movement achieve important goals, and the Sullivan camp had sufficient reason to believe 
the Court’s sentiments lay with these social goals, which were identical to those touted by the 
Times ad.20 
  Others who have studied that period of Supreme Court adjudication have remarked 
on the Court’s apparent sentiments and willingness to direct the outcome of this social issue 
controversy. Constitutional law scholars Henry J. Abraham and Barbara A. Perry, for 
example, described the Court’s landmark ruling in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
which outlawed racial segregation in public schools, as “one of the most far-reaching in our 
history in terms of its social impact. It catalyzed the issue of racial discrimination. . . . 
Conscious of its position as a national moral goad, the Court had led.”21 
 Sullivan’s lawyers were apparently fearful the Court would again take the lead, and 
they attempted to impress upon the tribunal that this was a relatively straightforward libel 
case and not a vehicle for advancing or resolving the racial and social issues that the Times 
and its amici curiae were trying to imbed in the case. Sullivan’s brief referred to written 
arguments submitted by the Times and its supporters that went “outside the record” of the 
case and took pains to inform the Court that similar libel lawsuits had been filed by the rest 
                                                 
20 The most noteworthy of these cases found racial segregation of the public schools to be unconstitutional. See 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 
21 HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT 336 (7th ed. 1998). 
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of the Montgomery City Commission against various news media.22 The Times supporters, 
particularly the Washington Post, indicated that these lawsuits were an attempt by Alabama 
officials to use libel law as a weapon to forestall integration, thwart social justice, and 
undermine the Civil Rights Movement by punishing the media that furthered such goals by 
publication.23 
 Pursuant to the effort to frame the libel lawsuit as part of a concerted effort to deny 
civil rights to blacks in Alabama, the Washington Post’s amicus brief informed the Court that 
lawsuits demanding aggregate damages in the millions of dollars had been filed against the 
Times, not only by the three incumbent Montgomery commissioners but by a former 
commissioner and the governor as well. The Post’s brief laid out details of what it construed 
to be a conspiracy of libel lawsuits:  
Nor were these litigations merely isolated instances. On the contrary, they 
appear to have been part of a broad attempt by officials in Alabama to invoke 
the libel laws against all those who had the temerity to criticize Alabama’s 
conduct in the intense racial conflict. Thus, seven libel suits were commenced 
in Alabama against the New York Times based on an article written by 
Harrison Salisbury concerning racial conflict in the State; and at least five 
Alabama officials filed libel actions against the Columbia Broadcasting 
System, based on its coverage of the conflict.24 
The brief accordingly framed the central issue facing the Court as a determination of whether 
the federal Constitution allows a state to use its libel law to “suppress and punish expressions 
of support for the cause of racial equality” and deny dissidents access to the mass media.25 
                                                 
22 Brief for Respondent at 52, Sullivan (No. 39). 
 
23 Petition for Certiorari at 19, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (No. 39). 
 
24 Brief of the Washington Post Company as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 7-8, Sullivan (No. 39). 
 
25 Id. at 1. 
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This was essentially the view expressed by Brennan when he wrote the decision embodying 
the Court’s unanimous reversal of the Alabama judgment against the Times. 
 Brennan wasted no time in revealing how he framed the issue. The first paragraph of 
the 33-page opinion said, “We are required in this case to determine for the first time the 
extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a State’s power to 
award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official 
conduct.”26 He ultimately determined that the state had wielded power beyond the limits 
permitted by the U.S. Constitution. “We hold that the rule of law applied by the Alabama 
courts is constitutionally deficient.”27 
 Alabama’s application of libel law in this case was likened to the enforcement of 
criminal seditious libel, a practice the Court found abhorrent and constitutionally 
impermissible. A comparison of Alabama law with the seditious libel laws of colonial 
America was highlighted in an amicus brief the Chicago Tribune submitted to the Court.28 
Seditious libel imposed criminal punishment on those who criticized the government. In that 
government exists only in the personae of the individuals who staff it, criticism of 
government, under Alabama’s application of the “of and concerning” element of libel law,29 
constituted criticism of those individuals, according to Brennan’s reasoning. Criticism of 
government became personal criticism that made the critic vulnerable to a libel suit. As a 
result, libel lawsuits had been transformed into sedition prosecutions that substituted civil 
                                                 
26 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
 
27 Id. at 264. 
 
28 Brief of the Tribune Company as Amicus Curiae at 10-15, Sullivan (No. 39). 
 
29 Libel plaintffs must prove the defamatory statement at issue is of or about themselves. That is, the statement 
identifies them in a defamatory context. See generally, ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION §2.9.1 (3rd ed. 
1999). 
 
 
 
115 
damages for criminal penalties. Either route could be expected to impermissibly suppress or 
chill public commentary on government, Brennan concluded. 
 However, a libel lawsuit, unlike a criminal prosecution for sedition, requires that the 
criticism or the allegations supporting the criticism be false. Truth would spare the critic. But 
the Times’ criticism lacked a full measure of truth. Brennan, however, determined that “[t]he 
state rule of [libel] law is not saved by its allowance of the defense of truth.”30 Here 
Brennan’s opinion brokered the value of truth to ensure greater protection for critics of 
government. He said, “[C]onstitutional protection does not turn upon ‘the truth, popularity, or 
social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are offered.’ . . . [E]rroneous statement is 
inevitable in free debate and . . . it must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to 
have the ‘breathing space’ that they need . . . to survive.”31  
 The Court decided that the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment required 
additions to the list of elements government officials must prove when suing for defamatory 
statements about their official conduct. An official would hereafter be required to prove with 
clear and convincing evidence that the statement was false and the defendant had made it 
with “actual malice,” which was defined as “knowledge that [the statement] was false or with 
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”32  
 The Court said the Times did not know that a number of statements in the ad were 
false. Even though the newspaper’s files contained accurate accounts of the incidents falsely 
referred to by the ad, the Court said the failure to check those files was, in effect, excusable. 
                                                 
30 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278. 
 
31 Id. at 271-72 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 445). 
 
32 Id. at 280. 
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The advertising department employees’ failure to check the news files did not amount to a 
reckless disregard for whether the statements were true. The fact “that they relied on their 
knowledge of the good reputation of many of those whose names were listed as sponsors of 
the advertisement” was sufficiently solicitous of the truth under the Court’s new standard.33 
Alabama’s top court had considered the ad department employees’ actions to be a “cavalier 
ignoring of the falsity of the advertisement,”34 and that tribunal had chosen not to allow 
deviation from the truth to be less culpable in such circumstances. 
 And so the Court set itself on the path of providing some falsity with much of the 
same legal protection given to truth in the arena of libel law. It decided that falsity must be 
tolerated to some degree in order to foster free speech. Falsehoods that were neither 
intentional nor reckless were protected as if they were truths in discussions of public 
officials’ performance of their duties. 
 
Actual Malice and Pragmatic Instrumentalism 
 A pragmatic instrumentalist seeking an ulterior basis for the Sullivan ruling could 
readily find evidence in Court papers to support a contention that the outcome was 
determined to a significant degree by the racial integration and social justice controversies 
that underlay the case and provided its historic framework. Sullivan’s attorneys filed a brief 
that included a complaint about their opponents’ deliberate efforts to align the case with the 
struggle over other social issues: 
                                                 
33 Id. at 287. The Times employees also relied on a letter from civil rights activist A. Philip Randolph 
confirming the authorization of the ad’s sponsors. 
 
34 Id. at 286. 
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In a desperate effort to secure review in this Court, the Times and its friends 
go outside the record and refer this Court to other libel suits pending in 
Alabama. With the exception of two brought by the other Montgomery 
commissioners, all are erroneously and uncandidly labeled “companion 
cases.” But the effort is as revealing as it is desperate. Clearly, petitioner feels 
that this case, standing on its own, does not present grounds for review.35 
 In short, the Sullivan ruling is arguably an example of the Court using or creating law 
to further a social goal. The Times and its amici appealed to the Court’s apparent affinity for 
those social goals when they used legal briefs to play the pragmatic instrumentalist card – 
framing the case in a manner that offered the Court an opportunity to pursue its liberal 
agenda on another front. Sullivan’s attorneys played the same card, but it was geared to 
entice the Court to pursue the social goal the Hutchins Commission referred to as the “social 
responsibility of the press.” The concept of a socially responsible press has been a major 
justification and impetus for the creation of journalism codes of ethics. The brief submitted 
by Sullivan’s attorneys extolled truth as integral to a responsible press, especially in public 
discussions of social matters such as racial issues. “Surely in a field so tense, truthful 
statements by huge and influential newspapers are imperative,” the brief said.36 It urged the 
Court to follow the lead of Alabama’s Supreme Court, whose ruling, if affirmed, could help 
make the press more responsible and solicitous of the truth. “The enormity of petitioner’s 
wrong is clear,” the brief argued. “Hopefully the decision below will impel adherence by this 
immensely powerful newspaper to high standards of responsible journalism commensurate 
with its size.”37 
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 In the Sullivan case, the Court was in a position to make a ruling that could have 
prodded journalists toward greater allegiance to the ethical canon of truth. The Alabama 
courts had taken that step, although it is not argued here that journalism ethics were a 
consideration for the Alabama courts. By affirming the state court’s ruling, the Court would 
have done what the Hutchins Commission had warned members of the press the government 
might seek to do. That warning was made repeatedly in the commission’s report in a variety 
of guises. The following excerpt is typical. “In the judgment of the Commission everyone 
concerned with the freedom of the press and with the future of democracy should put forth 
every effort to make the press accountable, for if it does not become so of its own motion, the 
power of government will be used, as a last resort, to force it to be so.”38 
 The Court did not choose to use its power to make the press more accountable, but 
less so. It told journalists, in effect, that they did not have to be as careful in securing the 
truth when the reputation of a government official was at stake. It chose a path that exerts 
less force on journalists to be more responsible truth tellers than did the Alabama Supreme 
Court decision it overturned. The Sullivan case invoked the Court’s power to allow or restrict 
civil penalties for failing to tell the truth. The Court chose the latter path. 
 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion in Sullivan addressed more than the law of libel. It 
tackled fundamental social and political issues that have troubled the country for nearly two 
centuries. In pursuit of these larger issues, the Court did damage to the value of truth, which 
libel law had traditionally recognized and affirmed. Libel law had conferred upon truth the 
power to absolve those who made reputation-damaging statements. But in Sullivan, truth was 
denigrated in the process of providing greater protection to those who would criticize the 
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government. The creation and application of “actual malice” as a legal concept allowed some 
false criticism to be given the same protection as criticism based in truth. Truth became less 
important if the victim of a reputation-damaging misstatement was a government official. An 
uncompromising allegiance to truth, as advocated by journalism codes of ethics, was 
reworked in the law forum and identified as strict liability and constitutionally unacceptable 
because it impinged on free speech. The Times employees’ failure to verify the allegations 
against Sullivan became legally excusable. Falsehoods that were the result of incompetence, 
negligence, or accident, as opposed to intentional lies or reckless statements, were protected 
as if they were the truths. These effects of the treatment of truth are examined to a greater 
extent in the following section of the study, which reviews cases that have expanded some of 
the legal precepts established in the Sullivan ruling.  
 
Sullivan’s Progeny 
 A central feature of the Sullivan ruling was the Court’s refusal to ascribe actual 
malice to the newspaper advertising department employees’ failure to verify the allegations 
made in the “Heed Their Rising Voices” ad. A comparable failure by journalists was not 
treated so tolerantly three years later when the Court ruled in another libel lawsuit, Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts.39 This was actually two rulings in two libel cases consolidated in one 
opinion because the legal issues presented were nearly identical. The second case was 
Associated Press v. Walker. Both cases required the Court to review libel judgments in which 
journalists had allegedly violated the truth-telling canon and thereby damaged the reputations 
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of plaintiffs who were not government employees or public officials, but who were deemed 
to be public figures. 
 The plurality ruling was a tentative step toward further expansion of the Court’s 
protection of journalists’ failures to tell the truth. The effort to extend the actual malice 
standard to published falsehoods about public figures did not attract a majority of the justices 
in Butts, but it would in a later case.40 The Butts ruling also shows the Court making value 
judgments about journalistic conduct and practices that would make failures to tell the truth 
culpable. These were judgments about matters clearly within the ambit of journalism ethics. 
The Court reviewed the journalists’ conduct – how they pursued truth – in both cases and 
granted protection in one when it determined the lapses were not bad enough to warrant 
culpability as actual malice or highly unreasonable conduct. It frowned on the journalism 
practices at issue in the other and accordingly found they did descend to a level that would 
make the journalists liable. The Court, therefore, affirmed that lower court ruling penalizing 
the journalists’ conduct. As stated by Justice John Marshall Harlan in the Butts plurality 
opinion:  
[N]either the interests of the publisher nor those of society necessarily 
preclude a damage award based on improper conduct which creates a false 
publication. It is the conduct element, therefore, on which we must principally 
focus if we are successfully to resolve the antithesis between civil libel actions 
and the freedom of speech and press.41 
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With that avowed orientation, it appears that a plurality of the Court crafted a ruling that 
mimicked the role of journalism ethics if, as ethicist Louis Hodges says, ethics is concerned 
with what one “ought” to do.42  
 A close reading of the Butts opinion reveals a Court determination that the journalists 
employed by the defendant Saturday Evening Post ought to have done a better job of 
verifying allegations of misconduct against Wally Butts, the athletic director at the 
University of Georgia. Butts sued for libel after the magazine published an article claiming 
he had conspired to cause his university’s football team to lose a 1962 game against the 
University of Alabama by providing the opposing coach with Georgia’s game plan and 
specific plays. In an article bearing the headline “The Story of a College Football Fix,” the 
Post published the allegations based on information provided by an insurance salesman who 
said he had accidentally overheard a telephone conversation in which Butts provided the 
Alabama coach with game plans. Harlan’s opinion noted that the Post’s journalists knew the 
salesman had been previously convicted on bad-check charges but did not test his credibility 
independently Although there was no crushing deadline pressure to publish the story, the 
journalist assigned to write it was not an expert on the sport and the story was not offered to 
an expert to review before publication. The opinion also included references to the Post’s 
new shift in editorial policy to embrace “sophisticated muckraking” and suggested “the 
pressure to produce an expose might have induced a stretching of standards.”43 The Court’s 
ultimate conclusion was that there was sufficient evidence “to support a finding of highly 
unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
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and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.”44 Here the Court found 
liability for the journalists’ failure to adhere to what it perceived to be responsible journalistic 
standards. 
 The journalists who were sued in Walker also were cited for deviating from their 
profession’s standards, but when measuring this failing against the same criteria applied in 
Butts, the Court did not find sufficient misconduct to deny constitutional protection to the 
false statements published by the Associated Press. In Walker, Edwin Walker, a former Army 
general who was known for his opposition to federally imposed integration, sued the 
Associated Press for libel. The news service had published dispatches about a riot at the all-
white University of Mississippi that was sparked by the court-ordered admission of James 
Meredith, a black student. The dispatches claimed Walker had led students in a charge 
against the federal marshals assigned to escort and protect Meredith. In short, the dispatches 
described Walker committing a federal crime. A young correspondent filed the dispatches in 
rapid succession from the scene of the disturbances and told his editors they were based on 
what he had seen and heard. Walker denied leading or even participating in any charge 
against the marshals and said he had spoken with the students and urged them to remain 
peaceful. To support his version of events, Walker’s lawyers submitted to the Court an 
excerpt of the United Press account of the incident, which said he spoke to the students and 
urged them “to cease their violence.”45 The jury that heard all of the conflicting testimony 
about the event also concluded that Walker had not taken control of the students or led them 
in a charge. 
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 Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling noted that the Associated Press 
correspondent, unlike the source relied on by the Saturday Evening Post, had given the news 
agency “every indication of being trustworthy and competent.” The Court said the 
correspondent’s reports had “one minor ” inconsistency, but nonetheless concluded that the 
acts the correspondent attributed to Walker “would not have seemed unreasonable to one 
familiar with General Walker’s prior publicized statements on the underlying [integration] 
controversy.”46 The Court ruled that “nothing in this series of events gives the slightest hint 
of a severe departure from accepted publishing standards.”47 
 While a rational distinction can be made between the “publishing standards” or 
efforts to secure the truth by the Post and the Associated Press in these instances, pragmatic 
instrumentalists would note that Walker, like Times v. Sullivan, involved a lawsuit 
challenging the veracity of negative statements about a plaintiff opposed to racial integration 
and the Civil Rights Movement in the South. An amicus brief filed on behalf of the Chicago 
Tribune informed the Court that Walker, in a tactic reminiscent of the broad-based legal 
attacks against the media in Sullivan, had “filed 15 libel suits in 10 states.” He sued the 
Associated Press in seven separate suits, its subscriber newspapers in eleven, and sought 
damages in excess of $33 million.48 Walker’s lawyers, following the failed tactic of 
Sullivan’s lawyers four years earlier, tried, in effect, to convince the Court that making 
journalists more truthful was a more important social issue than civil rights and not an 
infringement on press freedom. They argued that allowing civil penalties in libel cases 
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brought by public figures falsely depicted as committing criminal acts would benefit society 
and the press: 
It would appear that the news media, itself, would seek to establish higher, 
rather than lower standards of integrity and accuracy in its reporting. If 
accuracy is difficult to obtain under present conditions, it would be infinitely 
worse if those who gather and disseminate the news for profit are relieved of 
financial responsibility for damages caused by their product.49 
The brief cast journalists as “news merchants” and accordingly described false news reports 
as defective products that injured the public. It urged the Court not to expand the Times v. 
Sullivan actual malice rule to shield the press from corrective punishment when public 
figures are defamed. The Court was not persuaded. 
 Harlan’s plurality opinion allowed a public figure plaintiff to prevail in a libel suit by 
proving that the defendant had engaged in highly unreasonable conduct that was an extreme 
departure from responsible publishing standards. This was a third standard of truth that 
ostensibly offered less protection to journalists than the Times v. Sullivan standard but was 
never endorsed by more than a four-justice plurality. Three concurring opinions provided the 
votes necessary to uphold the judgment against the Saturday Evening Post and set aside the 
judgment against the Associated Press. But the concurrences were in result only, not in 
rationale. Chief Justice Earl Warren’s concurring opinion supported the Sullivan standard of 
culpability and clearly rejected a third standard. Warren claimed there was “no basis in law, 
logic or First Amendment policy” for making a distinction between the standards of culpable 
falsehood required in libel cases brought by public officials and public figures.50 The second 
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concurring opinion was written by Brennan and joined by Byron White. The third was 
written by Hugo Black and joined by William Douglas.  
 Sifting through the views expressed in the four opinions, it becomes apparent that a 
majority of the Court, composed of the five justices who signed on to the concurring 
opinions, would permit a libel judgment for a public figure plaintiff only if a standard of fault 
equal to the Times v. Sullivan standard or even less supportive of the value of truth were 
applied. Two of the five, Black and Douglas, had argued that the First Amendment erased 
libel as a cause of action in the United States. Their standard was most protective of falsity. 
Warren, Brennan, and White cast their lot with the Times v. Sullivan standard. It was not until 
seven years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,51 that the Times v. Sullivan standard 
emerged as unequivocally controlling in libel cases with public figure plaintiffs. 
 
Expanding Protection of Falsehood 
 A series of libel rulings handed down in the few years immediately after Times v. 
Sullivan better defined the “actual malice” standard that gave public officials and public 
figures less protection than private people from false statements that damaged their 
reputations. These rulings also clarified who belonged in this class of public officials and 
public figures. The first of these cases, Garrison v. Louisiana, amplified and added to the 
Times v. Sullivan definition of actual malice by explaining that First Amendment protection 
was denied by that standard to false statements “made with a high degree of awareness of 
their probable falsity.”52 This unanimous ruling also made it clear that the standard applied 
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not only to civil libel cases but also to the criminal libel charges at issue here. Although 
Garrison is cited here primarily for its role in the diminution of the ethical value of truth, it 
should be noted that the ruling also provided the Court with an opportunity to declare in 
dictum that truth was a defense against criminal libel in the United States although it 
traditionally had not been necessarily so. “Truth may not be the subject of either civil or 
criminal sanctions where the discussion of public affairs is concerned,” the Court said.53 
While Sullivan had made it clear that some false statements about official conduct were 
protected, Garrison made it equally clear that statements about the private conduct of a 
government official were now subject to the same standard of protection. “[A]nything which 
might touch on an official’s fitness for office is relevant,” the Court said.54 
 A government official was again the plaintiff in the 1967 case of Beckley Newspapers 
v. Hanks,55 in which the Court better explained “actual malice.” It specifically distinguished it 
from the common notion of animosity and ill will and issued a reminder that the phrase from 
the Sullivan ruling, “reckless disregard” for truth or falsity, did not include the simple failure 
to investigate. This effort at clarification was further extended in St. Amant v. Thompson.56 
There the Court emphasized that a failure to investigate was not in itself culpable. It 
described actual malice as deliberate lying or publishing a statement while knowing that it 
probably was not true, or “when the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the 
truth of his publication.”57 
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 “[R]eckless conduct is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would 
have published, or would have investigated before publishing,” the Court said. The opinion 
even conceded that “[i]t may be said that such a test puts a premium on ignorance [and] 
encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire.”58 Justice Abe Fortas found the ruling 
overly permissive of irresponsible conduct and unnecessarily protective of First Amendment 
values, but his was the lone dissenting voice. 
The First Amendment is not so fragile that it requires us to immunize this kind 
of reckless, destructive invasion of the life, even of public officials, heedless 
of their interests and sensibilities. The First Amendment is not a shelter for the 
character assassinator, whether his action is heedless and reckless or 
deliberate. . . . The occupation of officeholder does not forfeit one’s 
membership in the human race. . . . New York Times does not preclude this 
minimal standard of civilized living.59 
 St. Amant’s libelous statements were protected in this case, not because he was 
simply repeating the false words of another, but because the target of those remarks was a 
public official and a lower standard of truth telling applied. In Greenbelt Cooperative 
Publishing Association v. Bressler,60 the defendant journalist quoted false statements made 
by others, and again the target and subsequent libel plaintiff was a public official. But here, 
the meaning of a word became an issue because it was pivotal in determining whether the 
journalist had acted with the requisite actual malice that would permit the imposition of 
penalties. The continuing impact of the Sullivan opinion is evident here as the Court invokes 
the mandate to review factual determinations at the trial level when a free press issue is 
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implicated. In the Greenbelt case, a jury had determined that a pivotal word used by a 
reporter had one meaning, and the Court determined it had another. 
 That disputed word was used by a reporter for one of Greenbelt’s weekly newspapers 
who covered public meetings at which a land developer, who was also a public official, was 
criticized for his tough negotiating tactics with the city over two pieces of land. As a result of 
these tactics, critics said the developer was blackmailing the city. The reporter accurately 
published these criticisms while knowing the developer had not committed blackmail, which 
is a crime. Bressler’s attorneys argued that the alleged defamation met the Times v. Sullivan 
actual malice standard because the reporter referred to the developer as a blackmailer while 
knowing it was a false label. The Court disagreed, saying “blackmail” in this context did not 
mean the criminal act of blackmail. At least insofar as actual malice is concerned, a word 
does not necessarily mean what it says, the Court decided and reversed the libel judgment 
against Greenbelt. “Blackmail” was deemed “rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet,” as the 
Court concluded, “No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the meeting or the 
newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bressler with the commission of a 
criminal offense.”61 
 Justice White, however, disagreed. In a six-page concurring opinion, he wrote only 
four lines of concurrence. The rest read like dissent. Despite the Court’s insistence that no 
reader could see the word “blackmail” in the newspaper articles and think it meant 
“blackmail,” White noted that the jurors in the trial below had done precisely that. He also 
observed that journalists are trained and paid to be experts with words and should use their 
expertise to choose words better when they know that one usage could harm someone. “I see 
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no reason why the members of a skilled calling should not be held to the standard of their 
craft,” he wrote.62 In White’s view, the issues were accuracy and professionalism, and the 
professionally established ethical standard for truth telling should be the legal standard as 
well. White concurred in reversing the prior judgment only because it was based on an 
improper definition of malice. 
 White’s argument that journalists should be held to the standards of their craft would 
have applied quite well to the issues in Time, Inc. v. Pape.63 Here, Time magazine was sued 
for libel by Pape, a Chicago deputy police chief who was portrayed in a magazine article as a 
person who led a squad of detectives who brutally violated the civil rights of a black family. 
Time based the article on a 1962 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, which 
detailed allegations of police brutality across the country. The article, however, falsely 
reported the allegations as facts or conclusions reached by the commission. In short, Time 
magazine had omitted the word “alleged” as it provided details of the incident in which Pape 
was implicated. The result was to present the allegations made by the black family as facts or 
findings by the commission. The primary legal issue the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide 
was whether the publication of mere allegations as facts (by omitting the word “alleged”) 
constituted actual malice as required by Sullivan in a libel lawsuit filed by a public official. 
The Court found the omission did not qualify as actual malice and reversed the lower court 
judgment against the magazine. 
 The opinion explaining the 8-1 ruling took issue with the determination by the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals “that it was obvious that the omission of the word 
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‘allegation’ or some equivalent was a ‘falsification’ of the Report” and that the “omission 
was admittedly conscious and deliberate.”64 The Court found fault with the lower tribunal’s 
reasoning and said, “The question of ‘truth’ of such an indirect newspaper report presents 
rather complicated problems.”65 Time’s article on the Civil Rights Commission’s report gave 
the magazine choices when it decided to depart from “full direct quotation of the words of 
the [report],” the Court said. “Time’s omission of the word ‘alleged’ amounted to the 
adoption of one of a number of possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled 
with ambiguities,”66 the Court said before concluding that making a factually incorrect choice 
in such circumstances did not constitute actual malice. It was an error of judgment or 
interpretation, according to the Court. 
 It must be noted that the black family prevailed in a civil rights violation lawsuit filed 
against Pape, but that potential validation of the allegations published about him was not 
ostensibly relevant in the Court’s ruling in this libel case. There was no indication that the 
outcome of that case made Time’s article true. But the fact that this outcome was mentioned 
in a footnote of the opinion indicates that the Court was aware of it.67 It also must be noted 
that the Court did not want the Pape decision to expunge “alleged” from the journalist’s 
lexicon. In a final cautionary note, the Court said, “Nothing in this opinion is to be 
understood as making the word ‘alleged’ a superfluity in published reports of information 
damaging to reputation.”68 
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 Allegations of criminal conduct were also pivotal in the 1971 case of Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia,69 in which a plurality of the Court extended the constitutional protection of 
falsity beyond damaging statements made about public officials and public figures. Three 
justices voted to provide protection to reputation-damaging false statements about private 
figures involved in events of public or general interest. This meant the Times v. Sullivan 
actual malice standard had to be applied on the basis of the nature of the subject matter that 
led to the publication of the defamatory statement and not on the basis of the status of the 
plaintiff as a public person. If the subject matter was an event of public or general interest, 
three justices said, even private people would have to prove actual malice when suing for 
libel. Rosenbloom became involved in such an event when he was arrested and charged with 
possessing nudist magazines that Philadelphia authorities claimed were obscene. In reporting 
on the story, journalists used terms that were found to have falsely identified Rosenbloom as 
a “girlie book peddler,” a “smut distributor,” and a purveyor of “obscene” materials.70 
Rosenbloom filed a libel lawsuit against Metromedia’s radio station after he was acquitted of 
the charges and a finding that his materials were not obscene.71 
 Metromedia relied on truth and privilege as defenses. The latter defense was based on 
the fact that the information about Rosenbloom had been provided by a police captain and 
that it had been published with reasonable care.72 Three justices reasoned, however, that the 
pivotal issue was a determination of whether the actual malice rule should apply. In ruling 
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that it did apply, the justices said the germination of that rule in Sullivan and its extension in 
Butts were not based so much on the status of the plaintiffs as public officials or public 
figures as on the coverage of public issues that were at the heart of the defamatory 
statements. “If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become 
less so merely because a private individual is involved,” the three justices said en route to 
focusing on the arrest and charges against Rosenbloom.73 With this reasoning, the actual 
malice standard was applied. As a result, Metromedia’s failure to contact Rosenbloom about 
the accuracy of the charges or conduct any substantial investigation into the obscene nature 
of the magazines did not demonstrate the actual malice required to permit a judgment for 
Rosenbloom.74 
 Justice Byron White wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result but criticizing 
the plurality opinion for deciding constitutional issues more broadly than required for the 
resolution of the case. “I am not convinced that we must fashion a constitutional rule 
protecting a whole range of damaging falsehoods and so shift the burden from those who 
publish to those who are injured,” he said.75 Justice Harlan’s dissent was in accord with the 
sentiment White expressed in the preceding quote in that it also proposed a Court rule that 
would provide support for the truth-telling canon of journalism by “encouraging speakers to 
carefully seek the truth before they communicate.”76 He would have required the journalists 
to exercise reasonable care in securing the truth, a standard which has been widely 
interpreted as allowing a private libel plaintiff to prevail by proving the defamatory falsehood 
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was the result of negligence. Justices Thurgood Marshall and Potter Stewart also found fault 
with the judgment and complained about the danger created by the potentially unlimited 
expansion of the constitutional protection of falsity that it could presage. “This danger exists 
since all human events are arguably within the area of ‘public or general concern,’” they 
wrote.77 A brief filed with the Court on behalf of Rosenbloom similarly warned that by 
applying the actual malice standard to this case the Court would subject every libel plaintiff 
to it. “[Rosenbloom’s] arrest was newsworthy, but then so is virtually anything the media 
choose to focus upon,” the brief argued. “Consequently, if Mr. Rosenbloom must show 
actual malice, then so must any private citizen suing for libel.”78 
 Three years later, the Court took the opportunity presented by the case of Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.79 to scale back Rosenbloom’s extension of protection to libelous 
falsehoods about private people. But at the same time it eliminated strict liability for libel 
published about this class of people and essentially determined that all libel plaintiffs would 
have to prove some level of fault. For plaintiffs who were private, non-public people, the 
level of fault would be at least in the nature of mistake or negligence. It should be noted, as 
indicated earlier in this chapter, at least one prominent journalism ethics code seemed to 
advocate strict liability for truth telling and dismissed any consideration of fault.80 
 The Gertz ruling also helped better define who would be deemed a public figure. A 
primary issue in the case was whether a civil rights attorney hired to sue a police officer for 
killing a teen should be treated as a private person or public figure when he sued his 
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detractors for libel. A bare 5-4 majority of the Court found Gertz to be a private person and 
said he did not have to prove Times v. Sullivan actual malice to prevail.81 The standard to be 
applied in private libel plaintiff cases was to be at least negligence or reasonable care as each 
individual state chose.  
 Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence created the Court majority in Gertz, and he 
endorsed the holding because he thought the Court should eliminate the ambiguity created by 
the Rosenbloom plurality opinion. “A definitive ruling is paramount,” he wrote.82 Although 
he clearly did not fully endorse the Gertz opinion, he did not see it necessarily harming or 
benefiting the news media. “What the Court has done, I believe will have little, if any 
practical effect on the functioning of responsible journalism.”83 Justice Brennan, who wrote 
the Rosenbloom plurality opinion, disagreed and predicted negative effects on journalists as 
they would be forced to follow the truth-telling canon more closely for fear of running afoul 
of jurors empowered by the Gertz ruling to make determinations of negligence or reasonable 
care in the pursuit of truth. He wrote in dissent: “Under a reasonable care regime, publishers 
and broadcasters will have to make prepublication judgments about juror assessment of such 
diverse considerations as . . . the relative costs and benefits of instituting less frequent and 
more costly reporting at a higher level of accuracy.”84 
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 Gertz repudiated Brennan’s three-justice plurality opinion in Rosenbloom that would 
have required the Times v. Sullivan standard in this case because the article defaming Gertz 
had been written about a matter of public or general interest. Two lower federal courts had 
followed the Rosenbloom precedent and rendered judgments in favor of the magazine. The 
majority opinion in Gertz also upended the rationale that had been used in Rosenbloom to 
eliminate the legal distinction between public and private libel plaintiffs. 
 A pragmatic instrumentalist interpretation of the Gertz opinion would focus on the 
arrangement of the parties on each side of the civil rights issue and proper journalism 
practices. As in Sullivan, the party that ultimately prevailed in Gertz was on the “right ” side 
of that issue. Gertz was the rights champion, who, as the plaintiff’s attorney in the civil rights 
violation lawsuit, was aligned against the white police officer who had killed a black teen.85 
As in Butts, the defendant news medium was on the “wrong” side of journalism practices. A 
brief filed by Gertz’s attorneys informed the Court that the offending publication was entirely 
devoted to the arch conservative political philosophy of the John Birch Society: 
[T]he article [about Gertz] was rushed into print (in a monthly magazine) in 
the extraordinarily short time of 24 hours. This is the height of 
irresponsibility. Indeed, it was Stanley, [a magazine official] in light of his 
preconceived policy line of finding a Communist in every nook and cranny, 
who dispatched the author with instructions as to the kind of story he was to 
write — a story which was preconceived and concocted before one fact had 
been investigated. If the story had not agreed with this pre-conceived 
Communist-plot thesis, it would not have been printed at all. It was not that 
[the author] had a reputation for accuracy, but that he echoed Stanley’s 
Birchite viewpoint, which is completely contemptuous of the facts.86 
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In Butts and Gertz, cases in which the media defendants lost, the Court arguably had reason 
to believe these news outlets were motivated by a purely financial or political agenda instead 
of the journalism paradigm. Accordingly, the Court did not shield the media defendants from 
civil liability. 
 Media defendants were shielded from civil liability in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Hepps87 by a Court ruling that did not turn on application of the actual malice rule but on 
the assignment of a burden of proof. The ruling can be seen as expanding the protection of 
falsehood because in one type of libel case the common law presumption that defamatory 
statements are false was ended. The Court gave private plaintiffs the burden of proving 
falsity in libel suits against media defendants when the defamatory statement was about a 
matter of public concern. The Court used its ability to assign the burden of proof to one party 
or the other to protect what the plaintiffs claimed were journalists deviating from the truth. 
Years earlier, in Times v. Sullivan and its progeny the Court had protected journalists by 
placing the burden of proving falsity on plaintiffs who were public officials or public figures 
irrespective of the subject matter of the defamatory statement. 
 Hepps, the primary stockholder of a chain of stores, sued Philadelphia Newspapers, 
Inc. when the Philadelphia Inquirer published a series of articles indicating that the store 
chain used ties to organized crime figures to influence various government agents to ensure 
the stores’ ability to continue to legally sell alcoholic beverages. The plaintiff was deemed a 
private figure, but the allegations linking government officials to an influence-peddling 
scheme were deemed to be a matter of public concern. The Court accordingly required the 
plaintiff to bear the burden of proving falsity. “[W]e hold that the common-law presumption 
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that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media 
defendant for speech of public concern,” the opinion said.88 
 A dissenting opinion written by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined by three others 
found the result “pernicious” and indicated that in conjunction with the strictures created by 
Gertz, it did nothing to foster good journalism. “[T]he only litigants – and the only publishers 
– who will benefit from today’s decision are those who act negligently or maliciously,” 
Stevens wrote.89  
 An amicus brief filed with the Court by the American Civil Liberties Union and 
various news organizations and professional journalists’ groups had urged the Court to shift 
the burden of proving truth from the media defendants lest journalists be forced to “calculate 
not whether what they print is true, but rather whether they will be able to prove in court that 
what they print is true.”90 An amicus brief filed by the American Legal Foundation, which 
described itself as a public interest legal center dedicated to ensuring that the media act in a 
fair and responsible manner in reporting news, sought to prevent a ruling that would “further 
insulate the media from liability.”91 The Court ultimately decided to provide the insulation. It 
reasoned that the placement of the burden of proof would sometimes determine the outcome 
of a libel suit. If placed with the defendant, truth would sometimes be punished when it could 
not be proved, as when the evidence is in equipoise. If placed with the plaintiff, falsity would 
escape punishment in the same situations and be thereby encouraged. The Court chose what 
it saw to be the lesser evil, as it had before, and determined that truth should never be 
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punished even if deviations from truth were thereby not effectively discouraged. From one 
perspective, the ruling could be seen as protecting the truth value by making sure it was not 
punished just because it could not be proven. But in protecting falsehood the ruling 
undermines the value of truth. 
 
Limiting Protection of Falsehood 
 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,92 the Court revisited the public figure issue with an 
opportunity to clarify the definition of that category of libel plaintiffs but produced a 
puzzling outcome. In writing about a divorce decree ending the marriage of an industrialist 
and a socialite, Time, a weekly national news magazine, incorrectly reported the grounds for 
the dissolution and falsely indicated that Mrs. Firestone was found to be an adulterer. The 
controlling issue was whether Firestone was a public or private figure. If public, the 
magazine’s factual error would be legally “excusable” under the Times v. Sullivan actual 
malice standard. If private, the magazine could be liable for damages under a lesser standard 
such as negligence. The Court found Mrs. Firestone to be a private person because she had 
not thrust herself into a public controversy to influence the outcome as a limited or vortex 
public figure would. Nor was she deemed an all-purpose public figure who had assumed a 
role of “especial prominence” in society “other than perhaps Palm Beach society.”93 
 Mr. Firestone sought the divorce on two grounds: extreme cruelty and adultery. A 
Florida court granted his divorce request without specifying the grounds, and Time 
apparently reported the grounds to be those Mr. Firestone had presented to the court instead 
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of some others the court itself had provided. The Supreme Court noted a Florida appellate 
court’s finding and condemnation of Time’s conduct as “a flagrant example of ‘journalistic 
negligence,’” but said the finding of negligence or some level of fault had to be done at the 
trial level. Accordingly, the judgment against Time was vacated and the case returned to the 
state courts. 
 Justice Lewis Powell found “substantial evidence” that Time had not been negligent 
in reporting the divorce decree but nonetheless concurred in the majority ruling sending the 
case back to Florida.94 Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion that was easily susceptible 
to a pragmatic instrumentalist interpretation. He argued that news coverage of judicial 
proceedings had to be encouraged to further the values of the First Amendment, and 
accordingly, factual errors in court coverage should be given the special tolerance provided 
by the Times v. Sullivan actual malice rule. It was an argument reminiscent of the subject 
matter protection of negligent falsity that was condoned in Rosenbloom. Brennan also argued 
that journalists could be expected to and often did commit more factual errors in writing 
about legal issues because they do not have legal training. He attributed some of the errors to 
carelessness but said, “[A] great deal of it must be attributed, in candor, to ignorance which 
frequently is not at all blameworthy.”95 Mrs. Firestone’s lawyers had argued that Time should 
have known that when the judge awarded alimony to her, it necessarily meant that her 
husband’s claim of adultery had been set aside because Florida law denies alimony to 
adulterers.96 
                                                 
94 Id. at 470 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 
95 Id. at 478-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
96 Brief of Respondent at 7, Firestone (No. 74-944). 
 
 
 
140 
 Although the controlling issue in Firestone was the designation of the plaintiff as a 
private or public figure, its power depended on the fact that a designation of a libel plaintiff 
as public figure provided more protection to the defendant’s deviations from truth. This 
protection grew from the requirement that public figures prove Times v. Sullivan actual 
malice — that the deviations were intentional or reckless. The Court’s opinion in this case 
more tightly defined public figures and narrowed the class of people who would fit that 
definition. Libelous falsehood about those people now excluded from the class under the 
Firestone standard would be less protected.  
 The Firestone ruling seemed to imply that a defendant publication that circulated 
nationally, as Time magazine did, could enjoy the protection of the actual malice rule only 
when sued for libel by people who were national public figures, as distinct from people who 
were local public figures, such as Mrs. Firestone, who had attained special prominence only 
in local Palm Beach society. The ruling’s concordinate implication is that if Mrs. Firestone 
had filed her libel suit against a local Palm Beach society magazine, her local prominence 
would have made her a local public figure and the actual malice rule would apply to the local 
defendant. That would mean the Firestone ruling limited the protection of the actual malice 
rule to those publications whose circulation matched the geographic area in which a libel 
plaintiff had achieved especial prominence. National publications would enjoy the rule’s 
protection against national celebrities’ libel lawsuits and local publications would enjoy 
greater protection against local celebrity plaintiffs. Firestone  made it more difficult for libel 
defendants to claim public figure status for those who sued them. 
 The Court’s ruling in Hutchinson v. Proxmire similarly shrank the class of public 
figures by excluding a scientist and libel plaintiff who had received federal funding for 
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scientific research at a state hospital.97Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc.98 also 
narrowed the definition of public figure libel plaintiffs by establishing that mere association 
with a newsworthy event did not transform a private person into a public figure.99 As a result, 
libel defendants had fewer opportunities to protect their factual errors with the actual malice 
rule. Some journalists saw their protection threatened again when the Supreme Court ruled in 
Herbert v. Lando100 that a plaintiff who had to prove actual malice could gather evidence of 
the defendant’s intention, attitude, and doubts about the veracity of what was published by 
questioning journalists about their thoughts and actions. In so ruling, the Court gave itself the 
means and opportunity to condone or condemn practices employed in the editorial process. 
To some, the ruling provided incentive for truth-seeking journalism. To others, it inhibited 
the publication of truth. 
 The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the actual malice rule “made it essential to proving 
liability that the plaintiff focus on the conduct and state of mind of the defendant. … 
Inevitably, unless liability is to be completely foreclosed, the thoughts and editorial processes 
of the alleged defamer would be open to examination.”101 
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 Justice Brennan, architect of the actual malice rule, agreed with the majority that 
inquiries into the editorial process were permissible and not barred by editorial privilege. But 
he wanted them banned until after a prima facie showing that the publication was a 
defamatory falsehood. In a partial dissent, he cautioned that once journalists knew their 
prepublication discussions about news stories could be disclosed and used to secure damage 
awards in libel suits, they would be reluctant to conduct such discussions that might enhance 
accuracy and truth telling.102 His contention is analogous to the often-cited chill inflicted on 
the promulgation of journalism codes of ethics when attorneys inform their media clients that 
the codes could be used against them to prove they had strayed from their principles.103 The 
majority pointedly disagreed with Brennan’s argument, saying, “[W]e find it difficult to 
believe that error-avoiding procedures will be terminated or stifled simply because there is 
liability for culpable error and because the editorial process will itself be examined.”104 
Indeed, the Court said, the potential sanction of a libel judgment would encourage such 
prepublication discussions to ensure veracity. In a passage that indicates Brennan’s 
appreciation for the potential benefits and detriments of the Court ruling, he also validates a 
pragmatic instrumentalist view that the Court has a propensity to promote its vision of ethical 
journalism. 
I fully concede that my reasoning is essentially paradoxical. For the sake of 
more accurate information, an editorial privilege would shield from disclosure 
the possible inaccuracies of the press; in the name of a more responsible 
press, the privilege would make more difficult of application the legal 
restraints by which the press is bound.105 
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Similarly, Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent sought to maintain the law’s role in ensuring 
truthful journalism and condemned the chilling effect of inquiries into the editorial process. 
“Society’s interest in enhancing the accuracy of coverage of public events is ill-served by 
procedures tending to muffle expression of uncertainty.”106 
 In a 1989 case, the Court made another ruling that lessened the actual malice 
standard’s ability to protect falsehood. The ruling in Harte-Hanks Communications v. 
Connaughton 107 focused on the quality of journalists’ efforts to find and report the truth. The 
Court judged the truth-seeking practices employed by the Harte-Hanks journalists to be so 
lacking that it affirmed a jury’s finding of actual malice. The Court decided the journalists 
had purposely avoided finding the truth. The Court seemed to base its ruling on its 
assessment of the journalists’ truth-seeking intent. The rulings affirmed the value of the 
intent to tell the truth, irrespective of whether the actual truth was told. 
 The case developed from a series of allegations published by the Hamilton Journal 
Beacon newspaper about a political scandal. The newspaper indicated that plaintiff Daniel 
Connaughton had dishonestly tried to discredit an opponent in a local election. These 
allegations were based on information from a source whose veracity was clearly suspect, 
according to the Court, and the newspaper did not make any credible effort to confirm the 
source’s statements or pursue readily available information that contradicted the source. The 
Court said these and related failures to investigate in pursuit of truth amounted to a 
“deliberate effort to avoid the truth.”108 Such practices and the falsehood they spawned were 
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not protected by the actual malice rule. In fact, the Court ruled that the trial court jury was 
justified in determining that such practices constituted actual malice. 
 One year later, the Court took a major step toward reducing the protection libel law 
provides to falsity when it determined that factual statements presented as opinion could be 
deemed defamatory when false. The Court’s ruling in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.109 
affirmed the value of truth by not allowing a false statement to fully escape penalty by 
masquerading as opinion. As a general rule of American constitutional law, pure opinion is 
incapable of being proved true or false and therefore is not subject to defamation lawsuits 
because the plaintiff must prove falsity.110 “Before Milkovich, all opinion was immune,” 
according to law scholar Robert D. Sack.111 
 High school wrestling coach Mike Milkovich sued the Lorain Journal for libel after 
the Ohio newspaper published a sports opinion column in which the author indicated that 
Milkovich had committed perjury while testifying at a judicial inquiry into an altercation at a 
wrestling match. An Ohio trial court granted summary judgment to the newspaper upon 
determining that opinion was not subject to defamation law. The U.S. Supreme Court, 
however, found the accusation of perjury was based on facts that could be proved true or 
false. A statement, even when expressed ostensibly as opinion, can be defamatory if based on 
false information, the Court said. “The dispositive question in the present case then becomes 
whether a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the [sports] column 
imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich perjured himself in a judicial proceeding.”112 The 
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Court reversed the Ohio Court of Appeals ruling that had affirmed the summary judgment for 
the newspaper. The reversal sent the case back to the state trial court for a determination of 
whether the accusation of perjury was true or false. 
 Although the Milkovich ruling was based on writing the newspaper identified as 
commentary and the ruling redefined libel law’s impact on opinion, it belongs in this study 
because it falls within the definition of journalism as fact-based commentary and subject to 
the ethical obligation to tell the truth. A statement of ethical principles approved by the 
American Society of Newspaper Editors in 1975 said in part: “[C]ommentary should be held 
to the same standards of accuracy with respect to facts as news reports.”113 This ethical 
principle was affirmed and arguably strengthened by the Court’s ruling. 
 Since its ruling in Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court has crafted rulings in 
subsequent libel cases to refine the definition and applicability of the actual malice rule. The 
Court extended the rule’s protection of some falsity to cases in which public figures were 
victims of misstatements of fact. There was also a failed attempt to dramatically extend the 
rule by making it applicable whenever a public issue was implicated. In several instances the 
Court began to focus on journalists’ truth-seeking practices in determining whether the 
protective power of the actual malice rule would be invoked or if journalists would be held 
liable for shortcomings in the pursuit of truth. In a number of cases, notably Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts and Harte-Hanks Communication v. Connaughton, the Justices 
sought to hold journalists to the ethical standards of their profession. But ultimately, in most 
cases, the Court showed greater obeisance to constitutional values than ethical standards. In 
cases where the Court recognized clearly that its rulings could foster truth telling or protect 
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falsehoods, as in Associated Press v. Walker and St. Amant v. Thompson, it deferred to 
constitutional values. In these cases, the Court decided that it would not run the risk of 
allowing truth telling to be punished even if the rule it created to do so limited or restricted 
liability for failures to tell the truth. 
 The following section focuses on just one case because it presented the Court with its 
most recent and most pronounced conflict between the ethical principle of truth telling and 
the constitutionally protected values of free speech. 
Masson v. New Yorker 
 Tension between the Court’s and journalists’ formulations of the ethical obligation to 
tell the truth was nowhere more acute than in the final case reviewed in this examination of 
Supreme Court libel rulings, Masson v. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.114 Atypically, 
journalists were arrayed on both sides of the case because the legal issues overlapped an 
ethical question that had divided journalists into two opposing camps. That question, simply 
stated, was whether it was permissible to alter a quoted statement and still place it within 
quotation marks.115 One camp argued that quotation marks indicated an accurate, verbatim 
rendering of the words used by a speaker. The other said it was permissible to adjust the 
words within quotation marks to ensure an accurate rendering of the speaker’s meaning even 
if the words were not rendered precisely as spoken. 
 Masson sued The New Yorker for libel because it published an article that he said 
falsely attributed statements to him that damaged his reputation by making him look foolish 
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and egotistical. At issue on the legal front was whether quotes allegedly fabricated or 
otherwise adjusted by a New Yorker writer were necessarily statements made with knowledge 
that they were false.116 
 The Court ultimately determined that altering a quote was not necessarily tantamount 
to writing a statement known to be false. As a matter of law, it was not knowingly writing a 
falsehood that would always constitute actual malice. The Court said a determination would 
have to be made that the altered quote was a “material alteration” of the speaker’s meaning 
before it could be found to constitute actual malice. It said the issue was one for a jury to 
decide.117 Journalists have yet to resolve the ethical issue. 
 Nearly all the briefs filed to influence the Court’s resolution of this case addressed the 
ethical canon of truth telling and the propriety of judicial determinations in the arena of 
journalism ethics. Although journalists filed briefs in support of and against the interests of 
the defendant New Yorker magazine, all those who argued in support of the magazine’s legal 
position took pains at some point in their arguments to condemn the fabrication of quotes. 
The amicus brief filed jointly by Time magazine, the American Society of Newspaper 
Editors, the National Association of Broadcasters, and others stated in its second paragraph: 
“Amici disapprove of deliberate alteration or fabrication of quotes.”118 The Association of 
American Publishers’ brief stated, “Amici are opposed to the bald fabrication of quotes as a 
matter of journalistic practice.”119 Although their statement was not offered until the ninth 
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page of their joint brief, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association, the Society of Professional Journalists, and others said, 
“The inaccurate or altered quote is not a goal of good journalists.”120 Accompanying these 
statements in most briefs was an acknowledgment that the smallest alterations were 
permissible but only for cosmetic effect, as in cleaning up grammatical errors. The briefs 
generally agreed that the problem with altering quotes was the potential for misstating facts 
by changing the speaker’s meaning. The Court’s ruling was in accord with this latter point as 
it indicated that in determining whether there was actual malice, determining whether there 
was a change in meaning was more relevant than changes in the literal wording of a quote. 
This legal determination is fundamentally at odds with the values expressed in the first code 
of journalism ethics developed and approved by the Kansas Editorial Association in 1910: 
Lies. – We condemn as against truth: . . . (2) The publication of fake 
interviews made up of the assumed views of an individual, without his 
consent. (3) The publication of interviews in quotation, unless the exact, 
approved language of the interviewed be used. When an interview is not an 
exact quotation it should be obvious in the reading that only the thought and 
impression of the interviewer is being reported.121 
 A group identifying itself as Certain Journalists and Academics filed a brief 
ostensibly in support of Masson, but its argument focused on the harm that would be inflicted 
on journalism if the Court did not reverse a lower court ruling that the group saw as giving 
journalists an imprimatur to fabricate quotes. It criticized the Ninth Circuit’s ruling affirming 
summary judgment for The New Yorker and applying a “substantial truth” test that found the 
contested quotations to be a rational interpretation of what Masson said and therefore 
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protected by the First Amendment. “This rule would allow a writer to put his own words in a 
speaker’s mouth as long as the false words are close enough to what the speaker actually 
said. Under this ‘close enough’ standard, the reporter would be protected even if he 
deliberately falsified a quotation,” the group argued.122 The Certain Journalists brief never 
framed the issue in terms of ethics, but scrupulously kept to the language of law and First 
Amendment interests and seemed to indicate to the Court that good journalists did not need 
free press protections extended to a practice they abhorred. Protecting such a deviation is not 
essential to the operation of a free press, the brief said. “Indeed journalists who use quotation 
marks while substituting their voice for the speaker’s undermine the public debate that the 
First Amendment was designed to protect.”123Arguing that bogus quotes corrupt the 
marketplace of ideas, the brief urged the Court to return the determination of actual malice to 
a jury. And it did. 
 Unlike the Certain Journalists brief’s focus on the legal issues of the case, the written 
scholarly and professional takes on the case generally focused on the ethical issue. For 
example, a comment on the case published in the Rutgers Law Review after the circuit court 
ruling was titled, “Ninth Circuit Reveals Shocking Truth! No Protection for Public Figures 
Against Deliberate Fabrications by Media!”124 A Time magazine article bore a similarly 
descriptive headline: “The Right to Fake Quotes: A journalist’s legal victory raises questions 
about ethics.”125  
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 While the ethical issue may have been unavoidable in a full examination of the case, 
journalists generally cautioned the Court to avoid basing its ruling on the ethical principles of 
journalism or journalism standards because it was improper for jurists to play such a role or 
use the law to punish or reward, bolster or undermine journalism standards. They claimed 
Masson and his supporters were trying to make the legal system the arbiter of journalism 
ethics and practices. Such incursions into journalists’ domain were inappropriate and 
unwarranted, they argued. There were reminders that the Court had specifically rejected 
journalism standards as a gauge for setting legal or constitutional standards in defamation 
cases. “The first amendment does not protect only ‘ethical’ journalists,” the Reporters 
Committee brief said.126 The arguments also contended that journalism ethics were not 
matters of universal agreement in the profession and were typically in flux. As a result, they 
would be a poor basis for judicial determinations. “The continuing debate over what are 
proper journalistic ethics suggests that such standards are not useful measures of 
constitutional protections,” the Reporters Committee brief said as it concluded that the First 
Amendment precluded any such tampering with the free press.127 Indeed, the Time magazine 
brief reminded the Court of its own dictum: “[P]ress responsibility is not mandated by the 
Constitution.”128 
 The Court’s ruling in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine appears free of wording that 
indicates any attempt to judicially endorse or in any sense sanction either ethical position on 
the propriety of altering quotes. But the ruling’s practical effect on this issue, nonetheless, 
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may be powerful and, according to a pragmatic instrumentalist view, cannot be presumed to 
be without intent.  
 The ruling tells journalists that an altered quote, even if it thereby becomes 
defamatory, does not automatically invoke the wrath of the law as an indication of actual 
malice.129 And so, the law does not support the camp of journalism ethics that condemns the 
alteration of quotes irrespective of motive or result. Consequently, that ethical rule is less 
compelling than it might have been, and the competing rule benefits from the Court’s 
apparent affirmation. The ruling supports, or is at least closely compatible with, the camp of 
journalists who say it is permissible to alter words within quotation marks, provided the 
essential meaning is not changed. If the quoted statement remains substantially accurate after 
alteration, the Court will protect the author from legal liability.  
Irrespective of its intention, the Court has thrown its weight to one side of a debate 
among journalists who are trying to set ethical standards for their profession. This case is 
particularly noteworthy in that respect and because it may have been the first time that 
significant numbers of journalists have openly acknowledged the impact legal edicts can 
have on the ethical practices within their profession. Journalists made overt ethical arguments 
in the amici briefs submitted to the Court in hopes of influencing its ruling. 
 The outpouring of ethical arguments to the Court may have been prompted by some 
journalists’ fear of a Court-issued “pardon” for the apparently widespread practice of fakery, 
outright fabrication, and “filling in” that damaged the credibility of newspapers from the 
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earliest days of the American republic and into the 21st century.130 Fakery is the practice of 
creating tales and publishing them as if they were true news stories, and filling in is the 
practice of embellishing otherwise truthful news accounts with fictional details to make them 
more engaging, according to a 19th century press critic.131  
These definitions apply quite well to the practices that created some of the major 
ethical scandals of the 1990s and early 21st century at The New York Times, The New 
Republic, and USA Today.132 Reporters for these publications embellished their false accounts 
of newsworthy events by creating sources and or fabricating quotes. They apparently steered 
clear of libel in doing so. 
 
 
Treatments of Truth Beyond Libel 
 The great majority of Supreme Court rulings that addressed the value of truth and 
truth telling by journalists between 1947 and 2005 were made in libel cases, but these matters 
also were addressed in a handful of other proceedings. Among them were two false light 
cases. In both, the rulings closely followed the patterns established in libel cases. This was a 
result of the torts’ similarity. As law scholar Robert D. Sacks explained: “The principal 
elements of the false light cause of action are similar to the elements of defamation: The 
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[actionable] statement must be made public, it must be about the plaintiff, it must be 
unprivileged, and it must be false.”133 Both torts generally affirm the value of truth by 
penalizing damaging falsehoods and distortions of the truth. Both seek to remedy damage 
caused by falsity, but an action for libel is based on damage to reputation. In false light the 
damage is to a person’s sensibilities. 
 Both torts are subject to the actual malice rule, which, as discussed earlier, protects 
some falsehoods from civil sanctions. In both, falsehoods that are neither deliberate nor 
reckless are provided significant protection. The Court attached the actual malice 
requirement to libel cases in Times v. Sullivan and has so effectively tied it to false light that 
the Restatement of Torts incorporates the gist of the actual malice rule in the definition of 
false light. It says the tort requires proof that the falsehood was published with knowledge 
that it was false or with a reckless disregard for whether it was false.134 In libel cases, only 
plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures are required to prove actual malice. In 
false light cases, all plaintiffs must prove actual malice whenever the communication at issue 
involves a newsworthy matter.135 By making the actual malice rule applicable to false light 
cases on the basis of subject matter, the Court appears to have made it potentially applicable 
more often and to a larger pool of plaintiffs. That pool presumably will include public 
officials and public figures because communications about these plaintiffs are highly likely to 
be considered newsworthy. That pool also would include private people involved in 
newsworthy events. This inclusion achieves essentially the expansion of the actual malice 
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requirement that a plurality of the Court sought for libel cases in Rosenbloom v. 
Metromedia.136 
 Actual malice was made a prerequisite for recovery in false light cases by the ruling 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill,137 which was the Court’s first application of truth-telling standards to the 
tort. Hill sued Life magazine, which was owned by Time, Inc., for falsely indicating that a 
play about a family taken hostage by escaped convicts depicted the Hill family’s own 
experience. Hill family members apparently were treated well by their captors, and there was 
no violence. But the Life article that prompted the lawsuit indicated there had been violence 
and that the family heroically resisted and fought to get free. 
 The Hill lawsuit relied on a New York privacy law that allowed a person to sue for 
appropriation and other forms of commercialization.138 New York state courts applying the 
law recognized newsworthiness as an absolute defense to appropriation and placed 
newsworthy articles beyond the reach of the privacy statute. New York’s highest court 
interpreted this law to permit invasion-of-privacy lawsuits against the publishers of articles 
that were not true. In a line of reasoning that apparently construed truthfulness as an essential 
element of newsworthiness, New York courts said the publication of a false article that used 
a plaintiff’s name or likeness constituted appropriation or commercialization or, for the 
purposes of this discussion, false light. In false light cases, newsworthiness was not a 
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defense.139 With this application of the law, New York courts assigned a high value to truth 
telling and protected journalists and their truthful, newsworthy articles from this civil cause 
of action. Once a journalist abandoned truth telling or engaged in fictionalization, however, 
this protection was no longer available. New York’s courts applied the statute in a manner 
that supported the ethical value of truth telling in journalism and allowed civil sanctions for 
deviations from the truth. 
 In the instant case, New York’s courts determined the Hill family was newsworthy, 
but the magazine’s depiction of the family’s ordeal was found to be fictionalized and false 
and, therefore, a commercial use not entitled to the newsworthiness defense. Accordingly, the 
trial court rendered a judgment for Hill. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Hill 
could not prevail by merely showing the magazine depiction was false. The plaintiff was 
required to prove the falsity was the result of actual malice as defined in Times v. Sullivan for 
libel cases.  
 Justice Harlan, who concurred with the Court majority’s determination that the New 
York decision in Time v. Hill should be overturned and the case remanded for further 
proceedings, dissented from its application of the actual malice standard. His dissent 
indicated that he placed a greater value on truth telling than the majority apparently had. 
Harlan argued that journalists should be held to a reasonable-care standard of truth telling in 
these cases instead of the actual malice standard, which protected all but the deliberate and 
reckless departures from the truth. “A constitutional standard which relieves the press of even 
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this minimal responsibility in cases of this sort seems to me unnecessary and ultimately 
harmful to the permanent good health of the press itself,” Harlan wrote.140 
 Seven years later, in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.,141 the Court applied the 
actual malice standard it found applicable in Time v. Hill and ruled against a journalist 
defendant who was found to have deliberately and willfully abandoned the truth. 
Accordingly, the Court allowed the imposition of legal sanctions for false light. The 
journalist in Cantrell was sued for an article that was peppered with false statements and 
passages that could be described as “filling in.” These passages conveyed the journalist’s 
assessment and description of Margaret Cantrell in the aftermath of a family tragedy, but the 
passages were obviously fabricated because she was not present when the journalist visited 
her home. The Court called the passages “calculated falsehoods”142 and found them to be 
unprotected deviations from the truth. 
 With its rulings in Time v. Hill and Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing, the Court 
extended the applicability of the actual malice rule to cases beyond libel. False light, a 
privacy tort that somewhat resembles libel, was now subject to the rule,143 and defendants 
were protected to an even greater extent than they were in libel cases. By extending the rule 
to false light cases in which the plaintiffs are private figures involved in newsworthy issues, 
the Court increased the circumstances in which journalists are allowed to be less faithful to 
the truth without fear of legal consequences. This may be explained by the Court’s 
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comparative valuation of robust debate and the psychic injury claimed in false light cases.144 
Nonetheless, the two rulings did not value truth as highly as other principles. In these two 
false light cases, the Court focused on the quality or nature of journalists’ truth-seeking 
conduct just as it had in some libel cases discussed earlier to determine whether the conduct 
warranted or forfeited the protection provided by the actual malice rule.145 
 Between 1975 and 1989 the Supreme Court handed down four rulings that did not 
involve false light but were particularly supportive of truth telling. The rulings were made in 
civil suits and criminal prosecutions. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn146 was the first of this 
string of cases in which the Court consistently refused to allow the imposition of legal 
sanctions for the publication of truthful information. In Cox Broadcasting, the Court set aside 
a state civil judgment against the operators of a television station who were sued for 
broadcasting the name of a rape victim in violation of a Georgia law. 
 The Court said a major issue to be determined in the case was “whether the State may 
impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from 
public records.”147 It ultimately decided, “We are convinced that the State may not do so.”148 
 In its 1978 ruling in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,149 the Court again 
affirmed the value of truth telling by refusing to allow journalists to be criminally punished 
for publishing truthful information about a court proceeding. The Virginia Pilot newspaper, 
                                                 
144 385 U.S. at 387-92. 
 
145 Id. at 391-94. 
 
146 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 
147 Id. at 491 (emphasis added). 
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149 435 U.S. 829 (1978). 
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owned by Landmark Communications, had been indicted for identifying a state judge as the 
subject of a judicial fitness inquiry. State law made it a misdemeanor to identify those under 
review, but the newspaper chose to publish the name nonetheless. The newspaper claimed 
justification in that “the subject was a matter of public importance which should be brought 
to the attention of [its] readers.”150 It urged the Supreme Court to render a ruling that would 
ensure “that truthful reporting about public officials in connection with their public duties is 
always insulated from the imposition of criminal sanctions by the First Amendment.”151 The 
Court, however, found it “unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach.”152 Instead, it 
portrayed the newspaper’s disclosure as free discussion of governmental affairs – precisely 
the type of activity the First Amendment was designed to protect. Accordingly, the activity 
was granted the highest level of legal protection, but not the absolute protection the 
journalists sought. The Court said there was a legitimate need for secrecy in inquiries about 
the fitness of judges, but that need was not so compelling as to justify suppressing a truthful 
report on those inquiries.153 
 The Court paid homage to truth telling in Landmark just as it had in Cox 
Broadcasting, but truth alone did not control the outcome of the case. Instead, it seemed that 
the First Amendment mandate to ensure free discussion of governmental affairs was the 
dispositive factor. Nonetheless, the Court did indicate the high value it assigned to truth as it 
weighed the issues in the case.  
                                                 
150 Id. at 832. 
 
151 Id. at 838. 
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 In Smith v. Daily Mail154 and Florida Star v. B.J.F.,155 the Court ruled that a truthful 
publication would not be vulnerable to sanctions except in the most extraordinary 
circumstances. The Court’s review of the prosecution of the Daily Mail and another West 
Virginia newspaper for violating a state law that made it illegal to publish the name of a 
juvenile suspect in a homicide concluded that “state action to punish the publication of 
truthful information can seldom satisfy constitutional standards.”156 Those standards required 
the government to prove that its punishment of the truth was necessary to “further a state 
interest of the highest order.”157 
 The ruling in B.J.F. ten years later showed the Court using the same strict standard to 
protect truth telling. That case reached the Supreme Court after the Florida Star newspaper 
had been successfully sued for publishing the name of a sexual assault victim. The Court set 
aside the judgment and ruled that “where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it 
has lawfully obtained, punishment may be lawfully imposed, if at all, only when narrowly 
tailored to a state interest of the highest order.” 158 
 The Court repeatedly cited the truthful nature of the information that triggered civil 
and criminal proceedings against the journalists in each of the final four cases discussed here, 
but the Court also sometimes found reason to protect the dissemination of this information 
because it came from public government records and insisted that this protection could only 
be removed by a state interest higher than those relied on in these instances. The Court 
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affirmed the value of truth in most of these cases by affording it a high level of protection 
from civil and criminal sanctions. In the libel cases, the Court generally found First 
Amendment values more compelling than the truth interest. In the other cases discussed here, 
the truth interest was upheld, but in each of these cases that interest was entwined with 
democracy-enhancing First Amendment values, which also were upheld. 
 In the six Supreme Court cases discussed in this section as treatments of truth beyond 
the libel context, the Court issued rulings that were not uniformly supportive of truth telling. 
In the two false light cases, Time v. Hill and Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., the Court 
applied the actual malice criterion and was as unsupportive of truth telling as it had been in 
libel cases, where that criterion was developed. With that criterion in place, journalists who 
knowingly or recklessly published false information were not protected. Journalists, such as 
those in Hill, who published false information but were not reckless or clearly trying to 
deceive, were protected. Journalists, such as the one in Cantrell, were not protected because 
they blatantly fabricated statements. However, the Court expanded the actual malice rule’s 
sphere of protection of falsehood in false light cases by extending it to communication about 
newsworthy matters. In libel cases that protection was limited to communication about public 
officials and public figures.159 
 The final four cases also addressed truth telling, but the Court also seemed to focus on 
assuring the unrestricted flow of information about crime and the justice system. 
Nonetheless, truth was valued and highlighted in each ruling. These cases were decided 
                                                 
159 Some state courts have extended the actual malice rule to libel cases involving matters of general public 
concern or newsworthy matters. See, e.g., AAFCO Heating v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 162 Ind. App. 671 
(1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun Inc., 188 Colo. 86, cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 1025 (1975); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 82 Mich. App. 153 (1978) (per curiam); Green v. Northern 
Publishing Co., 655 P.2d 736 (Alaska 1982). 
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during a period from the mid-1970s through the 1980s when the Court issued a number of 
rulings that opened the courts and justice system to scrutiny by the press and the public. 
Prominent among them were Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,160 which made it more 
difficult for judges to legally bar journalists from reporting on court proceedings; Richmond 
Newspapers v. Virginia,161 which recognized the right of journalists and the public to attend 
criminal trials; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,162 which forbade the automatic and 
categorical closing of criminal trials; and the two cases identified as Press-Enterprise Co. v. 
Riverside County Superior Court,163 which opened jury selection and pretrial court 
proceedings to the press. The four cases reviewed here can be seen as part of the string of 
Court rulings opening up the justice system although the instant discussion focuses on the 
Court’s frequent mentions of the truthful nature of the reporting on crime and the justice 
system as it justified the opening of the system to reporters. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 This chapter examined U.S. Supreme Court rulings to assess how truth and truth 
telling – journalism’s highest ethical values – fared in the Court’s shifting hierarchy of values 
and goals. Starting with an examination of the Court’s rulings in libel cases, the chapter 
showed the Court usually positioning truth and truth telling high among social and legal 
values, but rarely highest. The existence of libel as a cause of action in its 21st century form 
is in itself an homage to truth telling, but it was not always so. The history of libel law, 
                                                 
160 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
 
161 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 
162 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 
163 The case often referred to as Press-Enterprise I is reported at 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and the case referred to 
as Press-Enterprise II is reported at 478 U.S. 1 (1986). 
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including the centuries prior to the time period examined in this study, reflects the 
ascendance and decline of a number of other competing values. From its inception and 
through common law applications, libel law valued reputation above other concerns and 
sought to protect it with civil and criminal sanctions. Initially, truth was not a prominent 
value in libel law, and a true statement that harmed reputation could be fully subject to civil 
or criminal penalties.  
As truth came to be more highly valued, it became an absolute defense to libel, even 
when reputation suffered grievous harm. Falsehood, the lack of truth, became integral to the 
definition of libel. A reputation-damaging statement would support a libel claim only if it 
was false. In this sense, libel law extolled and protected truth telling. Libel law that imposed 
strict liability for the publication of false, defamatory statements was in effect, was perhaps 
the highest celebration of truth telling. 
 However, when the Supreme Court constitutionalized American libel law with its 
ruling in Times v. Sullivan, the place of truth and truth telling in the hierarchy of values and 
social goals fell a few notches. The ruling set the Court on the path of valuing free speech, 
democracy and social equality above truth telling. The Court required a finding of culpable 
fault in libel and created the actual malice rule in Sullivan to empower principles of the First 
Amendment and extend greater protection to free speech values. Along the way it protected 
some defamatory falsehoods. Since Sullivan, false defamatory statements about public 
officials are just as protected as true defamatory statements if the statement was made 
without knowledge it was false or without serious doubts about its truth. The creation of the 
actual malice rule indicated the Court had begun to focus less on truth and falsity per se in 
libel cases than on the fault and truth-seeking practices and conduct that created a defamatory 
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publication. Subsequent Court rulings extended the actual malice rule’s protection to 
statements about public figures as well as public officials. The overall result was the 
devaluation of truth telling from the worth it had been assigned by common law. Sometimes 
overlooked in this transformation is the fact that as late as 1975 the Society of Professional 
Journalists was advocating the equivalent of strict liability for the failure to report the truth. 
This indicated a much higher valuation of the truth by journalists than the Court. Of course, 
under the code even under a strict liability standard there was no actual liability because the 
codes are unenforceable. 
 The Court expressly linked the actual malice rule to the furtherance of democratic 
principles that elevated the people above their governors. The ruling insisted that the people 
should be able to criticize their government officials without fear of civil or criminal reprisals 
even if their criticism turned out to be unfounded. Accordingly, recklessly false criticism and 
statements, if not known to be false when made, would be protected as if they were true. This 
would avoid a chilling of the democratic prerogative to speak freely about officials elected or 
appointed to government positions to serve the people. 
 Much of the expansion of the ambit of the actual malice rule was accomplished in 
cases that had no bearing on the government or its officials but involved public figures as 
libel plaintiffs. The early expansion occurred in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and 
Associated Press v. Walker. With its ruling in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court firmly 
established that public figures who sued for libel would have to prove the same level of fault 
as any public official. These cases and Connaughton v. Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. 
also saw the Court reviewing and judging journalism’s truth-seeking practices. In St. Amant 
v. Thompson, another public figure libel case, the Court moved toward examining journalists’ 
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state of mind to determine whether their truth-seeking and truth-telling practices warranted 
legal protection. The ultimate extension of that line of inquiry and its legal validation 
occurred in the Herbert v. Lando ruling. 
 Private people suing for libel shared some of the burden imposed on public officials 
and public figures after the Court ruled in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps that they 
too must prove the defamatory statement at issue is false if the defendant is a member of the 
media and the statement involved a matter of public concern. By reversing the common law 
rule and placing the burden of proving falsity on the libel plaintiff, the Court honored truth 
by providing greater assurance that truthful statements would be less likely to be penalized 
by a civil judgment. It simultaneously protected those falsehoods that could not be proved 
false and thereby devalued truth.  
 A number of rulings clearly indicated that truth telling was as highly valued by the 
Court as by ethical journalists. In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., for example, the Court 
announced that false statements labeled as opinion were not thereby exempt from libel law. 
This was an assertion of the value of truth telling and was in accord with a then-15-year-old 
statement of ethical principle made by the American Society of Newspaper Editors indicating 
that commentary should be as faithful to the truth as news reporting was. The Milkovich 
ruling did not mention the ASNE principle it affirmed, nor did it acknowledge that it had 
decided an ethical issue. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., the Court again decided 
an ethical issue involving truth when it ruled that altering a quoted statement was not in itself 
knowingly creating a false statement. One camp of journalists claims such alterations are 
unethical and such a statement is necessarily untrue if it remains within quotation marks. 
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 When the Court addressed truth-telling issues beyond libel cases it generally 
continued to place other values atop the hierarchy. Its treatment of truth telling in false light 
cases closely followed its treatment in libel. In cases involving journalists’ coverage of crime 
and the justice system, the Court highlighted the worth of truth telling and praised it while 
generally ruling in favor of the journalists. Although falsity was not at issue in any of these 
later cases, the Court took pains to state its intention to protect truthful reporting even when 
some other values and social goals were compromised. For example, in Smith v. Daily Mail, 
Florida Star v. B. J. F. and Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, journalists published the names 
of the principals in violation of law and social mores. And in Landmark Communications, 
Inc. v. Virginia, journalists violated the secrecy of a judicial inquiry. In each case, 
constitutional and free speech values were supreme in the Court’s hierarchy and determined 
the outcomes, but the truthfulness of the reporting was made germane as the Court said the 
government would have to show a compelling need to suppress or punish accurate or truthful 
reports about crime and the justice system. 
 The pursuit of societal goals embraced by the Court also played a role in the libel 
rulings that created and expanded the actual malice rule, according to the pragmatic 
instrumentalist view that claims law promotes social and political values as well as moral and 
ethical propriety. The Supreme Court’s willingness to craft legal doctrine to correct racial 
injustice in the South during the Civil Rights Movement had been demonstrated in cases 
prior to Times v. Sullivan. That orientation of the Court arguably played a role in the 
disposition of the landmark libel case because it was so closely tied to the same social, 
political, and moral issues. The ruling favored those who opposed unjust racial policies. Law 
briefs submitted on both sides addressed these issues as well as legal matters.  
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 Similar issues were also prominent and influential in subsequent libel cases reviewed 
in this chapter and support a pragmatic instrumentalist interpretation of the Court rulings as 
instruments of social engineering, social justice, and the imposition of the Court’s view of 
proper conduct for journalists. In Walker, for example, the losing party was an outspoken 
opponent of racial integration and social equality in the South. In Butts, the losing party was 
a publication that the Court noted had embarked on a new editorial policy of muckraking and 
was under pressure to produce an exposé that may have involved compromising the 
standards of good journalism. The Gertz ruling is subject to a pragmatic instrumentalist 
interpretation on two fronts. First, the prevailing plaintiff was an attorney representing a 
black family in a civil rights violation case. It was also a case in which the Court noted that 
the losing defendant magazine practiced improper journalism because it was not objective 
but reported from the far right-wing bias of the John Birch Society. Time, Inc. v. Pape 
involved a civil rights issue, but this one was in the North. The losing plaintiff was a Chicago 
deputy police chief accused of violating the civil rights of a black family. 
 The Supreme Court’s valuation of truth and other principles or interests involved in 
the cases reviewed in this chapter were not in perfect accord with the high value assigned to 
truth by journalism codes of ethics. Issues raised by the cases required the Court to address 
the truth-telling ethic as it sought to promote press freedom, social equality, and other 
principles and values. Those values generally prevailed in the Court even when they did not 
fully support or even undermined journalism’s ethical directive to tell the truth. 
 In the cases where Court rulings affirmed the value of truth and truth telling as set by 
journalism ethics, that ethical standard was strengthened by legal imperative, although 
apparently not as the result of any explicit judicial intent. But when the truth interest was 
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pitted against some other Court-supported interest, the Court decided which journalistic 
practices and conduct were proper or improper, or right or wrong in areas that journalism 
codes of ethics had already made such determinations. When truth telling competed with one 
of the Court’s favored interests, truth lost. When the Court’s interest and the truth interest 
were arrayed on the same side of a legal issue the Court had to decide, the ethical value of 
truth would be bolstered, but the value of truth did not appear to be the deciding factor. The 
Court, in effect, was creating an alternative code of behavior for journalists. A close study of 
the Court’s disposition of cases indicates that some truth-telling practices were given the 
High Court’s imprimatur and others were not. This may not amount to creating a code of 
ethics per se, but the similarity is striking. Placed in the context of this dissertation’s 
fundamental mission, which is to determine whether the Supreme Court was creating a code 
of ethics for journalists, the answer with respect to the cannon of truth telling has to be: it 
sometimes looked like it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Privacy: A Matter of Morality, Ethics, and Law  
 
 Invasion of privacy holds the distinction of being the only category of torts created 
with the specific purpose of holding journalists accountable for unethical practices. Judge 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley formally introduced the concept of privacy rights to American 
jurisprudence with the 1878 publication of A Treatise on the Law of Torts or the Wrongs 
Which Arise Independent of Contract.1 Magazine editor E. L. Godkin has been credited with 
making the first appeal to the general public for recognition of a right to privacy 12 years 
after Cooley’s work was published.2 But law scholars Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis are most often credited with making privacy an established legal concept in the 
United States. In the same year that Godkin’s article was published, Warren and Brandeis 
deftly provided the legal rationale and social policy justifications for subjecting journalists to 
civil and criminal penalties for invasions of privacy.3 Uncounted legions of others – scholars, 
demagogues, and common people alike – have contributed to the ongoing discussion of the 
nature, value, and parameters of privacy. Amid the dialogue, complaints about press 
intrusions upon what Cooley called the right “to be let alone”4 have been widespread and 
long-standing. 
                                                 
1 Douglas S. Campbell, Privacy, in HISTORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 536 (Margaret A. Blanchard ed., 1998).  
 
2 E.L. Godkin, Rights of the Citizen, SCRIBNER’S MAGAZINE, July 1890, at 67, noted in DON R. PEMBER, 
PRIVACY AND THE PRESS 24 (1972). 
 
3 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
 
4 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (2nd ed. 1888). 
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 Privacy earned an enduring place on the public agenda during the final decades of the 
1800s as the public’s taste for gossip and appetite for salacious, intimate details about the 
personal lives of others nurtured offensively intrusive practices often associated with yellow 
journalism. These tastes also contributed to the emergence of Jazz Age journalism during the 
early decades of the 1900s and what has been criticized as tabloid, sleaze, and insensitive 
journalism through the end of the 20th century and into the 21st. Newspapers that profited by 
pandering to these tastes invaded the privacy of the rich and poor alike and prompted such a 
surge of moral outrage in some quarters that legal and ethical strictures against intrusive and 
offensive publicity were created. Warren and his law partner Brandeis, who later became a 
U. S. Supreme Court justice, were among those outraged by such excesses in the press and 
published an elaborate condemnation in the Harvard Law Review in 1890.5 “The press is 
overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and decency,” Warren and 
Brandeis complained.6 Popular lore claims the article was prompted by intrusive press 
coverage of the Boston high-society wedding of Warren’s daughter, but at least one scholar 
has disputed the accuracy of that tale.7 The article is credited with eventually influencing 
legislatures and judges to recognize privacy as a legal right and create four torts to protect it. 
A half century after the Warren-Brandeis article was published, another law scholar, Louis 
Nizer, still found some journalism practices so unreformed that he also complained in writing 
and sought to justify the use of legal process to restrain journalists’ excesses:  
The privacy doctrine is the law’s answer to the abuses made possible by 
unrestrained and irresponsible operation of newspapers with their far-flung 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
5 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890). 
 
6 Id. at 195. 
 
7 PEMBER, supra note 2, at 24. 
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agencies for gathering information . . . and other mechanical devices by which 
it may soon be possible to know everything about everybody everywhere.8 
 
Even a full century after Warren and Brandeis made their famous call for censure, other law 
scholars found reason to criticize journalism that offended their sensibilities and to call on the 
law for redress of these grievances. Georgetown University law professor Peter B. Edelman 
wrote in 1990:  
Reports concerning the private lives of public figures have certainly reached 
an unprecedented low in terms of intrusiveness. A change in journalistic 
practices might ease the situation, but it seems fair to ask also whether such 
reporting should, under some circumstances, be subject to criminal or civil 
sanctions.9 
 
 Edelman was among a formidable number of 20th century law scholars who, in the 
tradition of Warren and Brandeis, urged that law be applied to solve the problems of what 
they considered to be a socially irresponsible and professionally unethical press. Such 
polemics are symptomatic of the public’s disapproval of some journalism practices and 
willingness to consider using the law to correct them. This type of public remonstration and 
demand for legal remedies is precisely what the Commission on Freedom of the Press, or 
Hutchins Commission, was cautioning the press and the public about in 1947 when its 
historic report warned:  
[E]veryone concerned with the freedom of the press and with the future of 
democracy should put forth every effort to make the press accountable, for if 
it does not become so of its own motion, the power of government will be 
used, as a last resort, to force it to be so.10 
 
                                                 
8 Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MICH. L. REV. 526, 559 (1941). 
 
9 Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1230 
(1990). 
 
10 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 80 (Robert D. Leigh ed., 1947). 
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The Warren-Brandeis article predated the Hutchins Commission’s warning by more than a 
half century, but it inspired the creation of privacy torts that arguably were fashioned to make 
journalism more ethical by establishing legal liability for improper practices.11 This creation 
of a category of tort law to solve this type of problem illustrates the pragmatic instrumentalist 
assertion that law is, in essence, a tool for solving social problems. 
 Journalists have tried to curtail socially intrusive practices within their craft since they 
began banding together in professional associations. As a result, privacy concerns have been 
reflected in virtually every major code of ethics developed by American journalists. These 
concerns, however, often have not been expressed explicitly and most recently, some codes 
have not even used the word “privacy.”12 This chapter examines how the codes addressed 
privacy issues and how U. S. Supreme Court rulings from 1947 until 2005 have valued 
privacy rights in cases that bear on journalism practices. A substantial portion of this 
examination of the Court’s treatment of privacy rights is devoted to rulings in privacy tort 
cases, but the chapter is not limited to them. This chapter also includes an assessment of 
other civil and criminal cases in which matters of privacy, as delineated in the journalism 
ethics codes, were at issue.  
 The first section of the chapter examines how five of the most influential journalism 
ethics codes have addressed and identified matters the press should consider private. The 
second section reviews Supreme Court treatments of privacy rights in rulings from 1947 until 
2005 that addressed the common law privacy torts false light and appropriation or their 
                                                 
11 The four privacy torts are public disclosure of private facts, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652D 
(1972); intrusion, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652B (1972); appropriation, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §652C (1972);  and false light, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652E (1972). See generally William 
L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
 
12 See, e.g., ASNE Statement of Principles, http://asne.org/kiosk/archive/principl.htm (last updated August 28, 
2002). 
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statutory counterparts. High Court treatments of the statutory counterparts of the intrusion 
upon seclusion tort during the same time frame are examined in the third section of this 
chapter.  
Rulings on public disclosure of private facts are the fundamental focus of the fourth 
and fifth sections. The fourth section examines the Court’s handling of cases in which 
lawsuits were filed on behalf of rape victims based on claims that their privacy was invaded 
when journalists publicly identified them. The fifth section examines the Court’s handling of 
cases in which the privacy interests of juvenile crime suspects were at issue, and the sixth 
section reviews Court rulings on privacy issues in other contexts that have a bearing on 
journalism practices. Particular attention is given to Freedom of Information Act cases. This 
section also discusses cases in which the Court addressed privacy issues in other guises and 
cases that carried a privacy label but actually addressed other matters, such as physical 
safety. The final section summarizes the chapter’s findings and draws conclusions. 
 
Privacy in Journalism Ethics Codes 
 Journalists who found fault with some of their colleagues’ handling of matters 
considered private sought to improve the practice of journalism by articulating ethical 
principles and standards of conduct.13 Two decades after the Warren and Brandeis article was 
published, the Kansas Editorial Association addressed the privacy issue in what is widely 
considered the first code of ethics adopted by an association of journalists. “No society 
                                                 
13 See MARION T. MARZOLF, CIVILIZING VOICES: AMERICAN PRESS CRITICISM 1880-1950 (1991); Mary M. 
Cronin & James B. McPherson, Pronouncements and Denunciations: An Analysis of State Press Association 
Ethcs Codes from the 1920s, 72 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 890 (1995). 
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gossips or scandals, however true, should ever be published concerning [offenses against 
private morality],” the code said.14 
 Both seminal pronouncements, the Warren and Brandeis law review article and the 
Kansas ethics code, primarily addressed one type of privacy invasion – public disclosure of 
private information. Law scholar Rodney A. Smolla called it “the quintessential cause of 
action for invasion of privacy.”15 Defining what is private, however, has proved problematic 
for those who developed ethics codes as well as those who create and apply privacy law. 
Both seem at times to presume privacy is a moral absolute whose value and boundaries are so 
well known as to need no delineation and that people have an innate ability to know what is 
private and what is not. Scholars who have addressed privacy issues have found the 
boundaries much less certain. It is “an unusually slippery concept,” according to Yale law 
professor James Q. Whitman, and “embarrassingly difficult to define.”16 Scholars such as 
Frederick Schauer have identified privacy as a purely social construct that varies with time 
and among cultures.17 Others, including Professor Martin E. Halstuk, claim it has immutable, 
intrinsic worth and is a fundamental value.18 Privacy has been identified as essential to 
                                                 
14 Kansas Code of Ethics, reprinted in NELSON ANTRIM CRAWFORD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM 202 (1924). 
 
15 Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American Privacy Law, 27 NOVA L. REV. 289, 296 
(2002). 
 
16 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151, 1153 
(2004). 
 
17 See  Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of Privacy, in JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER PRIVACY 
3 (Craig L. LaMay ed., 2003). 
 
18 See, e.g., Martin E. Halstuk, Shielding Private Lives from Prying Eyes: The Escalating Conflict Between 
Constitutional Privacy and Accountability, 1 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 71 (2003); Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a 
Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371 (2003). But seeWhitman, supra note 15; 
Anita L. Allen, Why Journalists Can’t Protect Privacy, in JOURNALISM AND THE DEBATE OVER PRIVACY 69-85 
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personal dignity and individuals’ ability to maintain a sense of self and to control when or 
whether to share themselves or information about themselves with others.19 As will be 
explained in greater detail shortly, American law generally has deemed a matter to be private 
if a reasonable person would be outraged or embarrassed by public disclosure of that matter 
or if the person asserting a right to privacy had a reasonable expectation of privacy with 
respect to that matter. If the matter is not a legitimate matter of public concern or is not 
newsworthy, it also is usually found to be private. The terms “reasonable” and “legitimate” 
are so elastic and relative that they are especially prone to criticism when applied to a set of 
circumstances because they may appear to be capricious and arbitrary. 
 The Kansas code of journalism ethics tried to protect privacy interests by proscribing 
news reports about offenses against “private morality,” but it defined such reports only as 
those “most often centering around the family relation.”20 It allowed for less circumspection 
when reporting offenses against private morality if the individuals involved were celebrities 
or otherwise public people. But even the famous were to be treated somewhat gingerly in 
these cases, according to the code. 
However prominent the principals, offenses against private morality should 
never receive first-page position and their details should be eliminated as 
much as possible. Certain crimes against private morality which are revolting 
to our finer sensibilities should be ignored entirely; however, in the event of 
their having become public with harmful exaggerations, we may make an 
elementary statement, couched in the least suggestive language.21 
 
                                                 
19 See generally CLAY CALVERT, VOYEUR NATION: MEDIA, PRIVACY AND PEERING IN MODERN CULTURE 
(2000); PRIVACY: A VANISHING VALUE? (William C. S. J. Bier ed., 1980). 
 
20 Kansas Code of Ethics, supra note 13, at 207. 
 
21 Id. at 208 (emphasis in original). 
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Despite its ground-breaking effort to protect privacy, the Kansas code’s final paragraph 
conceded its shortcomings and encouraged the association to strive for greater clarity: 
“Bounds of Publicity. – A man’s name and portrait are his private property and the point 
where they cease to be private and become public should be defined for our association.”22 
 When the American Society of Newspaper Editors developed its Canons of 
Journalism in 1923, it articulated ethical strictures protecting privacy more clearly than the 
Kansas code but did not provide an explanation of what matters were to be considered 
private. Nor did it provide a blanket condemnation of public disclosures of private 
information. Under the heading of “fair play,” the canons advised: “A newspaper should not 
invade private rights or feelings without sure warrant of public right as distinguished from 
public curiosity.”23 More than a half century later, in 1975, the canons were revised and 
renamed “ASNE’s Statement of Principles.” These revisions remained intact as the principles 
were displayed on the ASNE website in 2005. Under the heading of “Fair Play,” the ASNE 
principles said: “Journalists should respect the rights of people involved in the news, observe 
common standards of decency and stand accountable to the public for the fairness and 
accuracy of their news reports.”24 Here again were references to privacy rights that were not 
explained as ASNE apparently presumed there was a common and knowable standard of 
decency. 
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 The Society of Professional Journalists adopted the original ASNE canons in 1926 
but developed and adopted its own code in 1973. That code was revised in 1984 and again in 
1987. The 1987 version had become marginally more specific and made three 
recommendations without significantly clarifying what was meant by privacy: 
Journalists at all times will show respect for the dignity, privacy rights and 
well-being of people encountered in the course of gathering and presenting the 
news. . . . The news media must guard against invading a person’s right to 
privacy. . . . The media should not pander to morbid curiosity about details of 
vice and crime.25 
 
While the newer version added wording indicating that supplying details about vice and 
crime might be invasive of privacy, the general parameters of privacy rights remained 
undefined. The version of the SPJ code in effect in 2005 was adopted in September 1996 and 
addressed privacy issues under the general exhortation for journalists to minimize harm. The 
text had become a bit more detailed than its earlier versions and advised journalists to: 
Be sensitive when seeking or using interviews or photographs of those 
affected by tragedy or grief. . . . Recognize that private people have a greater 
right to control information about themselves than do public officials and 
others who seek power, influence or attention. Only an overriding public need 
can justify intrusion into anyone’s privacy. Show good taste. Avoid pandering 
to lurid curiosity. Be cautious about identifying juvenile suspects or victims of 
sex crimes.26 
 
This incarnation of the code went furthest in providing specifics about what information was 
to be considered private. It identified intrusions upon grief and the publication of the names 
of juvenile crime suspects and sexual assault victims as potential violations of privacy. The 
code urged the use of sensitivity and caution in these areas. It also placed a higher value on 
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the privacy of a common person than a public official or celebrity and indicated that while 
privacy is highly valued, there may be times when other values would prevail. 
 When the National Association of Radio News Directors placed a forerunner of its 
ethics code in the NARND Resolutions adopted in 1946 and approved its first Code of 
Standards in 1947, there were no clearly identifiable references to privacy issues, but there 
was a directive to select and present news within the bounds of “good taste.”27 This could 
have been generously interpreted to apply to privacy issues, but its intent was not clear and 
similarly oblique references appeared in a later revision of the code. By 1950 the 
organization was on its way to becoming the Radio Television News Directors Association, 
and its revised Code of Standards added a directive “to avoid sensationalism.”28 Again this 
was a provision that could be applied to privacy, but not necessarily or exclusively. The word 
“privacy” did not appear until the 1966 RTNDA Code of Broadcast News Ethics was 
adopted. Article 4 of the code said: “Broadcast newsmen shall at all times display humane 
respect for the dignity, privacy and the well-being of persons with whom the news deals.”29 
Article 4 was retained essentially unchanged in the 1973 revision of the code, but the term 
“newsmen” was replaced by “journalists.” Revisions to the code in 1987 eliminated the 
arrangement by articles, and the provision dealing with privacy dropped the reference to 
“humane respect” but retained nearly all the preceding language of Article 4. In 2000, 
RTNDA again revised its code and the provisions dealing with privacy remained unchanged 
at the time of this study. They advised professional electronic journalists to: 
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Treat all subjects of news coverage with respect and dignity, showing 
particular compassion to victims of crime or tragedy; Exercise special care 
when children are involved in a story and give children greater privacy 
protection than adults; [P]resent the news with . . . decency . . . respect the 
dignity . . . of the audience as well as the subjects of news.30 
 
These revisions broke no new ground in the references to respect, dignity, and children and 
generally mirrored the statements of other organizations of professional journalists. But when 
the code made reference to the dignity of the audience, it returned to a consideration of the 
privacy sensibilities of the receptors of media messages that was evident in the earliest 
newspaper codes but had been abandoned generally by the mid-20th century. This early 
privacy-related concern for the news subscriber is reflected in the following excerpts from 
newspaper ethics codes published in a leading text on journalism ethics in 1924. The Detroit 
News advised its reporters faced with a potentially sensitive article: “When in doubt think of 
a 13-year-old girl reading what you are writing.”31 Similarly, an ethical guide written by 
President Warren G. Harding when he was editor of The Marion Star informed reporters, “I 
want this paper to be so conducted that it can go into any home without destroying the 
innocence of any child.”32 Again these provisions could be more precisely identified as 
relating to issues of public sensibilities, morals, and matters of taste. 
 The Associated Press Managing Editors Association’s was the last of the major 
associations of journalists to develop an ethics code, and the privacy references have 
undergone the least change. Its first code was adopted in 1975 and made only a boilerplate 
                                                 
30 Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, Radio-Television News Directors Association, 
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reference to privacy as it urged journalists to “respect the individual’s right of privacy.”33 
When the APME code was revised in 1994 the privacy section was not changed, and that 
original wording remained on the association’s website in 2005.34 
 Despite their often vague wording, the oldest and the most recently developed ethics 
codes expressed concern about the privacy rights of people who became part of news stories 
and sought to ward journalists away from intrusions. Although the language usually did not 
specifically define the privacy rights journalists ought to respect, they generally seemed to 
track the sentiments expressed by Warren and Brandeis and included references that 
distinguished between information that was public or private. These codes spoke to the 
potential injury to feelings and sensibilities, and other psychic injuries that tort law would 
ultimately seek to compensate. The privacy concerns expressed by journalism ethicists were 
consistent with the central concerns expressed in the Warren-Brandeis article and were most 
faithfully reflected in the common law privacy tort usually referred to as public disclosure of 
private facts. The Restatement of the Law of Torts explains this civil wrong: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is 
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy if the matter publicized 
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (b) is 
not of legitimate concern to the public.35 
 
 During the 1970s and ’80s the codes made more references to public sensibilities, 
well being, personal dignity, and the idea of decency than they had during the earlier decades 
of the 20th century. There was an emphasis on accountability and how that would sometimes 
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require withholding information that might appear to pander to morbid curiosity about the 
misfortunes of others. The idea of accountability was firmly in place in the ’90s as the central 
ethical directive to minimize harm was embraced by the Society of Professional Journalists. 
This decade also saw the codes acknowledging the legal standard for distinguishing between 
public people and private people and recognizing that a greater public need can trump the 
codes’ prohibitions. Naming juvenile crime suspects and the victims of sex crimes, for 
example, was not absolutely prohibited if a journalist revealed the names for a purpose that 
served a greater public interest.  
As the codes were developed and revised over the years, cautions about respecting 
privacy remained a staple, but there was no indication of a widespread effort within the 
profession to draw the boundaries of privacy more carefully. While some news media 
companies’ ethics codes made specific references to the categories of privacy they would not 
violate, some press association codes did not use the word “privacy” at all. While privacy 
generally was deemed important, journalists, the public, and the courts had a hard time 
deciding what matters should be considered private. 
 
Supreme Court Addresses False Light and Appropriation 
 As mentioned previously, the earliest journalism codes of ethics and the Warren and 
Brandeis law review article arguing for the recognition of privacy rights focused primarily on 
personal harm caused by the unwarranted publication of details about private lives. The 
article led to the creation of four privacy torts: public disclosure of private information, false 
light, appropriation, and intrusion. Each of these torts deals with some aspect of the privacy 
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interests that are addressed by the ethics codes. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed all four 
types of privacy invasion between 1947 and 2005, the time frame of this examination. 
 Privacy tort cases with news media defendants rarely made it to the Supreme Court. 
The first of them arrived 1967, and its disposition indicated that the Court was not likely to 
favor privacy rights over First Amendment rights. That case, Time, Inc. v. Hill,36 was an 
appeal of a judgment in lawsuit for false light invasion of privacy, the public distortion of a 
person’s image. False light plaintiffs must prove the defendant published false information 
about them that portrays them in a false light that is highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
False light and the other privacy torts do not seek to remedy injury to reputation as libel does 
but pursue compensation for psychic injury. False light resembles the public disclosure of 
private facts tort in that both address the publication of information that is highly offensive to 
a reasonable person and causes injuries such as humiliation and embarrassment. Because this 
harmful information also must be false, this tort closely resembles libel and is dealt with to a 
greater extent in Chapter Three, which is devoted to the Court’s valuation of truth and truth 
telling. That chapter also examines the Court’s ruling in Time v. Hill more extensively as it 
addresses truth-telling values. This chapter focuses on what the Court said about the privacy 
interests in that case. 
 James Hill sued Time Inc. because it published an article in Life magazine that falsely 
described a new Broadway play as a reenactment of an incident in which Hill’s family was 
briefly held hostage by three prison escapees. Hill claimed the inaccuracies caused his family 
members psychic harms such as embarrassment as they tried to put the ordeal behind them. 
Even though the family was generally depicted as heroic, Hill sued, relying on a 1903 New 
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York civil rights law that purported to protect privacy by imposing criminal penalties and 
civil liability for commercial appropriation of a person’s name or image. New York’s courts 
interpreted this law so that the use of a person’s name in connection with a news story was 
exempt. But the exemption was lost if an ostensible news report was false.37 The law would 
consider the news usage of the name as a commercial use. With this interpretation, Hill 
prevailed at trial in a New York court. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment 
ruling that the falsity must be the result of actual malice. This was the central holding of the 
case, but the Court also made other observations related to privacy interests. Among them 
was a determination that affects lawsuits for appropriation, the first of the privacy torts to be 
defined by statute. Justice William Brennan wrote the majority opinion, which said the fact 
that statements are published in a news medium that is sold for profit does not mean the 
publication is sold for “trade purposes” or is beyond constitutional protection. “That books, 
newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from 
being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment,” the Court 
said.38 The statute at issue in Time v. Hill made it a misdemeanor to appropriate the “name, 
portrait or picture of any living person” without permission “for advertising purposes or for 
the purposes of trade.”39 The Court ruling effectively exempted the news media and other 
media from appropriation claims based on informational or news usage of a person’s name or 
likeness. The appropriation tort, while embodying protections of personhood and dignity 
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common to the other privacy torts, is essentially a protection of privacy as a mercantile 
property. 
 Statements made by the Court’s Justices in five separate opinions addressed a number 
of privacy issues presented by the case. Justice Hugo Black complained that the ruling may 
have “created a right of privacy equal to or superior to the right of a free press” because the 
Court had resorted to balancing the two interests to reach a decision.40 He apparently did not 
believe the privacy right warranted such lofty treatment in this case. Conversely, Justice Abe 
Fortas complained that the ruling did not afford the privacy right its due respect. “I do not 
believe that the First Amendment precludes effective protection of the right of privacy,” he 
wrote in dissent.41 He referred to privacy as one of the “great and important values in our 
society” and said it was “entitled to the Court’s careful respect and protection.” To bolster his 
case he cited Brandeis, a co-author of the seminal law review article on privacy, when he 
wrote as a member of the Court that “‘the right of privacy is the most comprehensive of 
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’”42 Justice William O. Douglas, in a 
separate concurring opinion, argued that Hill’s claim to any right to privacy in this context 
had been eliminated by the fact that the newsworthiness of his family’s ordeal had placed the 
incident into the public domain.43 Justice John Marshall Harlan said in dissent that the case 
was “not ‘privacy’ litigation in its truest sense” because “[n]o claim was made that there was 
any intrusion upon the Hills’ solitude or private affairs to obtain information for 
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publication.”44 His narrow view of privacy nonetheless indicated that he recognized the 
viability of intrusion as a privacy tort. “The power of a State to control and remedy such 
intrusion for news gathering purposes cannot be denied,” he wrote.45 However, the Court did 
not review any pure intrusion cases during Harlan’s tenure. Cases raising intrusion issues 
came to the Supreme Court in 1999 and 2001 but in the form of lawsuits based on statutory 
violations and not common law torts.46 These cases will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
 Seven years after deciding Time v. Hill the Court relied on it as the controlling 
precedent to direct a judgment in 1974 against a news media defendant in Cantrell v. Forest 
City Publishing Co.,47 another false light case. The ruling did not dwell on the privacy 
interest beyond what was necessary to identify the cause of action as false light distortion. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, it concentrated on the applicability of the actual malice rule to 
the tort. 
 In 1977 the Court overturned an Ohio Supreme Court ruling in another privacy tort 
case that had a news media defendant and that purportedly relied on the Time v. Hill 
precedent. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.48 was a pure claim of 
appropriation. A county fair performer who identified himself as a “human cannonball” sued 
when a television news program taped and broadcast his full 15-second performance despite 
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and Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 809 (1999), two “media-ride-along” cases in which journalists accompanied 
law enforcement officers in raids onto private property. The Court also addressed privacy issues in Bartnicki v. 
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), a case in which the content of illegally intercepted private phone conversations 
was publicized by the media.  
 
47 419 U.S. 245 (1974). 
 
48 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 
 
 
185 
his objections. The Supreme Court overturned an Ohio high court ruling that had found a 
First Amendment privilege that exempted bona fide news coverage of matters of legitimate 
public interest. Time v. Hill did indeed indicate that an action for appropriation was not 
constitutionally permissible against a news medium for coverage of a newsworthy matter if 
that coverage was truthful or if a legitimate effort had been made to ensure it was truthful. In 
Time v. Hill, the plaintiff actually wanted to be “let alone” in the original sense of privacy 
that Warren and Brandeis lent to the term in their influential law review article. Plaintiff 
Zacchini, however, did not want to be let alone; he wanted to be paid for the news program’s 
use of his right of publicity, which is oxymoronically, an offshoot of privacy law. But in 
Zacchini, the privacy right was, in effect, a property right closely akin to copyright. Justice 
Byron White, writing for a 5-4 majority, distinguished Zacchini from Time v. Hill in an 
opinion that concluded, “[W]e are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do 
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent.”49 
The ruling clearly indicated that the “newsworthiness privilege” did not fully subjugate all 
privacy interests to the Court’s First Amendment concerns as some scholars had feared.50 
 
Supreme Court Addresses Intrusion 
 Privacy interests also prevailed over First Amendment arguments in two Supreme 
Court rulings issued on the same day in 1999 that served as warnings to the news media that 
engaged in media ride-alongs, a common but intrusive news gathering practice that dates 
back to the 1920s. These rulings will be examined in this section as Court treatments of the 
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statutory counterpart of the common law intrusion upon seclusion tort. This section also will 
include an analysis of a 2001 Court ruling in a case that presented a statutory hybrid of the 
intrusion and public disclosure of private facts tort. In this latter instance, however, the free 
press interests prevailed over the privacy interests.  
 In both 1999 cases journalists accompanied law enforcement officers conducting 
raids or searches on private property. Although the journalists were not litigants in either case 
when it reached the Supreme Court, the profession was scolded for engaging in a practice 
that fell squarely within the definition of the intrusion tort. One justice warned of legal 
consequences if the practice continues. 
 A Maryland couple, Charles and Geraldine Wilson, were the petitioners in the first of 
these two cases, Wilson v. Layne.51 They sued a team of law enforcement officers from the 
U.S. Marshals Service and a Maryland police department for invading their privacy by 
bringing along a photographer and reporter from The Washington Post during an early 
morning raid inside the couple’s home in 1992. Mr. Wilson was clad only in his underwear 
and his wife was in a nightgown as the officers accosted them and the journalists watched 
and photographed the confrontation. Even though the officers had a valid arrest warrant for 
the couple’s son and the photographs were not published, the Court unanimously ruled the 
officers had violated the privacy protections of the U.S. Constitution. Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist concisely delivered the ruling: 
We hold that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring 
members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution 
of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid 
of the execution of the warrant.52 
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Rehnquist emphasized how the Fourth Amendment was crafted to reflect “the overriding 
respect for  the sanctity of the home,”53 but the Court ultimately decided that no damages for 
this affront would be awarded to the Wilsons because the officers were protected by qualified 
immunity. That immunity stemmed from the Court’s finding that the officers could not have 
reasonably known in 1992 that media ride-alongs were unconstitutional invasions of privacy 
under these circumstances even though there had been some state and lower federal court 
rulings to that effect. “[T]he constitutional question presented by this case is by no means 
open and shut,” Rehnquist wrote as he explained the unsettled state of the law in 1992.54  
 Justice John Paul Stevens concurred in the Court’s finding of a privacy violation, but 
disagreed with the grant of immunity. In a dissent that parodied Rehnquist he issued a 
warning to police and the media that there would be legal consequences for future 
transgressions. “That the Court today speaks with a single voice on the merits of the 
constitutional question is unusual and certainly lends support to the notion that the question 
in indeed ‘open and shut.’ ”55 Stevens ended with a cautionary note: “[T]he Court today 
authorizes one free violation of the well-established rule it reaffirms.”56 
 A Montana couple, Paul and Erma Berger, filed the second invasion-of-privacy 
lawsuit referred to earlier that was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on the same day as 
Wilson v. Layne.57 Agents of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, accompanied by Cable 
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News Network reporters and a camera crew, executed a search warrant at the couple’s ranch 
in hopes of finding evidence of illegal hunting or trapping. In this incident, the law 
enforcement officers and journalists did not enter the couple’s home. Nonetheless, the 
Court’s per curiam opinion cited its ruling in Wilson v. Layne and found the presence of the 
CNN journalists constituted a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections. This 
ruling went beyond Wilson v. Layne by extending the effective prohibition on media ride-
alongs to sites that did not have the legal sanctity conferred upon the home. As in Wilson, 
however, the officers were granted qualified immunity and Stevens dissented. A case note in 
an influential law review suggested that those whose privacy has been violated by the joint 
actions of the police and journalists “may find that adding a deep pocketed media entity to 
the lawsuit against an immunized police officer is an attractive option. . . . [C]haracterizing 
media conduct as a civil rights violation vindicates a humiliating experience.”58 In fact, the 
Bergers had named CNN as a co-defendant in their lawsuit. The trial court granted CNN 
summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that judgment, and the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to review that reversal.59 In the end, the district court resumed 
control of the case on remand and denied CNN summary judgment and approved a sealed 
settlement of the case in 2001.60 As a result, CNN was not a party when the case reached the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
 Many of the largest American media companies and professional associations of 
journalists filed an amici curiae brief that covered both cases and argued that if the Court 
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allowed the imposition of legal sanctions for media ride-alongs it would hinder journalists’ 
ability to provide a window through which the public could see how government officials 
actually perform their duties.61 As it insisted that the presence of journalists during the 
execution of arrest and search warrants caused only an “incremental diminution of privacy,” 
the media brief predicted that “this window will effectively be closed” by an adverse ruling 
by the Court.62 The brief expressed a greater fear of the Court’s ultimate holding in Berger 
than its decision in Wilson because it affirmed the lower court’s finding of a powerful 
privacy right in non-residential sites.  
The Ninth Circuit’s holding, if adopted by this Court, will have one certain 
consequence: To avoid the risk that they will be deemed to have violated the 
Fourth Amendment, law enforcement and other public officials performing 
their duties will simply bar the public through the news media, from observing 
their activities in a variety of settings. Such a regime will eliminate a class of 
news reporting that has contributed meaningfully to public scrutiny of official 
conduct.63 
 
The media brief focused entirely on the competing interests in the First and Fourth 
Amendments. It made no reference to the ethics of journalists who watch or photograph 
private people who might be in bed or in their underwear when government officials doing 
their jobs burst into their homes.  
 Media ride-alongs, in addition to posing a risk of illegal or unethical invasions of 
privacy, also appear to be derelictions of journalists’ ethical duty to operate independently of 
government.64 In both cases discussed here and in media ride-alongs generally, the journalists 
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arguably did not and do not function as watchdogs. Notwithstanding the arguments made in 
the amici curiae brief submitted by media groups, journalists on ride-alongs acted more like 
press agents for their law enforcement partners. One commentator on Hanlon v. Berger took 
the criticism even further by claiming, “CNN appeared to spurn journalistic integrity in favor 
of creating a propaganda video.”65 In assuming the role of government press agent and 
propagandist, journalists do not perform the role assigned to them in the American 
constitutional scheme of checks and balances. It is, therefore, understandable that in these 
instances the First Amendment interests raised in these cases, which establish and support the 
journalist’s proper role, did not fare well when the Court balanced them against the asserted 
privacy interests. Two years later, however, in Bartnicki v. Vopper,66 the Court faced a 
privacy case in which journalists and other media professionals did appear to live up to their 
constitutionally defined responsibilities. When the Court set about balancing the free press 
and privacy interests, the scales tipped against privacy. 
 Gloria Bartnicki, a union negotiator, and Anthony F. Kane, a Pennsylvania school 
union leader, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn a lower court ruling against their 
claim that a radio program host and others in the media had invaded their privacy by 
publicizing the contents of their cellular telephone conversations. The conversations had been 
intercepted illegally by some unknown third party. Recordings of the intercepts wound up in 
the hands of the media. Federal and state anti-wiretapping statutes made it illegal to intercept 
phone conversation or disseminate the contents of those conversations, and allowed lawsuits 
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against violators.67 Accordingly, Bartnicki and Kane sued radio host Frederick W. Vopper 
and others for publicizing the conversations. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that 
those statutes as applied in these circumstances violated the First Amendment. In a 6-3 
decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s ruling.  
 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion and relied heavily on the fact that 
Bartnicki and Kane’s intercepted conversations had not been intercepted by the media 
defendants. Of equal importance to Stevens was the determination that the conversations 
were about legitimate matters of public concern because they related directly to union 
contract negotiation tactics and the process of deciding how the public’s money was to be 
spent. The privacy-invading media defendants were being faithful to their constitutional roles 
as watchdogs and disseminators of information about public concerns when they accepted the 
stolen material and publicized its contents. That the defendants accepted stolen information 
and publicized it knowing it was stolen was not a decisive element in the case, according to 
Stevens. He cited the precedent-setting decisions in “The Pentagon Papers Case,” New York 
Times Co. v. United States,68 Florida Star v. B.J.F, 69 Smith v. Daily Mail, 70 and Landmark 
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia 71 to show that the Court had declined to permit penalties 
against the media for publishing truthful information of public concern that the media had not 
caused to be stolen, but had otherwise acquired legally.  
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 The petitioners’ arguments asserted privacy rights as legal and moral values that had 
been invaded by media malefactors who would provide a ready market for and therefore an 
incentive for more illegal and immoral intrusions if they were not held accountable by the 
law.72 The petitioners received a somewhat sympathetic response when they asserted that a 
democratic society needed to protect the privacy of communication to foster creative and 
constructive thought.73 Those arguments failed to sway a majority of the Court. “In this case, 
privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public 
importance,” Stevens wrote. “One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs 
is an attendant loss of privacy.”74 
 Stevens, in stating that the case presented “a conflict between interests of the highest 
order,” seemed to indicate that individual privacy rights were on a par with First Amendment 
rights.75 As such, the final balance between equals would be determined by an assessment of 
the particular facts of the case and generally limited to those facts, as indicated in the 
concurring opinion of Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sandra Day O’Connor.76 This 
concurring opinion affirmed the importance of protecting private speech, but indicated that 
the petitioners’ intercepted speech was less private because it concerned a public matter and 
was uttered by public figures who should have a lesser expectation of privacy with respect to 
such speech.  
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 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent, which was joined by Justices Antonin Scalia and 
Clarence Thomas, criticized the majority for making the matter “of public concern” a pivotal 
issue in the case when it is “an amorphous concept that the Court does not even attempt to 
define.”77 He also claimed the majority decision, which claimed to favor First Amendment 
interests over privacy interests, actually demeaned the First Amendment interest in private 
speech. “Although public persons may have forgone the right to live their lives screened 
from public scrutiny in some areas, it does not and should not follow that they also have 
abandoned their right to have a private conversation without fear of it being intentionally 
intercepted and knowingly disclosed,” Rehnquist argued.78 He said the majority had 
overridden the right to privacy and created a “newfound right to publish unlawfully acquired 
information of ‘public concern.’ ”79 
 
Supreme Court Addresses Rape Victim Privacy 
 Although journalism ethics codes and statements of principles generally have fallen 
far short of crystal clarity in their descriptions of matters that should be treated as private, 
their imprecise wording and use of generalities nonetheless have conveyed the basic message 
that information about sexual assaults and juvenile criminals should be treated cautiously or 
suppressed. Early references to sex crimes were couched in archaic expressions such as: 
“crimes against private morality which are revolting to our finer sensibilities” and “private 
morality and family relations.” Later references can be inferred from wording that 
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encouraged “humane respect for dignity.” When the modern codes address juvenile crime 
and sexual assault victims, their references are sometimes quite direct, as demonstrated by 
the Society of Professional Journalists code, which says: “Be cautious about identifying 
juvenile suspects or victims of sex crimes.” It is significant that the code urges caution as 
opposed to outright avoidance in this area. The implication is that at times such matters may 
be newsworthy.  
 When the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to address these issues, its rulings 
embodied a different set of directives and cautions about news media identifications of rape 
victims. Among the most influential of these was the ruling in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. 
Cohn,80 the Court’s first direct treatment of a privacy issue involving public disclosure of a 
rape victim’s name. The case was a civil suit based on the common law invasion of privacy 
tort – public disclosure of private (and embarrassing) facts. Plaintiff Martin Cohn had sued 
the Cox Broadcasting Company’s Atlanta television station WSB-TV for invading his 
privacy by identifying his 17-year-old daughter, Cynthia, as a rape victim. Six high school 
boys were charged with raping the girl after a drinking party, and she died of suffocation. A 
reporter for Cox Broadcasting found the girl’s name listed in the indictments against the six 
boys. A Georgia criminal statute specifically banned the identification of rape victims in the 
mass media, but the Georgia Supreme Court would not permit the violation of the statute to 
be the basis for Cohn’s privacy lawsuit. It did, however, allow the lawsuit to proceed under 
Georgia’s common law tort of public disclosure of private information, which the United 
States Supreme Court said protects “the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his 
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private affairs, which although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary 
sensibilities.”81 
 When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal from a Georgia ruling in 
favor of the plaintiff, Justice Byron White described the task before the Court as determining 
whether a state may constitutionally “extend a cause of action for damages for invasion of 
privacy caused by the publication of the name of a deceased rape victim which was publicly 
revealed in connection with the prosecution of the crime.”82 The Court ultimately decided 
that such state action was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 Cohn’s lawsuit was an effort to discourage and punish the dissemination of unwanted 
and offensive publicity about what he considered his private affairs. In the terminology of the 
ethics codes, he arguably was seeking to hold the Atlanta television station accountable for 
pandering to the public’s morbid curiosity about the misfortunes of others. The Court ruling 
did not challenge the legal existence of privacy rights or the legitimacy of this invasion of 
privacy tort. It implicitly accepted the contention that “there is a zone of privacy surrounding 
each individual, a zone within which the State may protect him from intrusion by the 
press.”83 But the ruling protected the presumptively invasive publication of the rape victim’s 
name because it was accurate information that already had been made public by placement in 
publicly accessible government records from which the journalists retrieved it. The lawsuit 
amounted to an encumbrance on the flow of information, and the Court found it intolerable. 
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Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information . 
. . the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful to an 
individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press.84 
 
 Accordingly, the Court also found that when a person’s zone of privacy is violated in 
such a manner, recourse cannot be found in law but perhaps from within the news media 
themselves. “In this instance, as in others, reliance must rest upon the judgment of those who 
decide what to publish or broadcast,” the Court said.85 Here the Court was neither endorsing 
nor overtly challenging a journalism ethics principle, but it was unable to stay clear of the 
crux of the ethical issue. The Court would not allow the imposition of civil penalties on 
practices that apparently violated an ethical stricture. The ruling, therefore, did not add legal 
strength to the ethicists’ efforts to guide journalists toward proper behavior. Journalism’s 
ethical stricture against naming rape victims suffered from a degree of ambiguity and 
vagueness that existed at the time of the Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn ruling and may yet 
remain. There is no certainty that the stricture was intended to apply to a rape victim who 
was dead when publicly named by a journalist. Nor is it clear that the ethics provision was 
meant to protect the sensibilities of the victim’s immediate relatives. Scholarly writings about 
the ethics of naming rape victims have been prolific but have focused on the stigma, 
revictimization, and other harms publication can inflict on rape survivors themselves and not 
their relatives.86 Although American law generally limits privacy rights to the living, except 
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in cases of appropriation,87 the Court did not address the girl’s death beyond a brief mention. 
It also did not question whether her father’s own privacy rights were invaded by the 
publication of her name but implicitly accepted the the legal sufficiency of his standing to 
sue under state privacy law. 
 This ruling placed a higher value on the free press principles that promoted the flow 
of information. In one sense, it undermined the value of the right to privacy. “We are 
reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the 
media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable 
man,” the Court said.88 
 Fourteen years later the Court again ruled in a case involving a civil suit based on a 
claim that a newspaper violated the plaintiff’s privacy by publicly identifying her as a rape 
victim. The result in Florida Star v. B. J. F.89 closely resembled the outcome in Cox 
Broadcasting as the Court found the awarding of damages violated the First Amendment. 
The ruling in Cox Broadcasting relied heavily on the fact that the rape victim’s name had 
been published in a court record that a reporter used as a source. In Florida Star the name 
was found in a police report. The fact that publishing the name violated the Florida Star 
newspaper’s own policy or ethics code and state law was not controlling. In a ruling carefully 
confined to other issues, the Court said: 
We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally 
protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State 
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may protect the individual from intrusion by the press or even that a State may 
never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense. We hold 
only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has 
lawfully obtained, punishment may be lawfully imposed, if at all, only when 
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order.90 
 
In this particular instance, the privacy interests purportedly protected by the Florida law were 
the state’s interest in preventing the public identification of rape victims. The fact that there 
were no provisions to prevent anyone other than the news media from naming rape victims 
were indications that these privacy interests were not of the highest order and the law 
protecting these interests was not sufficiently narrow to protect First Amendment interests. 
The holding indicated the Court’s recognition of privacy rights just as the holding in Cox 
Broadcasting did. And just as it had in Cox Broadcasting, the Court ultimately valued free 
speech and truth above privacy. The privacy interest of rape victims and the justification for 
not identifying victims were explained by Anita Allen, a professor of law and philosophy, 
who described rape as “an act of physical violence which by its very nature is an affront to 
privacy.”91 She argued that keeping victims’ names secret gives them “a shield against media 
sensationalism and public abuse.”92 Victims’ privacy right arguments, however, did not move 
the Court from assigning the higher value to the free press interests in these cases. 
 While journalism ethics codes and the Supreme Court recognize and are solicitous of 
victims’ privacy interests in rape cases, neither imposes an absolute ban on compromising 
those interests. The codes merely urge caution and a respect for human dignity and 
sensibilities when dealing with rape cases and, as indicated in the Florida Star v. B.J.F. 
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ruling, usually encourage journalists to refrain from publicizing the identity of rape victims. 
When The Florida Star violated its own ban against identifying a rape victim, it was of no 
legal consequence to the Supreme Court. Public policy considerations, such as the assertion 
that rape victims would be more likely to report the crime and participate in prosecutions if 
they knew they would not be publicly identified, also were of no significant consequence in 
the rulings. The Court made no specific distinction between privacy interests in rape cases 
and other sensitive matters but placed significant emphasis on whether this privacy-sensitive 
material was truthful and lawfully obtained or gleaned from public records or documents. 
The Court’s disposition of Cox Broadcasting and Florida Star can be interpreted as 
establishing a general rule that says publication of such material is protected by the 
Constitution even when it offends ordinary sensibilities. These rulings did not affirm the 
privacy values as articulated in the codes, nor did they directly undermine them. The Court 
affirmed the existence of privacy rights and was careful to say it had not ruled out the 
possibility that state law might protect those rights in some instances. However, those rights 
cannot be protected or their violations penalized at the expense of free press values. First 
Amendment values outstrip privacy values in rape victim identification cases, the Court has 
decided. As a result, the Court has not added its influence to the codes’ efforts to make 
journalists more scrupulous in protecting rape victims’ privacy rights. 
 
Supreme Court Addresses Juvenile Privacy 
 The values, principles, and rationales that support the rulings in Cox Broadcasting 
and Florida Star are consistent with Supreme Court rulings in two cases involving news 
media identifications of juveniles accused of committing crimes. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. 
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District Court93 was the first of these and required the Court to determine the constitutionality 
of a state court order barring the news media from publishing the name of an 11-year-old boy 
charged with fatally shooting a railroad switchman. A reporter had been allowed to attend 
juvenile court proceedings for the boy and thereby learned his name. A photograph was taken 
of the boy as he left the court, but the news media were enjoined by an Oklahoma trial court 
order forbidding them to publish his image or his name. The order was sustained by the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court but reversed as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Reversal was compelled by its decisions in prior cases including Cox Broadcasting, the Court 
said. The Oklahoma Publishing Co. ruling cited Cox Broadcasting as binding precedent for 
the principle that the Constitution does not allow a state to bar the news media from 
“truthfully publishing information released to the public in official court records.”94 When the 
state conducted juvenile proceedings with journalists present, that act was deemed to be the 
equivalent of releasing the boy’s identity to the public. 
 Two years after the Oklahoma Publishing Co. ruling, the Court heard Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publishing Co.95 and refused to permit the prosecution of two West Virginia newspapers 
that had been indicted for publishing the name of a juvenile crime suspect in violation of 
state law. The law’s effort to conceal the child’s identity was characterized in arguments to 
the Court as a means of keeping the boy’s transgressions secret, or private, and was essential 
to his rehabilitation. The Court found those goals and interests inferior to free press values. 
Reporters had legally monitored police radio transmissions, interviewed witnesses, police 
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officers, and a state prosecutor to discover the name of a 14-year-old boy accused of fatally 
shooting a classmate. Citing its holding in Oklahoma Publishing as particularly influential, 
the Court said, “If the information is lawfully obtained, as it was here, the state may not 
punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest more substantial than is 
present here.”96 It concluded that “[t]he sole interest advanced by the State to justify its 
criminal statute is to protect the anonymity of the juvenile defender . . . [to] further his 
rehabilitation.”97 The statute also fell short because it failed to serve that asserted interest in 
that it applied only to newspapers and not other media.  
 Although the Smith v. Daily Mail Court specifically found “there is no issue here of 
privacy,”98 law scholars have consistently considered privacy a central issue in the case.99 
Language in the opinion indicated that when legally acquired truthful information that might 
otherwise be considered private is a matter of “public significance, then state officials may 
not constitutionally punish publication of the information absent a need to further a state 
interest of the highest order.”100 In using the term “public significance” to refer to the 
homicide charge against the boy, the Court appeared to be accepting the argument made by 
the Chicago Tribune Company in an amicus brief that said in part: “Juvenile crime today is 
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on a sharp up-surge and is a subject of ever-increasing public concern and scrutiny. . . . In 
short, the juvenile justice system more than ever before is news – important news.”101 
 When the Court reviewed Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,102 it found a case 
that combined issues of juvenile privacy and rape victim privacy although these matters were 
not raised as privacy torts or explicitly referred to as privacy issues by the Court. Nonetheless 
the case involved privacy issues as defined by journalism codes of ethics in that they dealt 
with affronts to human sensibilities and matters that engendered embarrassment when 
publicized. Privacy interests were again trumped by free speech values in the case as the 
Globe Newspaper Co. challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute that 
required state judges presiding over rape trials to automatically close the courtroom to 
journalists and the general public whenever a juvenile victim was to testify. The statute was 
designed to encourage child victims of rape to pursue criminal charges against their attackers 
and to protect the privacy interests of the child victims. The Court characterized the latter 
purpose as protecting “minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and 
embarrassment.”103 While the Court found these interests highly important, it did not find 
them sufficiently compelling to prevail against the competing First Amendment interest in 
keeping the criminal courts open. Just two years earlier the Court had issued a landmark 
ruling in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,104 which established a presumptive First 
Amendment right of the public and the press to attend criminal trials. This presumption that 
trials should be open was not absolute but could be overcome in any individual trial with a 
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case-by-case determination of a compelling need. The Richmond Newspapers ruling was the 
controlling precedent in Globe Newspaper Co. The Court said closure of trials based on a 
case-by-case assessment of a compelling need could be constitutional, but automatic and 
mandatory closures as provided for in the Massachusetts statute were not. Another fatal 
infirmity of the statute was its facial ineffectiveness in protecting the child victims’ privacy 
interests. The statute did nothing to prevent reporters from gleaning the victims’ names from 
trial transcripts or getting them from court personnel and other sources.105 
 The Court has consistently determined that the privacy and secrecy interests of 
juvenile law breakers and rape victims, at least insofar as criminal court proceedings are 
concerned, are generally inferior to free press interests. Even when privacy interests are 
bolstered by public policy considerations such as the need to foster the rehabilitation of 
juveniles and encourage rape victims to report the crime and testify in the prosecution, the 
Court has maintained a presumption that these privacy interests are inferior. It nonetheless 
has continued to allow for the possibility that in an individual case the privacy interest can 
prevail if it is proved to be an overriding concern. 
 
Extending the Shield of Privacy 
 The preceding sections of this chapter have reviewed the Supreme Court’s handling 
of public disclosure of private information as a tort and as a central issue in other legal 
contexts related to journalism practices. Assessments also were made of Court treatments of 
other intrusive press practices. The chapter now moves to an examination of the Court’s 
handling of general privacy interests in other cases that involve news media interests but are 
not directly based on any privacy tort or their statutory counterpart. 
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 During the late 1970s and the 1980s the Court issued a spate of rulings that revealed 
varied valuations of privacy interests even though the opinions were grounded in other 
issues. In some cases decided during this period, particularly those involving the application 
of the privacy-protecting provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, the Court’s 
delineation of the bounds of privacy was often at odds with privacy parameters established 
by common law and journalism ethics codes. In these instances, the privacy interest often 
was valued more highly than it was in the tort cases. 
 In 1982, U. S. Department of State v. Washington Post106 required the Court to 
construe the privacy interests embodied in an exemption to the Freedom of Information Act -
that allowed federal agencies to withhold records from the public if the disclosure “would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”107 The Court said it was 
addressing a personal privacy issue pursuant to the statute, but it appeared to be addressing a 
physical security and safety issue. The case reached the Court after federal district and 
appeals courts ruled in favor of The Washington Post’s efforts to use the FOIA to gather 
federal records to determine whether some Iranian nationals holding positions in the Iranian 
government were citizens of the United States or had been issued United States passports. 
State Department officials had argued unsuccessfully in the two lower courts that they were 
not required to produce this information because it was the type of privacy-sensitive material 
that Exemption 6 was formulated to protect from disclosure.  
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 Six professional associations of journalists, nominally led by the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association, filed an amicus brief supporting The Washington Post 
and arguing that a person’s status as a citizen is clearly public information available in 
federal courthouses all over the country and should be released.108 “[N]o legitimate 
expectation of privacy can attach to the fact of citizenship,” the ANPA brief argued.109 It 
called a person’s citizenship status “uniquely public information” that “can never be withheld 
from the public in the name of ‘privacy.’”110 
 The State Department disagreed and relied on the wording of Exemption 6 to justify 
withholding the records.111 The appeals court found it unnecessary to deal with the question 
of whether releasing the passport and citizenship information constituted an unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy. It ruled that the first element of Exemption 6 – that the 
information be in personnel, medical, or similar files – had not been satisfied. When the State 
Department appealed, the Supreme Court reversed and in so doing addressed privacy issues. 
It found that the “similar files” referred to by the FOIA did apply to passport and citizenship 
information. It said the legislative intent of Exemption 6 was to “protect individuals from the 
injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal 
information.”112 While privacy issues usually revolve around the potential for embarrassment 
with the release of intimate information, here the Court also emphasized protection against 
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physical, non-psychic injuries. The Iranian nationals faced physical injury if the requested 
information was publicized, according to a sworn statement submitted by a State Department 
official and cited by the Court: 
Any individual in Iran who is suspected of being an American citizen or of 
having American connections is looked upon with distrust. An official of the 
government of Iran who is reputed to be an American citizen would, in my 
opinion, be in physical danger from some of the revolutionary groups that are 
prone to violence. It is the position of the Department of State that any 
statement at this time by the United States Government which could be 
construed or misconstrued to indicate that any Iranian public official is 
currently a United States citizen is likely to cause a real threat of physical 
harm to that person.113 
 
Although the Court found it unnecessary to reach the privacy issue once it dispensed with the 
appeals court’s interpretation of the reference to “similar files” in the FOIA, dictum in the 
opinion indicated the Court had addressed a privacy concern, which under its interpretation 
of Exemption 6 included a concern for a person’s physical safety. Under this construction, 
the privacy value embodied in the FOIA statute outweighed the competing free press values. 
 When the Court was petitioned in 1989 to again construe a privacy-protecting 
provision of the Freedom of Information Act in U. S. Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press,114 the privacy interests again prevailed even though 
physical safety was not an issue as in State Department v. Washington Post. The case began 
its trek toward the Court when a television journalist was rebuffed when he invoked the 
FOIA in an effort to compel the Federal Bureau of Investigation, an arm of the Department 
of Justice, to provide copies of the “rap sheet” records it had compiled from other law 
enforcement agencies on reputed organized crime figure Charles Medico. FBI officials 
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refused to provide the records and cited FOIA’s Exemption 7(C),115 which allowed the 
agency to withhold records compiled for law enforcement purposes if the release “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”116 
Ultimately, the journalist requested only Medico’s crime history that did not involve his 
ostensibly private finances and was a matter of public record. Nonetheless, the district court 
found releasing the rap sheets would be an unwarranted invasion of privacy that Exemption 
7(C) allowed the FBI to prevent. The court of appeals reversed that ruling, finding the 
privacy interest in rap sheets to be minimal because the information was already in public 
records. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying, “The privacy interest in a rap sheet is 
substantial.”117 The ruling was careful to distinguish between the privacy interests as defined 
and protected by the FOIA and those defined by common law privacy torts or the U.S. 
Constitution because the Court had found minimal privacy interests in matters contained in 
public records and newsworthy matters of public concern.118  
 The American Civil Liberties Union sided with the Justice Department in an amicus 
brief filed with the Court and argued that “a variety of harms to individual privacy may result 
from disclosure of criminal history record[s].”119 These harms included reputational damage, 
negating the presumption of innocence, and “the stigmatizing effect of a criminal history 
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record, and the lack of probative value or relevance of an arrest record.”120 This was 
essentially the same position taken by the Justice Department. An amici curiae brief filed by 
the American Newspaper Publishers Association and other news media groups121 said the 
Justice Department’s own argument showed that privacy was not actually at issue in this 
case, but the government was trying to claim that its compilation of information from public 
records had somehow made that information private: 
The gravamen of a privacy claim is the wrongful public disclosure of private 
facts, but the government’s objections to access to the information at issue 
actually relate to inaccurate collection and possible subsequent misuse. . . . 
The potential for misuse of collected public record information by a powerful 
public agency like the FBI does not create a privacy interest; it suggests the 
need for proper user safeguards, and public access to “watchdog” the 
implementation of those measures.122 
 
 Ultimately, the Court determined that its understanding of Congress’ legislative intent 
for the FOIA would control. Seven years later a Senate report repudiated that assessment of 
congressional intent.123 Nonetheless, the Court in Reporters Committee said lawmakers did 
not intend to have federal agencies serve as clearing houses to help disseminate personal 
information about private people but to provide access to records that would show how these 
agencies were doing their jobs. The fact that this information was already in the public arena 
was not dispositive because it was arduous to obtain and not otherwise readily available, the 
Court said. Its disposition of the privacy issue was clear: 
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[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party’s request for law 
enforcement records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be 
expected to invade that citizen’s privacy, and that when the request seeks no 
“official information” about a Government agency, but merely records that the 
Government happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is 
“unwarranted.”124 
 
 Fifteen years later, the Court revisited the FOIA’s Exemption 7(C) in National 
Archives v. Favish.125 Its conception of privacy expanded dramatically beyond the parameters 
set in Reporters Committee and the asserted privacy interests again proved to be superior to 
the other competing interests in the case. As before, the ruling was unanimous, and the 
concept of privacy differed in significant ways from the principles embodied in the privacy 
torts. Foremost among these differences was the Court’s explicit determination that under 
this provision of the FOIA, privacy rights extended beyond the death of a person identified in 
a requested government record and were vested in that person’s family. Nonetheless, there 
was one striking similarity in the Court’s ruling and the concerns that prompted the creation 
of journalism ethics codes and inspired the seminal law review article that gave rise to the 
torts. All expressed concern about the irresponsible and sensationalist media. 
 The ruling in National Archives v. Favish was the culmination of an attempt to secure 
death-scene photographs of Vincent W. Foster Jr., the former deputy White House counsel to 
President Bill Clinton, who was found fatally shot in a national park in Virginia in 1993. 
Allan J. Favish, the respondent in the case, sought the photographs because he wanted to 
further pursue his suspicion that there was a government cover-up in the death and 
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subsequent investigations that concluded Foster had committed suicide.126 Favish, an attorney 
acting on his own behalf, filed a FOIA request and was turned down by the Office of 
Independent Counsel, which did so in reliance on its interpretation of Exemption 7(C). A 
series of appeals landed the case before the U.S. Supreme Court, which determined that 
Congress, in enacting the FOIA and exemption 7(C), created separate and distinct personal 
privacy rights for the surviving relatives of a person identified in government records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Exemption 7(C) then required the Court to 
determine if the invasion of those rights was warranted. The Court found the Foster family’s 
privacy interests outweighed the public interest in disclosure of the death scene photographs 
and the images would not have to be disclosed.127 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the decision and clearly distinguished these survivor 
privacy rights from the privacy rights at issue in the Reporters Committee case. The personal 
privacy rights referred to by Exemption 7(C) are not limited to empowering living people to 
control public dissemination of information about themselves, Kennedy explained. Foster’s 
relatives “seek to secure their own refuge from a sensation-seeking culture for their own 
peace of mind and tranquility, not for the sake of the deceased,” he wrote in reference to 
                                                 
126 Favish initially became involved in the effort to acquire the Foster photographs as an attorney representing 
Accuracy In Media, a media watchdog group that filed a FOIA request with the National Park Service. The park 
service, which investigated Foster’s death, withheld the photos by claiming they were exempt from disclosure 
because they violated privacy rights. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed. See Accuracy in 
Media Inc. v. National Park Service, 194 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 111 (2000). Favish 
subsequently filed a FOIA request for himself and eventually received a favorable decision from the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in California. The FOIA request and subsequent lawsuit were filed against the Office 
of Independent Counsel, which was then conducting its own investigation of the Foster death and had legal 
possession of the photographs. When OIC completed its work, the photographs and related files were turned 
over to the National Archives and Records Administration, which became the petitioner in the appeal of the 
Ninth Circuit Court’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. See Favish v. Office of Independent Counsel, 217 
F.3d 1168 ( 9th Cir. 2000). 
 
127 451 U.S. at 170. 
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affidavits family members submitted to the trial court.128 Sheila Foster Anthony, the 
decedent’s sister, told the lower court that she had been beset by people who wanted to 
exploit her brother’s death for political or commercial advantage and that she had suffered 
nightmares and insomnia after seeing a death-scene photograph of her brother that had been 
leaked to the press. Kennedy’s decision included a highly emotive segment of Anthony’s 
statement that was particularly critical of the mass media: ‘“I fear that the release of 
[additional] photographs certainly would set off another round of intense scrutiny by the 
media. Undoubtedly, the photographs would be placed on the Internet for world 
consumption. Once again my family would be the focus of conceivably unsavory and 
distasteful media coverage.”’129 Anthony’s attorney, James Hamilton, elaborated on these 
points in oral argument before the Court saying the family should be freed “from seeing these 
photographs on television and in grocery store tabloids . . . [and] from the knowledge that 
these photographs are displayed in virtual perpetuity on ghoulish Web sites that show death 
and carnage.”130 
 Kennedy invoked ancient images of Antigone, the heroine of the classic Greek drama 
who sacrificed to ensure respect for her brother’s corpse, and the modern electronic images 
of mutilated dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets of Somalia or the 
Middle East to drive home his assertion that common law and universal, long-standing 
cultural traditions recognized privacy rights vested in relatives when a loved one’s corpse 
                                                 
128 541 U.S. at 166. 
 
129 Id. 
 
130 Oral Argument In The Supreme Court of the United States (Dec. 3, 2003) at 17, Office of Independent 
Counsel v. Allan J. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004) (No. 02-954). 
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was subject to desecration or exploitation.131 Kennedy’s references seem to validate 
Schauer’s claim, which was introduced early in this chapter, that privacy is a variable social 
construct,132 and Halstuk’s assertion that privacy is a fundamental and immutable human 
value.133  
 Jane Kirtley, a media law scholar who submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of 
Favish, provided an explanation for the emotional tone of the Kennedy opinion and its grasp 
on a moral or ethical justification: “Cases where ‘survivor privacy’ arises often are freighted 
with emotion, and it is difficult to fault the judicial instinct to shield innocents from 
emotional distress.”134 Kirtley’s fundamental argument, however, was that the survivor 
privacy concept was at odds with the FOIA’s statutory language and legislative intent and 
should not be grafted onto Exemption 7(C) by judicial fiat.  
 Justice Scalia also seemed to dispute and struggle with the survivor privacy concept. 
During oral argument he said, “It doesn’t seem to me that it’s . . .  their privacy that’s being 
invaded. It’s their sensitivity. . . . Surely they have an interest in not having their . . . relative 
displayed this way, but I wouldn’t normally call that a privacy interest.”135 Notithstanding 
those early doubts and his effort to reconcile his understanding with the evolving definition 
of privacy, Scalia was part of the unanimous ruling that validated the inclusion of survivor 
privacy in considerations of Exemption 7(C). Years before Scalia accepted the concept, 
                                                 
131 See Favish, 541 U.S. at 168-74. 
 
132 See Schauer, supra note 16. 
 
133 See Halstuk, supra note 17. 
 
134 Brief of Amicus Curiae Silha Center for the Study of Media Ethics and Law at 25, Office of Independent 
Counsel v. Favish, 541 U.S. 156 (2004) (No. 02-954). 
 
135 See Oral Argument, supra note 125, at 7. 
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journalism ethics codes recognized it and advised reporters and photographers to respect it. 
As early as 1993, the Society of Professional Journalist’s code and the collection of case 
studies it published to foster ethical journalism practices addressed the publication of graphic 
death-scene photographs and the effects on surviving family members.136 The SPJ ethics code 
expressed even more pointed cautions in the revised version that was in effect in 2004. It 
urged journalists to “[s]how compassion for those who may be adversely affected by news 
coverage” and to show sensitivity toward those “affected by tragedy or grief.”137 
 Embedded in Kennedy’s explanatory dictum was an implication that the Court’s 
configuration of privacy rights would help curb media access to and subsequent 
dissemination of disturbing images of death. Although Kennedy made no direct reference to 
the professional ethics of publishing such images, he framed the matter in such a way that the 
practice was presented as wrong and in need of the corrective measures the Court prescribed. 
First Amendment scholar and commentator Ken Paulson also noticed the Court’s slap at the 
media and, in an observation consistent with the Hutchins Report’s warning, wrote, “This is a 
reminder that as [the] public, press and media push the envelope with increasingly 
sensational content, courts are going to be inclined to push back.”138 Paulson indicated that 
the Court was really directing its venom at the Internet and not the mainstream news media. 
Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of the decision two mainstream newspapers 
apparently saw some writing on the wall and acted accordingly. Two weeks after the Favish 
                                                 
136 See  JAY BLACK ET AL., DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM: A HANDBOOK WITH CASE STUDIES 5-6, 172-74 
(1993). The case study addressed The Louisville Courier-Journal’s decision to publish photographs of the 
corpse of a pressman who was gunned down on the job. 
 
137 See Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, supra note 25. The code advised sensitivity in 
seeking interviews and photographs of those affected by tragedy and grief. 
 
138 Ken Paulson, Supreme Court Places  a Premium on Privacy (Apr. 1, 2004), at 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/commentary.aspx?id=13104. 
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decision was announced, two Florida newspapers abruptly ended their lawsuit challenging 
the constitutionality of a state law that denied them access to the autopsy photographs of 
famed race car driver Dale Earnhardt.139 The editor of one of the papers, the Orlando 
Sentinel, reportedly said “it would be difficult to prevail” in the aftermath of the Favish 
ruling.140 Even though the Florida cases and Favish raised different legal issues, both sought 
photographs of a dead person and that similarity apparently was enough to chill the Florida 
newspapers. 
 After identifying the privacy interest that would invoke Exemption 7(C), the Court 
then had to decide if releasing the requested photographs “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion” of that privacy.141 That meant balancing these privacy 
rights against the competing public interest in disclosure of the photographs. In this 
balancing, the Court gave privacy an especially high valuation.  
We hold that, where a privacy interest is protected by Exemption 7(C) and the 
public interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials acted 
negligently or improperly in the performance of their duties, the requester 
must establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. 
Rather, the requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a 
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have 
occurred.142 
 
                                                 
139 Doug Peters, Supreme Court’s Ruling in Favish Prompts Florida Newspapers to Drop Suit Challenging Law 
Sealing Autopsy Photos, SILHA BULLETIN (Spring 2004) at 
http://www.Silha.umn.edu/Spring%2004/FloridaSuitDropped.pdf (last visited Aug. 23, 2004). 
 
140 Id.  
 
141 541 U.S. at 171. 
 
142 Id. at 174. 
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By requiring users of FOIA to do a better job of proving how the requested government 
records will reveal a government malfunction before they can see the records, the Court has 
erected a formidable, if not impenetrable, protective barrier around privacy interests. 
 In 1984 the Court gave precedence to the privacy values embodied in a statutory rule 
of civil procedure when it decided a case pitting privacy interests against free press rights in 
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart.143 Just as FOIA compels the disclosure of records, Rule 37, a 
Washington pretrial discovery measure144 that was at issue in Rhinehart, compels parties to 
litigation to disclose some records to their adversaries. Both measures allow privacy 
exemptions. In this 1984 case, Keith Milton Rhinehart, the spiritual leader of a religious 
foundation in Washington, had sued The Seattle Times newspaper for libel and privacy 
invasion as a result of a series of articles it published. As the lawsuit proceeded toward trial, 
the newspaper availed itself of Rule 37 to acquire membership lists, donor lists, and related 
information about Rhinehart’s foundation. The newspaper openly revealed its intention to use 
that information in news stories that would be published before the trial ended. Rhinehart 
claimed publication of the information posed risks to himself and the foundation supporters’ 
privacy interests, physical security, and fundraising ability. Accordingly, he sought a court 
order to stop the publication pursuant to Rule 26(c), a state court rule that allowed sealing 
records uncovered pursuant to civil trials.145 The trial court granted the order despite the 
newspaper’s contention that its free press rights were thereby violated. The Washington 
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Supreme Court and a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court upheld the protective order and cited 
privacy interests as justification. 
 An amici curiae brief filed with the Court by the American Civil Liberties Union and 
others said none of the lower courts had made a factual determination that Rhinehart or his 
foundation “would suffer actual harm to any privacy interest by public disclosure of the 
requested information. Moreover, there has been no attempt to relate the requested 
documents to a specific privacy interest of the plaintiffs.”146 The Court opinion cited the 
portion of Rule 26(c) that said protective orders could be issued “to protect a party or person 
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden.”147 Each of these refers to the 
type of psychic injury associated with invasions of privacy. The Court also observed, 
“Although the Rule contains no specific reference to privacy or to other rights or interests 
that may be implicated, such matters are implicit in the broad purpose and language of the 
Rule.”148 Even Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, consistently staunch defenders of 
free press rights, joined in the ruling, agreeing “that the respondents’ interests in privacy and 
religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective order and to overcome the 
protections afforded free expression by the First Amendment.”149 Here the privacy interests 
prevailed when they were embodied in court rules and related to religious freedom and to a 
lesser degree, a physical safety issue.150 
                                                 
146 Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Petitioners at 19, Rhinehart (No. 82-1721). 
 
147 467 U.S. 20 at 26 (emphasis added). 
 
148 Id. at 35 n. 21. 
 
149 Id. at 38 ( Brennan, J., concurring). 
 
150 Rhinehart and church members reported assaults followed when they were publicly identified as members of 
the religious group and these increased risks of harm impaired their religious freedom. See id at 24 n.4, 25, 26. 
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 During the same year that it decided Rhinehart, the Court decided Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court,151 which required it to weigh the privacy interests of potential jurors 
against the constitutional interests in assuring fair and open trials and a free press. Here, 
potential jurors summoned to a California court for a rape-murder trial were questioned 
during voir dire about personal experiences and opinions that might affect their ability to 
fairly and impartially render a verdict in the case. Journalists and the public were barred from 
this process by the trial judge and denied access to a transcript of the voir dire afterward. The 
Press-Enterprise newspaper company filed suit challenging the restrictions as violations of 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 
 The prospective jurors were questioned about several highly charged issues imbedded 
in the trial. Among them was the fact that the defendant was a black man with a prior 
conviction for raping a white girl; he was here accused of raping and killing another white 
girl, and execution was a potential sentence and a matter of public controversy. More than 
one juror revealed they had been sexually abused at some point in their lives.152 Revelations 
about these issues were matters that should be kept private, according to defense attorney 
Joseph Peter Meyers. He argued in an amicus curiae brief on behalf of prospective jurors that 
a juror “should not have to be deprived of all privacy rights, or risk exposure of his or her 
most intimate feelings and experiences to broad segments of the public who have no need for 
such information.”153 
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 Attorneys for the USA Today newspaper and other news organizations argued 
conversely in their amicus brief that until this case, “no state or federal court has found a 
right of privacy protecting the disclosure of facts relevant to one’s qualification to serve as a 
juror.”154 The brief went on to claim that “a juror cannot avoid disclosure of personal 
information when the information is necessary to determine the juror’s fitness to decide those 
issues. Public scrutiny is equally important in each instance.”155 
 By the time the newspaper’s complaint about being denied access to the questioning 
of jurors reached the Supreme Court, resolution of the case depended on an answer to a 
single question: Does the constitutional guarantee of public criminal trials include the voir 
dire of potential jurors? The Court ruled that it does. Nonetheless, in extraordinary 
circumstances, narrowly defined portions of the voir dire could be closed if the trial judge 
could articulate the specific overriding privacy interests that required closure and 
demonstrate that there was no other way to protect those interests. The ruling placed a higher 
value on the free press, fair trial, and open trial interests by establishing a presumption that 
voir dire must be open to the press and the public. The ruling also clearly indicated that at 
times the privacy interests would be superior. “[A] valid privacy right may rise to a level that 
part of the transcript should be sealed, or the name of a juror withheld, to protect the person 
from embarrassment.”156 
 Although the Court’s judgment was unanimous, three Justices wrote separate 
concurrences to explain what the ruling did not do. Justice John Paul Stevens emphasized 
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that the right of access to voir dire proceedings comes from the First Amendment and not the 
Sixth.157 Justice Marshall’s concurrence addressed two issues, but he dealt first with the 
ambiguity that might have been engendered by the Court’s main opinion: 
I agree with the result reached by the Court but write separately to stress that 
the constitutional rights of the public and press to access to all aspects of 
criminal trials are not diminished in cases in which “deeply personal matters” 
are likely to be elicited in voir dire proceedings.158  
 
Justice William Blackmun addressed the Court’s handing of the privacy issue saying, “I write 
separately to emphasize my understanding that the Court does not decide, nor does this case 
require it to address, the asserted ‘right to privacy of the prospective jurors.’”159 He indicated 
that while privacy interests were important, this ruling did not elevate them to the level of a 
constitutional right. 
 The majority holding can be viewed as a victory of First Amendment interests over 
privacy interests because the Court ruled that the voir dire proceedings are presumptively 
open. But the holding also allows the jurors’ privacy interest to prevail in some narrowly 
defined circumstances. 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 Law scholars, jurists, legislators, and many of the American public have long 
expressed belief in the sanctity of privacy and the need for law to protect it. Some have found 
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justification in the penumbra of the Constitution and basic notions of human dignity for 
placing such a high value on privacy. Privacy became a social issue and invasions of it 
became a social problem at the twilight of the 19th century as the country became more 
industrialized and urban. City newspapers began widely publicizing information that 
previously circulated, if at all, among smaller social groupings in rural communities by 
discreet word-of-mouth communication. When newspapers began boldly discussing matters 
that previously would have been talked about in hushed tones or only among a select few, 
public sensibilities were enflamed in some quarters. Legal scholars sought and found 
rationales for the right to be let alone; popular outcries arose against yellow journalism; and 
eventually journalists themselves rebuked members of their profession for depredations 
against privacy. As a result, this social problem was attacked with moral, ethical, and legal 
strictures. Journalists tried to restrain but not fully eliminate press intrusions by making 
privacy concerns a prominent and common feature of their codes of ethics. Statutes and the 
common law also were applied to solve the problem and recorded some initial successes on 
the state level. However, when privacy cases were appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
particularly invasion of privacy tort cases, the privacy interest was pitted against free press 
interests and generally lost. Once the Court determined that an otherwise private matter had 
become a matter of public concern or newsworthy, the basic privacy tort – public disclosure 
of private information – became an ineffective remedy. When the Court revealed a reluctance 
to allow civil or criminal penalties against the press for disseminating private information 
that was true or had been made public by deliberate or inadvertent government action, the 
tort and related legal actions also were severely undermined. Privacy became a nearly 
inconsequential issue when the Court reviewed false light tort cases because the focus shifted 
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to the level of fault that caused the false assertion at issue. In order for a false light plaintiff to 
prevail, the Court said, not only must the harmful assertion be false, it must be the result of 
actual malice, that is, the assertion must be deliberately or recklessly false. 
 All four privacy torts – false light, appropriation, intrusion and public disclosure of 
private information – or the privacy interests related to them were addressed by Court rulings 
between 1947 and 2005 and were construed by the Court to protect the same privacy interests 
that journalism codes of ethics sought to protect. Accordingly, when the Court’s edicts 
valued privacy interests less than other competing interests, the efforts of the journalism 
codes were unsupported or undermined. But the codes and the Court were in agreement when 
the privacy interests at the heart of a case were those of a public official or public figure and 
the otherwise private or sensitive information was newsworthy or a matter of public concern. 
Both made provision for invasions of privacy under these conditions. 
 The justices’ words indicated that they value the principles of privacy at least as 
highly as the journalism ethics codes do, but their rulings have not borne out those 
valuations. In tort cases, free press interests generally have prevailed against privacy 
interests. As Justice Fortas observed in his Time v. Hill dissent, the Court’s written opinions 
are filled with “the ringing words of so many members on so many occasions in exaltation of 
the right of privacy,” but the controlling opinion “discloses hesitancy to go beyond the verbal 
acknowledgment.”160 
 The Court’s valuation of privacy interests increased significantly when they arose in 
cases that did not involve any of the privacy torts. In the two Freedom of Information Act 
cases examined in this chapter, for example, the privacy interests asserted under the privacy 
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exemptions to the law prevailed in contests with the news media’s access claims. This can be 
traced largely to the Court’s interpretation of the legislative intent that produced the law and 
the justices’ grouping other interests, such as physical safety, religious freedom, and 
sensitivity to survivors, within the rubric of privacy. The Court decisions construed as private 
much information that is publicly available or in government records. Information such as 
records of citizenship and criminal activity was deemed to have become private once the 
federal government had compiled those records and an outside party tried to gain access to 
them. The cases in this section indicate the often inconsistent and illogical distinctions made 
about the nature of privacy as defined by statute, the Constitution, and common law. It was 
the application of these varying definitions that usually determined whether privacy interests 
would be valued above or below free press interests. 
 A broader analysis of the Court’s treatment of privacy concerns indicates that the role 
the government was asked to play in these cases was dispositive of the outcome. When the 
government was asked to approve or impose civil or criminal liability on a media defendant 
for publishing information it had already obtained, as in Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 
Florida Star v. B.J.F., Oklahoma Publishing. Co. v. District Court and Smith v. Daily Mail, 
the free press interest clearly prevailed over the privacy interest and the punishments were 
not allowed. The free press interest prevailed in Time v. Hill, even though the published 
information was not true. When the government was asked to provide information or 
facilitate a media request for information that arguably invaded someone’s privacy, as in U.S. 
Department of State v. Washington Post Co., U.S. Department of Justice v. Reporters 
Committee for Freedom of the Press and Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, the privacy interest 
prevailed over the free press interest. In these cases the Court was adhering to its established 
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edict that the First Amendment generally does not create a right to gather news or, more 
precisely, a right of access to information. As a result, the privacy interest as defined and 
supported by federal law and state court rule prevailed. Although the Court has determined 
that there is no general First Amendment right of access to information, it has found a First 
Amendment right of access to court proceedings. That exception makes this analysis 
applicable to the rulings in Press Enterprise v. Superior Court and Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Superior Court, where the privacy interests did not prevail. In effect, this exception creates 
one area in which the First Amendment operates as a Freedom of Information Act. The Court 
has not said that all court proceedings must be open, but only a compelling interest would be 
sufficient to close them, and such determinations would be made on a case-by-case basis. No 
such interest was found in Press Enterprise or Globe Newspaper. A more basic analysis of 
the cases indicates that the Court has been unwilling to facilitate the public dissemination of 
information deemed private, but once such information has been publicized, the Court has 
been unwilling to allow the media to be punished for having made the exposures.
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
  
Civic Responsibility: A Casualty of Ethical Principle  
 
 As the tally of American troops killed in Iraq spiked upward in the spring of 2004, 
The Seattle Times openly defied a federal ban on photographing soldiers’ coffins enroute to 
grieving families for burial. The front page of the newspaper’s April 18 edition showed a 
procession of flag-draped coffins aboard a transport plane in Kuwait.1 The newspaper’s 
editors knew the Pentagon had forbidden taking such pictures since 1991 and that federal 
officials “had issued a stern reminder of that policy in March 2003.”2 They also knew the 
policy had been challenged in court soon after it was announced and that a federal appeals 
court ruling in 1996 allowed the ban to remain.3 Nonetheless, The Seattle Times made an 
ethics-based decision to publish the photograph of coffins. It was open defiance of the law 
and a refusal to comply with a duly promulgated and judicially tested government policy. For 
those reasons, some of the newspaper’s readers condemned the publication of the photo as an 
immoral, illegal, and unethical act.4 Such condemnation is a common and perhaps inevitable 
                                                 
1 See Hal Bernton, The Somber Task of Honoring the Fallen, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A1. The 
photograph of the coffins accompanied this news article. The photograph was not taken by a newspaper 
employee, but was supplied by a Seattle-area resident who was employed by a private military contractor in 
Kuwait. 
 
2 See Ray Rivera, Images of War dead a Sensitive Subject, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, at A22. 
  
3 JB Pictures, Inc. v. Department of Defense, 86 F. 3d. 236 (D.C. Cir.) (1996). The ruling focused specifically 
on press access to coffins at the U.S. Air Force base in Dover, Delaware, but the Defense Department policy at 
issue applied in both instances.  
 
4 A majority of the written reader responses to the issue that were published in the newspaper or its online 
edition praised the editors for publishing the photos. See What Readers are Saying, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 
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consequence when morality, law, and journalism ethics collide. This chapter examines the 
collisions that ensue when ethical principles and directives encourage journalists to violate 
the letter of the law or the public policy it embodies. 
 
Four Ethical Directives to Break the Law 
For the limited purposes of this examination, morality, law, and ethics can be defined 
as guides to proper behavior. Because they often agree on what is proper, morality and ethics 
are sometimes codified in law. But the three also can make opposing determinations of 
propriety because they address separate responsibilities and duties. Law establishes the civic 
responsibilities and duties people owe to their governments and civic community. Morality 
establishes the major responsibilities and duties people owe to society and the human race. 
Ethics define the responsibilities and duties a person owes to society based on his or her 
specifically defined role in that society or civic community.5 Morality, law, and ethics serve 
overlapping constituencies and often operate in tandem, but the nature of that service 
sometimes causes conflict. Those conflicts are defined here as ethical and moral dilemmas 
that have to be resolved through a painstaking, reasoned, and value-laden process.   
Readers of The Seattle Times had witnessed the resolution of one such dilemma and 
criticized the outcome. Their criticism of the “illegal” publication of the photo is grounded in 
                                                                                                                                                       
22, 2004) available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/20019099336_webreaders22.html (last 
visited July 27, 2005). 
 
 
5 To illustrate these definitions consider the fact that morality condemns murder and guides people to take 
action to punish murderers. Law codifies this moral rule by making murder a crime and by prescribing the most 
severe punishments. But the ethics codes created for those in the specifically defined role of criminal defense 
attorney require them to zealously protect murderers from punishment. Ironically, the law also prescribes 
punishment for attorneys who do not fulfill these ethical duties.  See American Bar Association Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (2004), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/current/ABA_CODE.HTM 
(last visited March 15, 2006). 
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the assumption that every citizen has a fundamental moral duty to obey the law in accord 
with the primordial social contract that lifts humans out of anarchy and the barbaric state of 
nature.6 And despite some claims that equating law breaking with moral transgression is 
indicative of immature moral development,7 the type of moral condemnation made by The 
Seattle Times readers is historically quite common in a variety of contexts and arises among 
people who are arguably mature and morally astute. 
In response to reader criticism, the newspaper publicly and painstakingly addressed 
the ethics of taking and publishing the photograph. It described the photograph as 
“undeniably news worthy”8 and justified journalists’ use of even graphic war photographs 
“because it is their job to convey what is happening.”9 But its explanation focused almost 
exclusively on privacy issues. The editors did not address or seem to struggle at all with the 
moral propriety of breaking the law or flouting a government directive that a federal appeals 
court had found valid.10 Nor did the fundamental concepts of civic responsibility or the 
intrinsic civic duty to comply with the law arise in the newspaper’s explanation for its 
actions. It was as if this violation of the spirit or the letter of the law was an automatic, pre-
ordained reaction and not the culmination of the careful consideration required when the law, 
morality, and ethical principles collide headlong.  
                                                 
6 Obeying the law is widely identified as a civic duty and civic responsibility. See, e.g. Daniel Warner, 
Citizenship, in, ENCYLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS VOL. 1, 493 (Ruth Chadwick ed., 1998) “[T]o be a good 
citizen requires following the laws.” 
 
7 See generally, LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT : MORAL STAGES AND THE 
IDEA OF JUSTICE (1981). 
 
8 See Michael R. Fancher, Powerful Photograph Offered Chance to Tell an Important Story, THE SEATTLE 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at A2. 
 
9 Editorial, The Photo That Stirred a Nation, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at D2. 
 
10  Fancher, supra note 8. 
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Some of the newspaper’s readers found the contravention of law unacceptable. “The 
Seattle Times is guilty of trafficking [in] stolen merchandise,” one reader complained in the 
newspaper’s online edition.11 Another arrived at the civic and ethical crux of the matter by 
writing: “[T]aking the photograph was against the law. Obviously, you think that people 
should break the law if they don’t agree with it.”12 Moral philosophers as venerable and 
diverse as Plato, Socrates, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau have 
insisted that citizens, as part of the basic social contract, have a moral obligation to obey the 
law.13 More recently, Boston University law professor Randy E. Barnett asserted “most 
citizens think that when a command is called a ‘law,’ it carries with it a moral duty of 
obedience. . . .”14 Duke University law professor George C. Christie also has argued in 
support of this duty and concluded, as if validating The Seattle Times readers’ complaints, 
“[I]f ordinary people believe that there is a moral obligation to obey the law, who is to say 
that they are wrong. Nor am I persuaded that we should want to say that they are wrong.”15 
The Seattle Times’ willful decision to violate the law and government policy was not 
an aberration. Indeed, American journalists have a long history of flouting the widely touted 
                                                 
11  What Readers are Saying, supra note 4. 
 
12 Id.  
 
13 See generally SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF, MORALITY AND THE LAW 181-242 (1966); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES, (G. D. H. Cole, trans. Dutton, 1959) (1762); JOHN LOCKE, THE 
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 
(Oakeshott ed. 1960) (1651). 
 
14 Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV.111, 116 (2003). 
 
15 George C. Christie, On the Moral Obligation to Obey the Law, 1990 DUKE L. J. 1311, 1336 (1990). See also 
W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 65 (2004), “A person who sincerely believes 
that a law is morally wrong nevertheless has an obligation to obey it, because the law represents a social 
decision about what ought to be done, collectively speaking, in the circumstances of persistent disagreement.” 
But see J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a 
Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law? 82 YALE L. J. 950 (1973). 
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civic responsibility and moral duty to obey the law. It is a journalistic practice that predates 
the First Amendment, which is the commonly cited defense and justification for these acts of 
apparent civic irresponsibility. Colonial American newspaperman John Peter Zenger 
achieved legendary status by defying well-established law. He published libels against the 
governor of New York, refused to identify the source of those libels, and asserted the then-
unlawful truth defense at his trial in 1735.16 For these arguably unethical acts of civic 
irresponsibility, Zenger is widely regarded as perhaps the first hero of American journalism. 
The roster of law-breaking and authority-flouting journalists has grown long during 
the ensuing centuries. Within their profession they often are considered heroes or even 
martyrs. Gossip columnist Marie Torre of the New York Herald Tribune defied a federal 
court order in the 1950s to become the first journalist to claim a First Amendment privilege 
to conceal the identity of a news source. The court said there was no such privilege.17  New 
York Times reporters Earl Caldwell and Myron Farber earned laurels in the 1970s by refusing 
in separate episodes to obey court orders to reveal their sources or testify about them.18 The 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Farber’s case but accepted the cases of Caldwell and 
two similarly situated journalists. It did not find the journalists’ refusal fully justifiable but 
about three decades later, putative journalist Vanessa Leggett used the same arguments in an 
effort to justify her refusal to comply with a similar court order. Leggett was jailed for 168 
days after refusing to surrender materials law enforcement officials said they needed to 
pursue a murder investigation. Her travails were recounted by the news media in a largely 
                                                 
16 See A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN PETER ZENGER (Stanley Nider Katz ed., 1972). 
 
17 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). 
 
18  See In re Farber, 78 N.J. 259, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
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sympathetic and supportive manner. One such account of her fight with the law bore the 
headline: “The Making of a First Amendment Martyr.”19 Among her accolades was the 
$25,000 PEN/Newman’s Own First Amendment Award, which was bestowed upon her in 
2002 for being “a hero in the effort to preserve investigative freedom for writers and 
journalists.”20   
These were but a few of the many journalists who rejected the civic responsibility to 
obey the law and whose actions were in accord with ethical principles. This chapter examines 
how these principles have been addressed by U.S. Supreme Court rulings from 1947 through 
2005. These rulings focus on ethics-based journalism practices that run afoul of civic 
responsibility and that journalists claim are required and protected by the First Amendment. 
This examination continues this dissertation’s analysis of how the Court has addressed 
fundamental principles of journalism ethics. Each Court ruling examined here was prompted 
by the actions of people who did or could claim to be upholding at least one of the following 
principles or directives of ethical journalism: the duty to gather and report news, maintain 
independence, protect the First Amendment, and protect confidential sources. Each of these 
principles is presented by the codes in such a manner that compliance with each is being 
faithful to and protecting the role the First Amendment establishes for journalists. The 
Amendment is interpreted in such a manner that it protects and justifies some civic 
irresponsibility. These principles and directives have promoted practices that conflict at times 
with civic responsibilities. In the two prior chapters, which analyzed Court rulings that 
                                                 
19 Paul McMasters, The Making of a First Amendment Marty, (Aug. 22, 2001), available at 
http://www.freedomforum.org/templates/document.asp?documentID=14670. 
 
20 Free Expression Network, Vanessa Leggett to Receive 2002 PEN/Newman’s Own First Amendment Award 
(Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.freeexpression.org/newswire/0411_2002.htm. 
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addressed the principles of truth telling and respect for privacy, adherence to those principles 
usually was consistent with the law. But in the cases examined for this chapter, the 
journalists’ allegiance to ethical principles has led them to break the law, defy court orders, 
or flout their government’s policy.  
The first section of this chapter is an examination of the longstanding notion that 
citizens have a moral duty to obey the law. This section includes an assessment of some 
moral and civic justifications for abandoning that duty.21 The second section of the chapter 
examines how the ethical principles and directives this study links to civic irresponsibility 
have been promoted by journalism ethics codes as well as the landmark Hutchins 
Commission Report, which is perhaps the best known written advocacy of ethical, socially 
responsible journalism.22 The third section of this chapter is an analysis of Supreme Court 
rulings in cases involving lawbreaking traceable to those ethical principles and directives. It 
also includes an examination of the general conflict between law and journalism ethics. The 
fourth and final section identifies a nascent movement by journalists to reconcile their ethical 
duties with their civic responsibilities. 
 
The Moral Duty to Obey the Law 
It may be impossible to determine precisely when the duty to obey the law became 
widely accepted as a basic civic and moral responsibility, but the concept was already in play 
in the 5th century B.C. as indicated by the iconic Greek philosopher Plato’s use of Socrates as 
                                                 
21 This section of the discussion relies on many of the icons of moral philosophy and civil disobedience used in 
a more general analysis of legal and moral imperatives by Professor Robert P. Lawry. See Robert P. Lawry, 
Ethics in the Shadow of Law: The Political Obligation of a Citizen, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 655 (2002).   
 
22 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS (Robert D. Leigh ed., 1947). 
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a rhetorical device to explore the intersection of civic and moral duties. Through much of the 
20th century and into 21st century A.D., Western philosophers such as John Rawls affirmed 
the duty to obey the law.23 Others have questioned when or whether such a duty exists.24 
Socrates may have performed the ultimate act of civic responsibility when he killed himself 
in accord with a court order even though he found that order patently unjust. Socrates, as 
depicted by Plato in Crito and The Apology, examined the moral basis of the citizens’ duty to 
their government and its laws.25 Socrates is a fitting vehicle for this dissertation’s discussion 
of journalists caught between legal duty and ethical imperatives because he was enmeshed in 
a similar dilemma. He too ran afoul of the law by following his ethical principles. He was 
convicted of corrupting the youth of Athens and other acts of impiety that he considered 
necessary pursuant to his duties as a philosopher and teacher. When an Athenian court 
convicted him, he condemned its judgment as unjust, but willingly complied with the 
government order to kill himself by drinking poisonous hemlock. He reasoned that it was his 
moral duty to obey the law or legal judgments of his government even when he believed 
them wrong. Socrates argued that he owed obedience to his government because to disobey 
the will of the duly constituted civic authority was to attack and damage it. The society made 
possible by government would die if citizens could flout the law that bound it together.  He 
also said he owed the government obedience because as a citizen he had been cared for by 
the government and because he had agreed to obey its laws. 
                                                 
23 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Christie, supra note 15; Raz, supra note 15; Lawry, supra 
note 21. 
 
24 See Raz, supra note 15; Smith, supra note 15. 
 
25 See THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1989). 
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These notions of civic damage and civic agreement were intrinsic to the social 
contract theory that was formally introduced to Europe in the 17th century by Thomas 
Hobbes as elaborations on the citizen’s duty to obey the law.26 Leviathan, Hobbes’ best-
known work, postulated that humans escaped the back-biting, life-threatening, anarchistic 
condition he referred to as the state of nature by creating governments to establish and 
maintain order. Government is the product of a social contract through which people 
willingly surrender some measure of the freedom they had in the state of nature and agree to 
follow their government’s laws in return for security and stability, according to Hobbes. Each 
breach of the promise of obedience to the government damages the government and threatens 
to return the citizen to the dreaded state of nature. Late 17th century philosopher John Locke 
affirmed the civic duty to obey the law in his classic Two Treatises on Government, but he 
cast that duty as revocable.27  He constructed a less hostile version of Hobbes’ state of nature 
concept as he expanded the social contract theory to include situations in which a person is 
relieved of the civic duty to obey the law when the government does not live up to its 
responsibilities. He even encouraged the eradication of irresponsible governments, but called 
for the formulation of a new government by agreement. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s 18th 
century writings also reaffirmed the citizen’s duty to obey the law in accord with the social 
contract, but he emphasized the reciprocal duty of the government to uphold its agreements 
with the citizen.28 
                                                 
26 Hobbes, supra note 13. 
 
27 Locke, supra note 13. 
 
28 Rousseau, supra note 13. 
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These seminal philosophical discourses on the moral duty to obey the law have 
remained vibrant and in play for centuries. Their themes are apparent in the wording of a 
1994 ruling made by U.S. District Judge William M. Hoeveler as he proceeded with criminal 
contempt charges against journalists of the Cable News Network who openly defied his order 
against televising the confidential conversations that Panamanian drug trafficker and political 
strongman Manuel Noriega had with his legal counsel.  
The thin but bright line between anarchy and order – the delicate balance 
which ultimately is the vital protection of the individual and the public 
generally – is the respect which litigants and the public have for the law and 
the orders issued by the courts. Defiance of court orders and, even more so, 
public display of such defiance cannot be justified or permitted.29 
 
Although the duty to obey the law is widely regarded as a fundamental and moral 
obligation of citizenship, no major philosopher has said it is absolute. As with other moral 
obligations, obedience to law must yield when there is sufficient justification. Professor John 
Rawls declared in 1964, “I shall assume . . . that there is, at least in a society such as ours, a 
moral obligation to obey the law, although it may, of course be overridden in certain cases by 
other more stringent obligations.” 30 Even Socrates in his address to the Athenian jurors said 
he would reject a court order that prohibited him from philosophizing because he believed he 
was morally obligated to be a philosopher and that obligation outweighed his civic duty. 
“Gentlemen, I am your grateful and devoted servant,” he said. “[B]ut I owe a greater 
obedience to God than to you and so long as I draw breath and have my faculties, I shall 
                                                 
29 United States v. Cable News Network, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1549, 1564 (S. D. Fla. 1994) (emphasis added). 
 
30 John Rawls, Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play, LAW AND PHILOSOPHY: A SYMPOSIUM 3 (Sidney 
Hook ed., 1964). 
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never stop practicing philosophy and exhorting you and elucidating the truth for everyone 
that I meet.” 31 
Journalists who defy the law on ethical principle match the Socratic model in some 
respects. They too often claim a professional calling to elucidate the truth that morally 
overrides their civic obligation to accept or comply with the government’s interpretation of 
the First Amendment. Their codes of ethics provide the justification and motivation to openly 
defy the law. These deliberate violations of law, while encouraged by ethics codes are also 
apparently intended to effect change in the law or public policy. By the middle of the 20th 
century this type of activity widely came to be called civil disobedience. Its practitioners 
claimed justification for their lawlessness because the laws at issue conflicted with a higher 
moral principle and were therefore trumped. They were, in effect, following a moral directive 
that placed their actions beyond the reach of law. Indeed, under such circumstances many 
prominent moral philosophers have found it morally responsible to disobey some laws. 
Henry David Thoreau, the 19th-century Massachusetts philosopher and author of the 
influential essay titled “Civil Disobedience,” insisted that matters of conscience should trump 
civic responsibility.32 His conscience compelled him not to pay a state poll tax though he did 
not dispute poll taxes in general. His complaint was against the United States’ war with 
Mexico and the federal laws protecting slavery.33 Civil disobedience has been defined in 
                                                 
31 THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO, supra note 25, at 15 (Apology). Socrates referred to his moral 
obligation to philosophize or teach as a duty imposed upon him by his god, but modern philosophers have 
interpreted that sense of religious piety as matters of conscience or moral duty. See, e.g., T. A. SINCLAIR, A 
HISTORY OF GREEK POLITICAL THOUGHT (1967); N. GULLEY, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCRATES (1968). 
 
32 See, HENRY DAVID THOREAU, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (David R. Godine ed., 1969) (1849). The essay was 
originally titled “Resistance to Civil Government,” but was renamed “Civil Disobedience” when published after 
Thoreau’s death. 
 
33 Id. 
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many ways. Some scholars have said that Thoreau, although often cited as the originator of 
the term, did not actually engage in civil disobedience because his resistance was not public 
enough and the law he broke had little or nothing to do with the law and public policy he 
opposed.34 For the purposes of this discussion, much of the journalists’ behavior cited here 
bears many of the characteristics of civil disobedience because it consists of intentional 
public lawbreaking in pursuit of a moral principle by a person who does not flee legal 
punishment, or seek anarchy or complete dissolution of the government.35 Its major failing as 
civil disobedience exists in the fact that journalists generally do not mount campaigns to 
break any laws to challenge their moral validity; the lawbreaking occurs as a matter of course 
in the process of practicing journalism. Archetypal American civil disobedients, however, do 
not engage in illegal behaviors in the course of doing something else. American civil rights 
activists of the 1960s, for example, did not illegally sit at segregated lunch counters or drink 
from whites-only water fountains because they became hungry or thirsty.36 They clearly 
wanted the law to prosecute them, but it may be safe to assume that journalists would prefer 
not to rouse enforcement of the laws they break. They clearly would prefer to get back to the 
work of gathering and reporting news without any legal entanglements.  
In the 20th century, civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. became the most visible 
American proponent of civil disobedience based on moral principle. The Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s relied heavily on deliberate law breaking to end racial discrimination 
                                                 
34 See e.g., Lawry, supra note 21; David Lyons, Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience, 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. , Winter 1998, 31-49; William A. Herr, Thoreau: A Civil Disobedient? 85 ETHICS 87 (1974). 
 
35 See ELLIOT M. ZASHIN, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DEMOCRACY (1972) for a similar definition of civil 
disobedience. 
 
36 See generally DAVID GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN 
CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (1986). 
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and segregation in the Southern states. Opponents criticized King and his followers as law 
breakers who had abandoned their civic responsibility. Historian James A. Colaiaco framed 
the opposition’s position in nearly Socratic terms. “In effect, the racists said to the blacks: 
‘For the sake of law and order, you must submit to a social system, even though you believe 
it to be unjust.’”37 Others said King’s actions threatened to unleash anarchy and were creating 
“a legacy of lawlessness.”38 These also were the underlying themes of  “An Appeal for Law 
and Order and Common Sense,” a statement published by eight Alabama clergymen in the 
Birmingham News on April 12, 1963, to criticize King’s non-violent, but disruptive flouting 
of the law.39 
King’s public response, the historic Letter from a Birmingham Jail, eloquently laid 
out the moral basis of his action and reaffirmed his basic civic allegiance.40 His  rationale is 
applicable in many respects to journalists who break the law pursuant to ethical principle. 
The letter addresses the clergymen who signed the appeal. 
You express a great deal of anxiety over our willingness to break laws. This is 
certainly a legitimate concern. . . . I agree with St. Augustine that “an unjust 
law is no law at all.” . . . Sometimes a law is just on its face and unjust in its 
application. . . . In no sense do I advocate evading the law. . . . That would 
lead to anarchy. One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly. . . . I 
submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust 
and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the 
conscience of the community over its injustice is in reality expressing the 
highest respect for the law.41 
                                                 
37 James A. Colaiaco, Martin Luther King Jr. and the Paradox of Nonviolent Direct Action, 47 PHYLON 16, 18 
(1986). 
 
38 Frank Meyer, Showdown with Insurrection, NAT. REV., Jan 16, 1968, at 36; See also LIONEL LOKOS,  THE 
LIFE AND LEGACY OF MARTIN LUTHER KING 460 (1968). 
 
39 The text of the “Appeal for law and order and common sense” is available online at the Birmingham Public 
Library; http://www.bplonline.org/Archives/faqs/letterrespondedtobymartinlutherking.asp. 
 
40 The text of the letter is reprinted in Alton Hornsby, Jr., Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham 
Jail, J. NEGRO HIST., Winter-Autumn 1986, at 38-44. 
 
41 Id. at 40-41.  
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In a manner that roughly parallels King’s reasoning, journalists who violate the law pursuant 
to ethical principle generally claim in defense that the First Amendment is a just law that is 
being applied unjustly when the government and its judges interpret it in a manner that would 
thwart journalism’s ethical directives by not providing them a full measure of protection 
against other laws and court orders they consider unjust when applied to themselves. They 
routinely accept the government’s punishment after exhausting their legal challenges of the 
law and profess no disrespect for the United States or the Constitution. They do not attempt 
anarchy, but their conscience – as guided by journalism ethics codes – tells them that some 
applications and interpretations of First Amendment law are unjust and must be resisted. 
 
Ethical Justification for Lawless Conduct 
Journalists who engage in these types of civic irresponsibility or civil disobedience 
can find encouragement and justification in four fundamental ethical principles and 
directives: report the news,42 remain independent, protect the First Amendment and protect 
confidential sources. These principles can provide the justification for what may be described 
in King’s parlance as “acts of civil disobedience that have roused the conscience of the 
community.”43 American lawmakers, apparently roused by the highly publicized struggles of 
journalists against some arguably unjust interpretations of the law, had enacted press shield 
laws in 31 states and the District of Columbia by 2005 and introduced legislation to create a 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
42 The definitions of “news” and “newsworthy” are varied and necessarily elastic. For the purposes of this 
examination, news and newsworthy refer to those issues and occurrences that are matters of public concern. 
 
43 Hornsby, supra note 40 at 41. 
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federal press shield law.44 The widespread adoption of state shield laws followed repeated 
instances during the 1970s of journalists refusing court orders to identify their confidential 
sources and claiming an ethical obligation and a First Amendment right to do so. A 2005 
proposal to create a federal press shield law to provide journalists some measure of 
protection against government subpoenas and forced disclosure of sources directly flowed 
from the highly publicized federal action begun in 2003 against journalists targeted in an 
investigation of the public disclosure of Valerie Plame’s status as an undercover operative for 
the Central Intelligence Agency.45 Journalists in each of the instances referred to above defied 
legal edicts that would have them violate basic ethical principles or shirk their duties. 
These principles establish an affirmative duty to gather and report the news. This duty 
is necessarily as compelling as the journalist’s obligation to tell the truth, the most heralded 
principle of ethical journalism. Ideally, the two duties are inseparable. Perhaps because the 
duty to report is so basic, it is not always expressed explicitly in journalism ethics codes but 
it is affirmed in every one examined for this study. It is such an overarching imperative that 
other ethical principles were created to restrain or guide it. These other principles, for 
example, indicate how this fundamental duty to report matters of public concern is to be 
executed – truthfully, independently, with a respect for privacy, and in a manner that 
minimizes harm.46 Most of the written codes examined in this study apparently assumed 
                                                 
44 See KENT R. MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 508 (6th ed. 2005); David B. 
Smallman, Federal Shield Law Introduced in House, THE IRE J.,  March/April 2005, at 2; CONG. REC. S 9423 
(daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of  Sen. Dodd). 
 
45 See Jim Abrams, House Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Protect Reporters from Subpoenas, Associated Press 
(Feb. 2, 2005) http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=db4531d5d029e851600da8f2b6945d4d.  
 
46 See, e.g., Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics, available at http://www.spj.org/ethics_code.asp 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter SPJ Code]; RTNDA Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, available 
at http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.html (last visited April 8, 2004) [hereinafter RTNDA Code]; Gannett 
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journalists needed no encouragement to gather and report news. Accordingly, the codes 
focused most of their directives on how this affirmative duty was to be performed. The power 
of this fundamental ethical directive is so great that it apparently has the ability to induce 
journalists to set aside the moral duty to obey the law. Legal prohibitions are not necessarily 
seen as waivers of the duty to gather and report news. 
The first sentence of the Canons of Journalism  one of the earliest and most 
influential statements of journalism ethics  provided journalism’s fundamental ethical 
impetus in 1923 as it declared: “The primary function of newspapers is to communicate to 
the human race what its members do, feel, and think.”47 The codes created in the ensuing 
decades have affirmed that seminal directive implicitly, explicitly, and consistently.  The 
1987 incarnation of the code developed by the Society of Professional Journalists, for 
example, informed its members that “[t]he public’s right to know events of public importance 
and interest is the overriding mission of the mass media.”48 This imperative to report 
remained compelling at the start of the 21st century as indicated by journalism ethics 
professor Christopher Hansen’s declaration in the Columbia Journalism Review in 2003 that 
“[i]nforming the public is a key principle of journalism.”49 The Associated Press Managing 
Editors’ ethics code agreed and stated, “The public's right to know about matters of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Newspaper Division, Principles of Ethical Conduct for Newsrooms, available at 
http://www.gannett.com/go/press/pr061499.htm (last visited April 6, 2005) [hereinafter Gannett Principles]. 
 
47 Canons of Journalism, reprinted in NELSON ANTRIM CRAWFORD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM 183 (1924). 
 
48 The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Ethics, reprinted in JAY BLACK ET AL., 
DOING ETHICS IN JOURNALISM 4 (1993). 
 
49 Christopher Hansen, Weighing the Costs of a Scoop, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan. / Feb. 2003, at 35. 
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importance is paramount.”50 Ben Bradlee, the legendary editor of The Washington Post, was 
quoted in a journalism trade magazine referring to “our God-given duty to report the news.”51 
In 2005, the Society of Professional Journalists continued to extol the duty to report.  “The 
duty of the journalist is . . . seeking truth and providing a fair and comprehensive account of 
events and issues.”52  This wording resembles the statement made more than a half century 
earlier by the Hutchins Commission Report as it reiterated and reaffirmed the overarching 
duty to gather and report the news by listing it first among the five things the American 
polity required of its press: “Today our society needs, first, a truthful, comprehensive account 
of the day’s events.”53  
As the codes and the Hutchins Commission Report were goading journalists to gather 
and report the news, they also ascribed a duty to maintain journalistic independence and 
protect the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and the free press. “Freedom of the 
press is to be guarded as a vital right of mankind,” declared the second of the enumerated 
Canons of Journalism.54 Three decades later, the Hutchins Commission Report indicated that 
its own work was motivated by a desire to preserve press freedom. The Commission’s 
pronouncements affirmed the primacy of those freedoms.55 “Freedom of speech and the press 
is close to the central meaning of all liberty. Where men cannot freely convey their thoughts 
                                                 
50 Associated Press Managing Editors, Ethics Code, available at http://www.asne.org/index.cfm?ID=388 (last 
updated May 4, 2004). 
 
51 Florence George Graves, Protecting the Privilege, AM. JOURNALISM REV., April 1998, at 22. 
 
52 SPJ Code, supra note 46. 
 
53 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 22, at 20. 
 
54 Canons of Journalism, supra note 47, at 183. 
 
55 Robert M. Hutchins, Foreword to COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 22, at vii. 
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to one another, no other liberty is secure,” the report said.56 Here was an indication of the 
commission’s frequently expressed conviction that press freedom was a necessary and 
indispensable component of democracy. Journalism ethics codes also have reflected and 
consistently reinforced this assumed duty to protect press freedom. “Freedom of the press is 
to be guarded as an inalienable right of people in a free society,” announced SPJ’s 1987 
code.57 When the Associated Press Managing Editors released its revised ethics code in 1995, 
prominently listed among newspapers’ responsibilities was the following clause: “The 
newspaper should uphold the right of free speech and freedom of the press.”58  The Principles 
of Ethical Conduct unveiled by the Gannett news corporation in 1999 similarly identified 
protecting press freedom as a journalistic duty geared to maintain democracy. Under the 
general heading of “Serving the public interest,” Gannett said, “We will uphold First 
Amendment Principles to serve the democratic process.”59 The Hutchins Commission 
ascribed more than political value to press freedom; it was deemed a moral right as well. “It 
is a moral right because it has an aspect of duty about it,” the report said.60 It asserted that this 
moral right was expressed as a legal right in the First Amendment, but the moral right had 
precedence.   
Because of this duty to what is beyond the state, freedom of speech and 
freedom of the press are moral rights which the state must not infringe. The 
                                                 
56 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 22, at 107. 
 
57 The Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, Code of Ethics, supra note 48. 
 
58 Associated Press Managing Editors, supra note 47. 
 
59 Gannett Principles, supra note 46. 
 
60 COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 50, at 8. 
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moral right of free expression achieves a legal status because the conscience 
of the citizen is the source of the continued vitality of the state.61  
When The New York Times published a newly revised ethics code in 2003, it too made a 
nearly reverent reference to journalism’s democratic purpose and “its solemn responsibilities 
under the First Amendment” and also appeared to assume a duty to maintain press freedom.62  
None of the aforementioned statements of journalists’ ethical duty and responsibility 
explained or suggested moral or legal limitations on this obligation to protect and support 
press freedom and the First Amendment. There are, however, recurrent indications that an 
expansively interpreted First Amendment is an indispensable means of maintaining 
independence,63 a principle of ethical journalism that was venerated in the earliest codes and 
remains enshrined in the latest. Indeed, independence was the third of the Canons of 
Journalism enumerated in 1923. This early ethical pronouncement informed journalists that 
“[f]reedom from all obligations except that of fidelity to the public interest is vital.”64 
Similarly, in 2005 the Society of Professional Journalists’ code was urging its members to 
“[a]ct Independently  Journalists should be free of obligation to any interest other than the 
public's right to know.”65 Broadcast journalists of the Radio-Television News Directors 
Association made the most explicit connection between independence and press freedom in 
the ethics code its members approved in 2000 and which remained in effect in 2005. It listed 
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62 The New York Times, Ethical Journalism Guidebook, at 3 (Jan. 2003), available at 
http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-coe.html.  
 
63 The assumed interdependence of independence and the First Amendment is common among journalists and 
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independence as a major heading in its written code and included within it the responsibility 
to protect press freedom. “Professional electronic journalists should defend the independence 
of all journalists from those seeking influence or control over news content,” the broadcasters 
wrote.66 RTNDA’s final directive under the “independence” rubric was, “Defend the rights of 
the free press for all journalists.”67  
Ethical directives that addressed independence generally sought to insulate news 
coverage from the influence of advertisers, media owners, special interest groups, and even 
journalists’ own personal interests. Directives supportive of press freedom and the First 
Amendment were apparently designed to forestall government influence on the news. In 
short, independence is presented in the codes as an ethical principle to be protected against 
private and government encroachment alike. Independence was to be maintained in fact as 
well as appearance.68 Journalists who had apparent conflicts of interest were instructed to 
withdraw from the conflicting activity, fully disclose it, or withdraw from reporting on 
matters upon which their independence could be questioned or appeared to be 
compromised.69 Partnerships with government were particularly odious to the independence 
principle, and journalists went to great lengths to avoid even the appearance of collaboration, 
particularly when the government’s judiciary or law enforcement agencies sought 
information acquired by journalists. This latter aspect of the independence principle 
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68 See, e.g., SPJ Code, supra note 46. (directing journalists to “[a]void conflicts of interest, real or perceived.”). 
 
69 Id. (directing journalists to: “Remain free of associations and activities that may compromise integrity or 
damage credibility. . . .  Disclose unavoidable conflicts.”) 
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encourages and justifies journalists’ refusal to disclose even non-confidential sources and 
information when sought by the government. 
While journalism ethics codes generally have been unequivocal in urging journalists 
to zealously protect the freedom and independence granted by the First Amendment, they do 
not explicitly acknowledge that neither the First Amendment nor any other federal law 
necessarily means precisely what it says. It has long been established in American 
jurisprudence that these laws ultimately mean only what the Supreme Court says they mean.70 
The first Chief Justice of the United States, John Marshall, essentially settled that matter 
more than 200 years ago when he wrote the decision in Marbury v. Madison and concluded, 
“[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”71 The First Amendment’s statement that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press.”72 has never meant Congress shall make no such laws, 
according to the Supreme Court. It has never been interpreted by the Court in such absolutist 
terms. At best it has meant Congress should have a compelling reason when making such 
laws. Neither Congress nor the President  the first and second estates of government  is 
allowed to insist on its interpretation of the First Amendment or any other federal law. The 
First Amendment and the rest of the Constitution these elected government officials swear to 
uphold is the one created by Supreme Court interpretation. But the Fourth Estate has insisted 
at times on its own absolutist or fundamentalist interpretation of the Amendment’s text that 
no Supreme Court justice, with the possible exceptions of William O. Douglas and Hugo 
                                                 
70 See Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 887 (2003). 
 
71 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). See also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958); DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 77 - 85 (1993); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A 
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72 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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Black, has ever sanctioned.73 Ben Bradlee, for example, insisted on his interpretation as he 
condemned the Court’s 1972 ruling in Branzburg v. Hayes, 74 which found journalists had no 
First Amendment privilege to conceal confidential sources when subpoenaed by a grand jury. 
“There is a privilege whether the Supreme Court says so or not,” Bradlee declared.75 
Similarly defiant interpretations of the Amendment have been embedded in 
journalists’ codes of ethics for nearly a century. The codes consider the First Amendment to 
be more than a legal document. They have treated it as holy text that creates a moral 
imperative, an entitlement, and, at times, a justification for law breaking. Since 1937 the 
Court has sought to disabuse journalists of this notion.76 As the Court decisions examined in 
the next section will illustrate, its success has been limited. Some of the most notable failures 
have occurred when trying to compel journalists to identify their confidential sources.  
Journalists have been particularly adamant in following the ethical directive to protect these 
sources. To do otherwise would compromise independence. Compliance with subpoenas for 
confidential and non-confidential materials risks the appearance of collaboration with the 
government. Some ethics codes have openly directed journalists to defy subpoenas and other 
court orders in this cause. The code developed by the American Newspaper Guild, for 
                                                 
73 See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); 
Mary E. Fairhurst & Andrew T. Braff, William O. Douglas Lecture: William O. Douglas: The Gadfly of 
Washington, 40 GONZ. L. REV. 259 (2004-2005); Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. 
L. REV. 1221 (2002); HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS, AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3-11 (1992). 
 
74 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
 
75 Graves, supra note 51. 
 
76 See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); 
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 
U.S. 178 (1946). In these cases the Supreme Court found the First Amendment did not immunize the press 
against laws of general application such as labor laws and anti-trust legislation. 
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example, told its members: “Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose 
sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigating bodies.”77 
 
Beyond the Reach of Law 
 Journalists have defied the law and engaged in civic irresponsibility in two basic 
frameworks. They have flouted court orders instructing them to reveal news sources and have 
broken the law in pursuit of news. In both frameworks, journalists have relied on ethical 
principles to justify their actions and fundamentalist interpretations of the First Amendment 
to defend themselves against legal sanctions. This examination of Supreme Court decisions 
addressing these two frameworks will proceed thematically instead of chronologically. 
Branzburg fits squarely within the first framework of civic irresponsibility. Journalists in that 
case gathered or published newsworthy information and then refused to comply with 
government orders to reveal their sources or provide other information that would facilitate 
government investigations of potential criminal behavior such as drug dealing and gun 
trafficking.78 
The Vanessa Leggett case similarly developed from a government demand for 
information from her to pursue a murder investigation,79 and the Valerie Plame case involved 
journalists defying court orders issued in an investigation of a potentially life-threatening 
breach of national security law.80 Each of these cases occurred long after the U.S. Supreme 
                                                 
77 Newsman’s Code of Ethics reprinted in GEORGE L. BIRD & FREDERIC E. MERWIN, THE PRESS AND SOCIETY 
592 (1971). 
 
78 408 U.S. at 667-78. 
 
79 See Dan Eggen & Paul Duggan, Jailing of Writer Sparks 1st Amendment Debate;Prosecutor Seeks Notes In 
Texas Murder Case, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1001 at A3 
 
80 Howard Kurtz, A Case Most Clearly Defined By Its Shadows, WASH. POST, July 7, 2005 at A12. 
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Court had established that the First Amendment did not immunize journalists against laws of 
general application that applied to all citizens. In Branzburg, the Supreme Court specifically 
addressed subpoenas issued to journalists and ruled in accord with its precedents that the 
First Amendment did not place journalists beyond the reach of grand jury subpoenas that 
would be applicable to all citizens. Yet the same basic issue was presented in the Leggett and 
Plame cases decades later, and journalists raised the same ethical justifications and First 
Amendment defenses the Supreme Court had rejected in Branzburg.81 But the Court’s 5-4 
disposition of Branzburg was widely seen as an equivocal statement about journalists’ ability 
to resist subpoenas and protect their sources from government inquiries. That ruling will be 
analyzed in greater depth later in this chapter.  
The second framework of journalistic civic irresponsibility – breaking the law in 
pursuit of news – is illustrated by the Lawrence Matthews case. Matthews, a veteran 
journalist, was charged with violating a federal child pornography law. He defended himself 
by asserting that he was sending and retrieving the pornography via the Internet in order to 
make contacts with pedophiles and write news stories about this matter of public concern.82 
He failed to convince the trial court judge and an appeals court that the First Amendment 
protected his activity. In fact, they would not even allow him to make that argument to a jury. 
His basic claim was that although he was in technical violation of the law, he did not have 
the same intent as a typical criminal. He broke the law to report on a matter of public concern 
the law was designed to solve. Journalists sometimes violate laws for the sole purpose of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
81 See Douglas McCollam, Attack at the Source, Why the Plame Case is So Scary, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., 
March 2005 at 29. 
 
82 See U.S. v. Matthews, 209 F. 3d 338 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910 (2000). 
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reporting on newsworthy issues.83 An amici curiae brief filed with the U.S. Supreme Court 
by several journalism associations in support of Matthews argued:  
When an individual engaged in a constitutionally protected activity, such as 
news gathering, violates an otherwise valid law that affects that activity, but 
does not cause the harm meant to be proscribed by the statute, he should be 
able to argue at trial that his actions were protected by the First Amendment.84 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear Matthews’ appeal and let stand a lower court’s 
finding that consistent with the holding in Branzburg, journalists did not have a broad First 
Amendment exemption from legal responsibilities that bound other citizens.  
Branzburg, notwithstanding its alleged ambiguity, has emerged as the Court’s 
keystone iteration of its longstanding pronouncement that the First Amendment does not 
place journalists beyond the reach of laws that apply to everyone. It is the basic precedent 
relied on in court rulings involving journalists who assert a First Amendment right to resist 
subpoenas or break the law pursuant to news gathering. Branzburg’s majority opinion 
undercuts the ethical principles and directives that goad journalists toward civic 
irresponsibility and law breaking. Branzburg has been interpreted in some lower federal 
courts as recognizing some limited First Amendment protection or privilege for journalists 
when gathering news,85 but the majority decision written by Justice Byron White denied the 
broad protection journalists had sought. The first two sentences of the opinion appeared to be 
                                                 
83 See, e.g., Alice Kaderlan, Reporter Accused of Staging a Dogfight, WASH. JOURNALISM REV., November 
1990, at 19 (explaining how journalists set up an illegal dog fight to capture video images for news report on 
dog fighting); Alix M. Freedman & Rekha Balu, How Cincinnati Paper Ended Up Backing Off From Chiquita 
Series, WALL STREET J., July 17, 1998 at A16 (recounting the travails of a newspaper reporter who illegally 
obtained corporate e-mails during investigation of questionable business practices); Alan Wolper, Undercover 
Angel Grounded in Texas, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, February 2005, at 19 (examining actions of a reporter who 
posed as prostitute and illegally solicited customers). 
 
84 Brief of Amici Curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press et al. at 3, Matthews v. U.S., 531 
U.S. 910 (2000) (No. 00-5605). 
 
85 See infra p. 255 and note 93. 
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clear: “The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and testify before 
state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press guaranteed by the First 
Amendment. We hold that it does not.”86 Less clear was the concurring opinion of Justice 
Lewis F. Powell, whose vote created the bare majority that ruled against the journalists’ 
claims.  
The first sentence in Powell’s opinion said the majority holding was limited. The 
second sentence sought to mark those limits by pointing out what the majority did not say: 
“The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury are 
without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in safeguarding their 
sources.”87 Indeed, White’s majority opinion did say “news gathering is not without its First 
Amendment protections,” and “grand juries must operate within the limits of the First 
Amendment.”88 But White’s ultimate conclusion was that in the case before the Court these 
particular journalists had no First Amendment right to refuse to identify their sources before 
grand juries, or ignore subpoenas, or break the law to gather news.89 The four dissenting 
justices, as well as Powell and the rest of the majority, agreed that there were some First 
Amendment protections for newsgathering and confidential sources, but only the dissenters 
concluded that these protections applied in the instant case.90 The various Branzburg opinions 
were unanimously supportive of some First Amendment protection for news gathering 
processes. On the specifics of that protection, however, the opinions were fragmented and 
                                                 
86 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972). 
 
87 Id. at 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring). 
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89 Id. at 682, 690, 691. 
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ranged from the vague generalities of White’s opinion to the virtually absolute First 
Amendment protection advanced by Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent. Powell’s 
concurring opinion was so much in accord with the Court’s dissenting minority bloc on the 
parameters of this protection that his opinion might well be described as a dissenting 
concurrence. Justice Potter Stewart described the Branzburg 5-4 ruling on reporter’s 
privilege as perhaps “a vote of four and a half to four and a half.”91 
 It is therefore understandable that during the ensuing three decades some lower 
federal courts cited Branzburg as a precedent for protecting sources or newsgathering 
processes in some instances.92 It is equally understandable that other federal courts relied on 
Branzburg to subject journalists to the strictures of law.93 One scholar has concluded that the 
greater number of those courts had been deciding in favor of some type of reporter’s 
privilege or other protection until the closing years of the 20th century when the tide began to 
shift.94 An opinion handed down in 2003 by the highly influential federal circuit judge 
Richard A. Posner in McKevitt v. Pallasch was particularly indicative of the shift.95 Posner’s 
opinion expressed surprise that some fellow jurists had thought Branzburg affirmed the 
existence of a reporter’s privilege. Posner also indicated that some of these jurists’ rulings 
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“essentially ignore Branzburg.”96 Posner’s ruling rejected the claim of reporter’s privilege 
raised by journalists seeking to quash a court order directing them to surrender audiotapes to 
a criminal trial court. 
 Notwithstanding the apparent shift in the interpretations and effects of Branzburg, the 
case has provided journalists with a legal justification for some ethics-based acts of civic 
irresponsibility in subsequent cases. In that respect, those cases appear to be theoretical 
framework descendants, though not direct legal progeny, of New York Times v. United States, 
the Pentagon Papers case.97 This case was decided in 1971, a year and a day before 
Branzburg and yielded a per curiam opinion with nine separate opinions – six concurring and 
three dissenting. At that time, no other Supreme Court case had more pointedly showcased 
the civic responsibility of American journalists in conflict with ethical principles.98 
Journalists adhering to their duty to independently gather and publish news ostensibly broke 
the law, flouted government policy, and risked national security.  
 The federal government sought injunctions to stop The New York Times and The 
Washington Post from publishing news articles revealing the contents of a top secret federal 
report commonly referred to as the Pentagon Papers but formally titled “History of U.S. 
Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy.” Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo were 
suspected of stealing the report and copying it.99 Copies of the report eventually wound up in 
                                                 
96 Id. at 532. 
 
97 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
 
98 Many of the same issues were raised in a lower federal court a few years later in the “atomic bomb” case, 
United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979). 
 
99 See United States v. Russo, No. 9373 – (WMB) – CD (filed Dec. 29, 1971), dismissed (C.D. Cal. May 11, 
1973). Ellsberg and Russo were indicted, but the charges were later dismissed. See also Melville B. Nimmer, 
National Security Secrets v. Free Speech, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311 (1974) (arguing that the conduct of Ellsberg 
and Russo was not illegal and that the federal law purporting to criminalize their actions was unconstitutional); 
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the possession of the newspapers and was the basis of news articles that detailed the history 
of the United States’ political and military involvement in the ongoing Vietnam conflict. The 
Supreme Court was called on solely to determine whether the injunctions would violate the 
First Amendment, but the individual opinions went further afield into theoretical frameworks 
that implicated issues of civic responsibility and journalists’ professional responsibilities. 
 Justices Black, Douglas, William Brennan, Stewart, Byron White, and Thurgood 
Marshall wrote separate concurrences to the short per curiam denial of the injunction. They 
concluded that the government had failed to overcome the high burden of justification 
created by the First Amendment. Black’s opinion, which was joined by Douglas, used 
language that was amenable to an interpretation that would absolve journalists who published 
newsworthy information about a matter of public concern even if that information had been 
stolen or publication was otherwise precluded by any law subordinate to the First 
Amendment. “Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that 
the press must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, 
injunctions or prior restraints,” Black wrote.100 This opinion displayed the absolutist or 
fundamentalist interpretation of the First Amendment sometimes promoted by Black and 
Douglas and provided legal support for the ethical directives under discussion here.  
[P]aramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent 
any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to 
distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, 
far from receiving condemnation for their courageous reporting, The New 
York Times, The Washington Post and other newspapers should be 
                                                                                                                                                       
William S. Robby, Receipt of Public Documents Taken by Another Without Authorization as Receipt of Stolen 
Property, 57 A.L.R. 3d 1211 (1974). 
 
100 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J. concurring) (emphasis added). 
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commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so 
clearly.101 
 In Black’s view, the government was asking his Court “to hold that the First Amendment 
does not mean what it says.”102 Indeed, Black’s opinion cited Solicitor General’s Erwin N. 
Griswold’s remarks making that point on behalf of the government during oral argument: 
“You say that no law means no law, and that should be obvious. I can only say, Mr. Justice, 
that to me it is equally obvious that ‘no law’ does not mean ‘no law.’ ”103 
 Douglas’s opinion was largely in accord with Black’s but took pains to point out that 
no federal law would be broken by the newspapers’ publication of the contested information 
and that the government’s request for the injunctions was not premised on criminal activity 
by the newspapers.104 Brennan’s opinion echoed Black’s fundamentalist interpretation of the 
First Amendment and even condemned the delay in publication occasioned by the 
proceedings through the federal courts. “The error that has pervaded these cases from the 
outset was the granting of any injunctive relief whatsoever, interim or otherwise,” he 
complained.105  This was an argument supporting press independence. 
Stewart and White indicated that the newspapers may have broken the law, that their 
actions were contrary to government policy and would do “substantial damage to public 
interests.”106 White also indicated that the government had made a mistake in seeking an 
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injunction but might well prevail in a criminal prosecution of the newspapers. “I would have 
no difficulty sustaining convictions under these sections on facts that would not justify [an 
injunction],” he wrote.107 Here was a clear warning that the First Amendment would not place 
journalists beyond the reach of criminal law even when performing the essential job of 
informing the people about government deception or other matters of public concern. 
 The dissenters, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger and Associate Justices John M. 
Harlan and Harry A. Blackmun, wanted to permit the injunction but settled for chastising the 
two newspapers for receiving stolen documents and forsaking their civic duty to return them 
and preserve their secrets. “To me it is hardly believable that a newspaper long regarded as a 
great institution in American life would fail to perform one of the basic and simple duties of 
every citizen with respect to the discovery or possession of stolen property or secret 
government documents. That duty, I had thought – perhaps naively – was to report forthwith, 
to responsible public officers. This duty rests on taxi drivers, Justices and the New York 
Times,” Burger wrote.108 Blackmun also pointedly remarked on what he perceived as an 
unseemly lack of civic responsibility displayed by the press in light of the potential harm that 
publication of the Pentagon Papers might inflict on their nation’s international relations and 
the American troops still on the battlefields of Vietnam. “I strongly urge, and sincerely hope 
that these two newspapers will be fully aware of their ultimate responsibilities to the United 
States of America. . . . [T]he Nation’s people will know where the responsibility for these sad 
consequences rests.”109  
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Blackmun’s comments were reminiscent of Socrates’ arguments about the moral 
duties every citizen owed to the state and evoked the Hutchins Commission Report’s warning 
to journalists that their fellow citizens might rewrite the First Amendment to limit its 
protection if the press did not live up to its responsibilities.110 Subsequent studies have 
indicated the commission’s warning accurately gauged the mindset of the American public in 
some such circumstances, but not all. Writing in 1970 about opinion surveys on this topic 
dating back to 1936, social researcher Hazel Gaudet Erskine concluded: “Americans believe 
in free speech in theory, but not always in practice. Many would like to see . . . the Bill of 
Rights tailored to the times and the occasion.”111 A year later she similarly concluded that 
“the public has never exhibited overweening concern for freedom of the press,” but polls 
conducted to gauge public opinion on the Pentagon Papers controversy indicated “[m]ost 
Americans sided with the newspapers in the contest.”112  On the basic question of whether the 
newspapers were right to publish the information despite the government’s opposition, the 
Gallup Poll found 58 percent favored the newspapers and 30 percent opposed them; the 
Harris Poll found 51 percent backed the papers and 35 opposed them.113 Notwithstanding 
these findings, another Harris Poll conducted on August 12, 1971, posed the following 
question: “If there is any doubt about violating the national security in publishing documents 
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such as the Pentagon papers on Vietnam, then the documents should not be published.” An 
overwhelming 70 percent agreed and only 14 percent disagreed.114 
 Although the Court’s disposition of the Pentagon Papers case was ostensibly 
determined by the First Amendment’s abhorrence of prior restraints on publication and an 
affirmation of the precedents on that point, it is susceptible to interpretation as affirming 
some basis for First-Amendment immunity for journalists’ unlawful practices.  Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist made precisely this claim 30 years later when he dissented from the 
Court’s ruling in Bartnicki v. Vopper,115 a case devoid of prior restraint as a legal issue but 
rife with allegations that journalists had broken the law or otherwise shirked their civic 
responsibility.116 The Court majority in Bartnicki relied on the Pentagon Papers case and 
others as it determined that the First Amendment would shield journalists from civil liability 
for publishing stolen information. The information was true and newsworthy, and journalists 
therefore had an ethical duty to report it. 
 As in the Pentagon Papers case, journalists in Bartnicki, came into possession of 
“stolen” newsworthy information and published it. The information was a cell phone 
conversation between the president of a Pennsylvania high school teachers union and the 
union’s primary negotiator about matters that would ultimately affect how taxpayer money 
would be spent on education. The conversation had been illegally intercepted – stolen – by an 
unknown person and shared with journalists and others. Because the information dealt with a 
matter of public concern, it was newsworthy and the journalists had an ethical duty to report 
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it. The union president and negotiator, as permitted by federal law, sued the journalists for 
publishing the conversation. The case made its way to the Supreme Court as the journalists 
claimed the protection of the First Amendment.  
The Court said the narrow issue to be decided was whether the First Amendment 
protects the disclosure of an illegally intercepted communication under these specific 
circumstances. By a 6-3 vote the Court decided in favor of the journalists saying, “[W]e are 
firmly convinced that the disclosures made by respondents in this suit are protected by the 
First Amendment.”117 The Bartnicki findings most germane to this study were that the 
journalists played no role in the interception, the journalists knew or should have known the 
conversation had been illegally intercepted, the conversation was about a matter of public 
concern, and the law forbidding the dissemination of the conversation was a law of general 
application. 
Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens cited a series of precedents dating 
from the Pentagon Papers case through the 1970s that generally provided First Amendment 
protection for journalists who disseminated truthful, newsworthy information that wound up 
in their hands through no legal fault or improper action of their own.118 In these cases the 
Court did not allow the illegal acquisition of information by a third party or the mistaken 
release of information to justify sanctions against the journalists who thereafter published it. 
Some of these cases specifically noted that the journalists had not broken the law or caused it 
to be broken to acquire news and that the First Amendment would not immunize journalists’ 
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illegal acts.119 But in Bartnicki, legal sanctions were not limited to the acquisition of the 
information but extended to the subsequent publication as well.120  
This was also true in the cases Stevens relied on: Florida Star v. B.J.F., Smith v. 
Daily Mail, and Landmark Communications v. Virginia. Statutes in these cases made 
publication illegal or allowed civil liability for publication. In Bartnicki, as in the cases 
Stevens relied on, the penalty provisions of the statutes could not be enforced in these 
circumstances without violating the First Amendment. Although the Court did not say 
journalists were beyond the reach of law, it did say these laws were reaching into areas 
protected by the First Amendment and were therefore unconstitutional as applied.121 It is a 
fine distinction in terms of consequences for journalists, but the effect can be seen as case-
by-case grants of immunity – the journalists were not punished or held liable.  It should be 
noted that the Court has emphatically denied that this is what has been occurring. White’s 
majority opinion in Branzburg, for example, stated, “It would be frivolous to assert . . .  that 
the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on 
either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws.”122 Surely, the Court has 
issued no licenses but has issued a number of decisions with the individual effects of 
licensing that support some of journalism’s ethical directives. 
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122 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 691. 
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These case-by-case grants of immunity in effect will be referred to here as the 
Pentagon Papers line of cases because each case revolved around journalists who willfully or 
negligently engaged in civic irresponsibility by breaking the law or contravening their 
government’s policy. The journalists in Daily Mail, for example, knowingly and willfully 
violated the law that forbade them to identify a juvenile crime suspect. Although they 
initially followed the law, they later made a conscious decision to break it. This decision was 
made after the juvenile’s identity was disclosed in another medium, but the law did not 
recognize such an escape clause.123 Equally willful were the actions of the journalists in 
Landmark, who flouted the law’s ban on publicizing internal investigations of the 
judiciary.124 The journalists in Florida Star who violated the law against identifying sexual 
assault victims were merely negligent.125 The Court’s ruling in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. 
Cohn has to be included in this line even though Stevens did not cite it in Bartnicki.126 The 
journalists in Cox Broadcasting violated a Georgia law that forbade the publication of the 
name of a rape victim and allowed lawsuits against those who violated that law. In an 8-1 
ruling the Court protected the journalists by not allowing the challenged provisions of 
Georgia that would have permitted a civil suit against the journalists under the specific facts 
of the case. The majority opinion written by Stevens noted that the embattled journalists had 
discovered the victim’s name by examining a public government record. Stevens also 
highlighted the fact that the proceedings in the rape case “are without question events of 
legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to 
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124 435 U.S. at 832. 
 
125 491 U.S. at 528. 
 
126 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
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report the operations of government.”127 Here was, perhaps, an apparent affirmation of the 
duty to report notwithstanding the law. 
The Court opinions in the Pentagon Papers line of cases frequently and favorably 
cited the fact that journalists were pursuing matters of public concern, matters of public 
significance, public questions, or public issues when they ran afoul of the law.128 These were 
among the rationales for protecting the journalism practices at issue in these cases and the 
rulings supported if not encouraged the affirmative duty to report the news about these public 
matters. Notwithstanding some adverse rulings, the Supreme Court has been generally 
supportive of those ethical directives and principles of journalism that are often linked to 
practices that are illegal or otherwise contrary to government policy and civic responsibility. 
Despite a multitude of Court statements insisting that journalists are no more beyond the 
reach of the law than any other citizen is, a case-by-case tally indicates that more often than 
not, the Court has placed them outside of harm’s way without affirming the fundamentalist 
reading of the First Amendment that journalists promoted. 
Notwithstanding the assertion above that the Court tolerated or to some degree 
excused journalists’ civic misbehavior when public issues were involved, the next section of 
this examination focuses on a landmark case in which the most important public issue – 
electing government officials – was integral to the journalists’ actions, yet the Court provided 
virtually no protection or tolerance. 
 
 
                                                 
127 Id. at 492. 
 
128 See, e.g., Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536-37; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103; Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 491-
95.  
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Within the Grasp of Equity 
This chapter’s examination of U.S. Supreme Court cases in which journalists 
complying with ethical principles have collided with the law and broken it, now turns to 
Cohen v. Cowles,129 a case in which journalists complying with two ethical principles collided 
with a third and broke a rule of equity, but technically did not violate the law.130  
Journalists employed by the Cowles Media Company in Minnesota intentionally 
broke their promise to conceal the identity of a confidential source who, while working for a 
state political candidate, provided the journalists with potentially damaging information 
about an opposition candidate.131 The journalists subsequently decided that the political 
operative’s use of a smear campaign tactic – anonymously circulating negative information 
about the opposition – was newsworthy, and they revealed his name and tactics in their 
newspapers. This disclosure was clearly a violation of the ethical directive to protect 
confidential sources. In breaking the promise, however, the journalists were complying with 
the two ethical principles that impelled them to report the newsworthy truth. The information 
was about prior criminal acts by a candidate and was newsworthy because voters arguably 
needed it to make an informed democratic choice. The source, Dan Cohen, once publicly 
identified and linked to negative campaigning, was fired immediately; he sued the journalists 
                                                 
129 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
 
130 Law and equity are separate forms of jurisprudence, according to legal scholar Peter Charles Hoffer, but the 
distinction is rarely made since the merger of law and equity in American federal and state courts empowered 
judges of law to act simultaneously as chancellors in equity. See PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S 
CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 85-106 (1990). 
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claiming they had breached their contract with him by breaking their promise of 
confidentiality.132  
Minnesota’s Supreme Court determined that the journalists’ promise was not a legal 
contract and Cohen, therefore, could not prevail in a lawsuit for a contract law violation. 
Minnesota’s highest court nonetheless found Cohen might have a remedy in equity under the 
promissory estoppel doctrine, but ruled that resorting to equity under these circumstances 
would violate the First Amendment.133 On appeal and in a 5-4 ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court 
overturned this portion of the Minnesota ruling and said deciding the case under this equity 
doctrine would not necessarily violate the First Amendment.134 The Court found the equitable 
doctrine of promissory estoppel to be a state law of general application; and just as it had in 
Branzburg, the Court ruled that journalists were not immunized by the First Amendment 
against laws of general application that applied to every other citizen.135 The Court 
accordingly remanded the case to the state court where Cohen eventually prevailed.136 
With this ruling the Court seemed to begin fulfilling the Hutchins Commission’s dire 
prediction and warning about the consequences of irresponsible journalism. The warning said 
the government would make the press responsible if it did not become so on its own and the 
                                                 
132 Id. 
 
133 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W. 2d 199, 205 (Minn. 1990) (concluding “that in this case enforcement 
of the promise of confidentiality under a promissory estoppel theory would violate defendants' First 
Amendment rights. ... There may be instances where a confidential source would be entitled to a remedy such as 
promissory estoppel, when the state's interest in enforcing the promise to the source outweighs First 
Amendment considerations, but this is not such a case. Plaintiff's claim cannot be maintained on a contract 
theory. Neither is it sustainable under promissory estoppel.). 
 
134 501 U.S. at 665. 
 
135 501 U.S. at 670 (holding that [t]here can be little doubt that the Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is 
a law of general applicability). 
 
136 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W. 2d 387 (Minn. 1992) (reinstating a $200,000 damages award). 
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First Amendment would not protect them.137 The Court had cleared the way for a case 
involving an ethics-based journalism practice to be decided in a court of equity – a court that 
scholars say makes judgments based on morality and decides cases based on its conception of 
social responsibility.138 Scholars have described equity’s morality-based jurisprudence in a 
variety of ways. Legal historian Peter Charles Hoffer called it “the law’s conscience.”139 Two 
other scholars, Judge Roger Young and law professor Stephen Spitz, devised the following 
maxim in a light-hearted, but not inaccurate encapsulation of the basic normative premise 
upon which equity cases are decided: “[I]n equity, good guys should win and bad guys 
should lose.”140  
Although this study has found other Court rulings that enforced or undermined press 
responsibility as defined by journalism ethics codes, Cohen v. Cowles may have the greatest 
potential to allow, in effect, the creation of a governmental code of journalism ethics because 
it opened the door to equity jurisprudence in this context. Equity is the branch of 
jurisprudence that is designed to provide justice when the technical requirements of law 
cannot.141 Law, for example, enforces a promise only when the promise meets the technical 
                                                 
137 See COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 22, at 80 (warning that if the media “are 
irresponsible, not even the First Amendment will protect their freedom from governmental control. The 
amendment will be amended.”). 
 
138 See generally, HOFFER, supra note 130, at 7-21 (defining equity and explaining why courts of equity came to 
be widely known as courts of conscience); Susan Poser, Termination of Desegregation Decrees and the Elusive 
Meaning of Unitary Status, 81 NEB. L. REV. 283, 300-18 (2002) (presenting a history of the evolution of equity); 
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 918-40 (1987) (explaining that chancellors in equity historically have 
considered the larger moral issues). 
 
139 HOFFER, supra note 138 at xii. 
 
140 Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable Maxim: In Equity, Good Guys Should 
Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S. C. L. REV. 175, 175 (2003-2004). 
 
141 See Marcia S. Krieger, The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity: What Does That Mean? 50 S.C. L. REV. 
275, 279 (1999) (observing, “[E]quity was available only when no adequate remedy at law existed. Thus it grew 
interstitially to fill the gaps in the common law.”). 
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requirements of contract law. Equity, through promissory estoppel, enforces a promise when 
the failure to do so would deny justice to the person who relied on the promise.142  In short, 
equity focuses on producing the right or just result when the technicalities of law would 
prevent it; equity makes sure the good guy wins. Equity is morally based and enforces 
society’s demand for responsibility from its members. Virtually every society considers 
promise keeping to be a moral responsibility of its members and condemns those who break 
promises.143 The journalists in Cohen v. Cowles broke their promise to Cohen and were 
therefore the bad guys when their transgressions were judged under equity.  
Equity originated during the Middle Ages in the English Court of Chancery, which 
was distinct from courts of law, and was brought to America by English colonists who 
replicated the dual systems of jurisprudence in the United States.144 It has been condemned 
often for allowing judges or chancellors too much discretion and being subject to their 
prejudices and notions of right and wrong as well as their potentially arbitrary identifications 
of those parties Young and Spitz would refer to as “good guys and bad guys.” One of the 
most famous critical commentaries on this point was written by 17th century English jurist 
John Seldon. 
Equity is a roguish thing. For law we have a measure, know what to trust to: 
equity is according to the conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
142 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) defines promissory estoppel as: The principle that a promise made 
without consideration may nonetheless be enforced to prevent injustice if the promissor should have reasonably 
expected the promisee to rely on the promise and if the promisee did actually rely on the promise to his or her 
detriment. 
 
143 See, e.g., Rachel Cohon, Hume on Promises and the Peculiar Act of the Mind, 44 J. HIST. PHIL. 1 (2006) 
(observing that “[p]romising—with its more formal manifestation, contract—is a vital part of social life. Most 
forms of long-term cooperation, including commerce, depend in some way on the fact that people can bind 
themselves to others now to perform actions later.). 
 
144 See Subrin, supra note 138. The U.S. Supreme Court was given jurisdiction over law and equity from 
inception, U.S. CONST. art. III, §2.  
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larger or narrower, so is equity. ’Tis all one as if they should make the 
standard for the measure the Chancellor’s foot. What an uncertain measure 
this would be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third 
and indifferent foot; ’tis the same thing in the Chancellor’s conscience.145 
  
Seldon’s critique was based on the fact that early English equity was not bound by the 
rule of precedent that made common law stable and relatively predictable. The American 
brand of equity follows precedent much more faithfully than its English predecessor, but 
nonetheless functions with a significant degree of discretion.146 Hoffer, an ardent supporter of 
20th-century American equity jurisprudence, has praised it for producing the Supreme 
Court’s landmark 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education ordering the desegregation of 
public schools in the South.147 “[T]he justices were acting as chancellors. Brown was and 
remains the greatest ‘equity’ suit in our country’s history, perhaps in the history of equity,” 
he wrote.148  
Fans and opponents of that ruling have praised or criticized it as social engineering by 
Chief Justice Earl Warren, who led the Court at that time. Viewed through the lens of 
pragmatic instrumentalism, which is the theoretical framework of this dissertation, Warren 
and his brethren on the Court had used the law to achieve a social goal. When considered in 
terms of an equitable proceeding, the Brown decision could be readily perceived as a 
judgment of conscience and a ruling based in morality. Indeed, law scholar Karl Llewellyn, 
who was identified in the first chapter of this dissertation as a pragmatic instrumentalist,149 
                                                 
145 JOHN SELDEN, THE TABLE TALK OF JOHN SELDEN 148-49 (3d. ed 1860) cited in John Kroger, Supreme Court 
Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1436 (1998).  
 
146 See Subrin, supra note 138, HOFFER, supra note 138, at 147-78. 
 
147 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 
148 HOFFER, supra note 138, at 4. 
 
149 See infra Chapter One p. 10. 
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referred to the social activism of the Warren Court as pragmatic and instrumentalist.150 The 
Court’s decision in Cohen v. Cowles may well have positioned journalism’s ethical practices 
for this type of engineering, not only by the High Court, but by 21st century chancellors 
sitting in each of the state courts as well. 
It seems apparent that disputes submitted for equitable resolution are geared to favor 
the party who has seized the moral high ground or who most effectively frames the dispute in 
terms of morally proper versus improper behavior. Briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in 
Cohen v. Cowles contain arguments calculated to do both. One obvious frame presented the 
dispute as a battle between one now-jobless guy, Cohen, against a multi-million dollar media 
corporation that owned the two newspapers that cost him his job. Another focused on the fact 
that at least one of the reporters who personally made the promise of confidentiality to Cohen 
recognized that breaking it was wrong and was forced to do so by her deceptive corporate 
bosses. A portion of a brief submitted by Cohen’s attorneys indicates framing in this 
direction. 
Respondent Cowles Media claimed that its journalists did not regard the 
promise of confidentiality as creating an obligation to Mr. Cohen. On the 
contrary, its reporter, Lori Sturdevant believed that identifying Mr. Cohen 
violated the promise she had made to him. She objected so strongly to [her 
editors’] decision to dishonor her promise that she refused to allow her name 
to be used on the Star Tribune article identifying Mr. Cohen.151 
 
Similar morality-based framing is evident in the briefs submitted by the Cowles Media Co. 
attorneys. They depicted Cohen as a deceptive and dishonorable political operative who tried 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
150 KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 3-4 (1960) cited in Kroger, supra note 145, at 1478. 
 
151 Reply Brief of Petitioner Dan Cohen at 12-13, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (No. 90-
634) (citations omitted). 
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to use the newspapers to boost the campaign of his boss, Whitney, by anonymously smearing 
his opponent Johnson. 
Cohen’s strategy failed, however, in its further objective to manipulate the 
thrust of the news coverage. Cohen wanted to keep his role in releasing the 
information confidential so that the focus of the story would be on Johnson’s 
court record, and to avoid public backlash against the Whitney campaign. The 
editors decided that the public was entitled to both parts of the story, and 
identified Cohen as the source. Cohen’s lawsuit amounts to a complaint that 
he was unable to attack Johnson while shielded by anonymity.152 
 
An amici curiae brief submitted by nine news media companies also sought to present Cohen 
as the bad guy by arguing that “[p]etitioner was attempting to use the media to disseminate 
misleading information . . . and sought to prevent the dissemination of the truth.”153  
This brief also recognized that this case posed the risk of inducing judicially 
mandated journalism ethics and tried to steer the Court away from that course. “Judicial 
enforcement of an ethical obligation not to publish truthful information about political 
campaigns violates the First Amendment,” the media attorneys argued.154 They further argued 
that journalists themselves disagreed over the proper ethical resolution of this case and the 
Court should not impose its own resolution.155 The enforcement of ethical obligations, 
according to the brief, would be provided by peer criticism and a loss of peer respect. “[A]s 
is true of most ethical obligations, ‘enforcement’ must come from self-policing, rather than a 
                                                 
152 Brief of Respondent Cowles Media Company at 28-29, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) 
(No. 90-634) (citations omitted). 
 
153 Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al., at 31, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 
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government command.”156 Cohen’s attorneys disagreed, arguing that this type of enforcement 
had proved ineffective against media companies in the instant case.  
The specter of a large damage award is a much more effective incentive for a 
publisher to honor a promise of confidentiality than the fear of criticism from 
other members of the press. Indeed, any such fear of professional criticism 
was apparently insufficient to convince appellants to abide by their 
promises.157 
 
 
These arguments, despite their various intents, served to reinforce the moral and 
ethical implications of the case. Other arguments presented in conjunction with guiding 
journalists toward proper practices also raised the troubling notion that an ethical judgment 
should or could be weighed as a financial consideration. Cohen’s brief reminded the Court 
that the Minnesota trial court found that the relationship between journalists and their sources 
of information “is a commercial one.”158 Chief Justice William Rehnquist highlighted the 
commercial side of the dispute during oral argument by asking the Cowles Media Co. 
attorney John D. French whether the cost of tort damages should “weigh in the balance when 
they decide whether or not to breach their agreement [with a confidential source]. . . . [A]ny 
number of large concerns which have the potential for doing damage to people, whether 
they’re trucking companies or . . . making asbestos . . . have to live with the threat of 
litigation. That’s part of doing business in our economy, isn’t it?”159 
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Justice Byron White, in the majority opinion that Rehnquist joined, returned to the 
commercial, cost-of-doing business concept that would be resolved in a state court of equity. 
[C]ompensatory damages are not a form of punishment. . . . If the contract 
between the parties in this case had contained a liquidated damages 
provisions, it would be perfectly clear that the payment to [Cohen] would 
represent a cost of acquiring newsworthy information to be published at a 
profit. . . . The payment of compensatory damages in this case is 
constitutionally indistinguishable from a generous bonus paid to a confidential 
news source.160 
 
Justice Harry A. Blackmun disagreed insisting that “the sanctions we review in this 
case are no more justifiable as ‘a cost of acquiring newsworthy material,’ than were the libel 
damages at issue in New York Times Co. [v. Sullivan], a permissible cost of disseminating 
newsworthy material.”161 Nonetheless, the debate over making journalism more ethical 
gained another impetus or rationale for putting the onus on the owners of the media by 
making ethical transgressions a matter of finance and perhaps more likely to be self-imposed 
by the managers of the practice of journalism. 
 
Obeying the Law: An Emerging Ethical Principle 
Several prominent news media companies recently have become increasingly 
uncomfortable with American journalists’ longstanding professional acquaintance with 
ethically motivated law breaking and have sought to restrain these practices. Whether it is 
fueled by fear of financial liability or professional ethics remains to be seen. Some individual 
journalists also have been embracing greater civic responsibility despite the traditional 
ethical teachings.  
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Several of the most recent iterations of these media companies’ journalism ethics 
codes have reasserted the civic responsibility to obey the law. The Gannett newspaper 
division, for example, stated unequivocally in its 1999 newsroom guidelines, “We will obey 
the law.”162 This directive was listed under the heading “Integrity.” Similarly, when The New 
York Times revised its code in 2003 it stated forthrightly: “Staff members must obey the law 
in pursuit of news. . . . In short, they may not commit illegal acts of any sort.” 163  
These pronouncements are consistent with the ethical guidelines of major 
professional associations such as the American Medical Association and the American Bar 
Association. The AMA declares, “A physician shall respect the law.”164 Similarly, the 
American Bar Association ethics rules state, “A lawyer’s conduct should conform to the 
requirements of the law.”165 
The latest pronouncement of The New York Times code of ethics went on to explain 
that even when the law did not impose sufficiently stringent standards of behavior, the Times 
would hold its journalists to a higher code of conduct.166 In the matter of protecting 
confidential new sources, a practice that frequently has led journalists to defy the law, the 
code adopted by the Associated Press Managing Editors in 1994 seemed cautious as it 
advised: “News sources should be disclosed unless there is a clear reason not to do so. When 
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164 American Medical Association E-Principles, available at http://www.ama-
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it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of a source, the reason should be explained.” 167 
The Gannet Corporation’s ethics directive for its newspapers advised caution in granting 
source confidentiality, but indicated that in clearly defined instances “[t]he newspaper will 
not name [confidential sources] under any circumstances.”168 
 Douglas McCollam, writing in the Columbia Journalism Review, identified himself as 
one of a growing number of journalists who do not agree with their colleagues’ time-worn 
insistence on a fundamentalist interpretation of the First Amendment that flies in the face of 
repeated judicial pronouncements. “[A]s Branzburg made clear, those First Amendment 
protections may guard the final [news] product but don’t necessarily extend to news 
gathering,” he observed.169  Similarly, Mark Bowden, a journalist who was held in contempt 
for refusing a Pennsylvania court order to turn over his notes in 2000, wrote, “The First 
Amendment protects freedom of the press, but it doesn’t absolve it from all civic 
responsibility.”170 He expressed second thoughts about his refusal and doing what journalism 
ethics and his colleagues had goaded him to do. He considered what would have happened if 
he had turned over his notes. “I would have lost my chance to play hero for a day,” he wrote, 
“but I would have done my duty as a citizen, and that would have been that.”171 
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 In this context consider the case of Charlotte-Herald News reporter Michael Smith.172 
He had done extensive reporting on corruption among public officials in Florida, and a state 
grand jury subpoenaed him to testify about what he knew. He quietly complied. Afterward, 
he decided he wanted to write news articles and a book about his experience in the grand jury 
room but was told such publications would violate the law. He did not rush into publication 
but filed a lawsuit asking the courts to determine if his First Amendment rights were violated 
by this prior restraint. A unanimous U.S. Supreme Court, relying on its holdings in Landmark 
Communications, ruled in Smith’s favor.173  
 Perhaps the most significant defection from traditional journalism ethics, particularly 
for the purposes of this dissertation, was the decision by Time magazine’s editor-in-chief 
Norman Pearlstine to comply with a subpoena in connection with the government’s search 
for confidential sources in the Valerie Plame case.174 One report in The New York Times 
indicated the corporate decision was unprecedented in the history of modern journalism.175 
Time magazine is often referred to as “the house that Luce built” because it rose to 
journalistic prominence under the guidance of Henry Luce – the man who created the 
Hutchins Commission and inspired its push for journalism ethics. Pearlstine’s decision to 
comply was widely, but not universally, condemned by journalists and First Amendment 
advocates. The publisher of The New York Times, which vigorously supported its reporter 
Judith Miller’s longstanding refusal to obey a subpoena issued in the Valerie Plame case, 
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said, “We are deeply disappointed by Time Inc.’s decision to deliver the subpoenaed 
records.”176 Matthew Cooper, the subpoenaed Time reporter who had been resisting 
subpoenas beside Miller, objected to his employer’s decision and said he was “obviously 
disappointed.”177 
 Pearlstine, who has a law degree, explained his decision as a citizen’s duty to comply 
with the law because the magazine’s legal challenge of the subpoena was defeated in court 
and the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal. “Once a federal grand jury and the 
Supreme Court have weighed in, we had little option,” Pearlstine said as he questioned 
whether a corporation has a right to engage in civil disobedience.178  
Reaction from Time readers was mixed and reflected several concepts addressed in 
this study such as civil disobedience and the social contract. “Pearlstine said the company 
had an obligation to follow the law. But throughout our country’s history, it has been those 
who have stood up to the misuse of law who have brought about the social changes needed to 
protect our constitutional rights,” wrote one reader.179 Another reader said: “Time did the 
right thing. . . . We don’t have to like laws, orders or rulings. But unless we are anarchists, 
we should follow the law.”180 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 This final chapter traced the citizen’s dilemma from ancient Greek civilization into 
the 21st century and found scholars and lay people alike insisting that citizens do or do not 
have a moral duty to obey the law. It remains a great divide. The basic framework of the 
ongoing conflict between civic responsibilities and a citizen’s moral and ethical duties has 
not changed over the centuries. Ethics codes historically have told citizen journalists to 
answer to an ethical authority that is superior to mere statutes or court orders. The codes 
draw on the First Amendment to define journalists’ duties in their civic communities and to 
protect them when lesser laws or transient government policies seek to keep them from 
performing their duties. From time to time a tiny minority of the Supreme Court has agreed 
with this fundamentalist view of the First Amendment’s protection of journalists, but in all of 
the cases reviewed here the great bulk of the Court’s members have rejected that premise. 
Nonetheless, when the Supreme Court has decided cases in which journalists have broken the 
law or acted contrary to public policy pursuant to an ethical directive, the outcomes generally 
have favored the journalists.  
There have been indications in Court rulings since the late 1990s, however, that such 
outcomes may not be so common in the future. There is also mounting evidence that 
journalists and their institutional employers may be in the process of reassessing their civic 
and professional responsibilities and may perhaps decide that ethics may not always trump 
some civic responsibilities. This shift may be consistent with the Hutchins Commission 
Report’s recommendations for the ethical practice of journalism. That report urged 
journalists to act with greater social responsibility – a framework that arguably includes civic 
responsibility. Although the commission expressed a hope that the reforms would be self-
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generated instead of government compelled, it is not altogether clear if corporate news 
media’s in-house reforms are fulfilling this hope if they are motivated by fears of government 
directed or permitted sanctions that threaten their profits.  
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
 
Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
 
 
As this dissertation has indicated, criticisms of American journalists and efforts to 
make them perform more ethically predate the First Amendment and have continued 
unabated into the 21st century. The Hutchins Commission’s call for ethical and socially 
responsible journalism in 1947 is the starting point of this study because it has proved to be 
the most influential of these efforts and because the commission considered inviting 
government intervention to achieve these ends. This study looked at government intervention 
in the form of U.S. Supreme Court rulings that addressed matters that implicated journalism 
ethics. This study’s conclusions will be presented here in two formats. The first is a theory 
and philosophy-based overview of government- or Court-created journalism ethics. The 
second is a summary of the study’s findings with respect to the specific ethical principles 
addressed by Court rulings and answers to the individual research questions posed by the 
study. 
Theoretical and Philosophical Overview 
Although the Hutchins Commission ultimately rejected of the idea of recommending 
government intervention to improve journalism, it feared the intrusion might occur of its own 
accord if journalists did not reform themselves sufficiently. During the phase of American 
history in which the commission operated – a period that included the Great Depression and 
World War II – the federal government had been called on to solve a variety of social and 
economic problems and had achieved some commendable successes. It was therefore 
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understandable that a governmental resolution was considered. Even during this troubled 
phase, however, it was fairly well established that the First Amendment would prohibit 
government imposition of rules of behavior for the press even when the goal was to make 
members of the profession perform more ethically and serve society better.  
Nonetheless, the commission warned that if the American public became sufficiently 
roused by journalists’ misbehavior, not even the First Amendment would be enough to 
protect the press. This too, was an understandable warning given the period in which it was 
issued. This was the heyday of pragmatic instrumentalism – a descriptive legal theory that 
claims the law, particularly judge-made law, is a coercive tool for justifying and 
implementing social policy directly or indirectly. The contours of First Amendment 
protection, according to an instrumentalist view of the problem, might well be altered by 
interpretation and redefined by Supreme Court edict if the Court found sufficient cause.  
This dissertation proceeded from a pragmatic instrumentalist perspective and 
examined United States Supreme Court rulings from the year of the Hutchins Report through 
2005 to determine whether or to what extent the commission’s warning and concerns had 
been validated. This study was limited to Supreme Court rulings because the Court 
determines whether and to what extent particular press behaviors are protected by the First 
Amendment. Rulings were studied in cases that addressed the five major principles that 
journalists identified in their ethics codes and in other pronouncements as most vital to the 
ethical practice of their profession. One of the major goals of this study was to determine if 
the Court, in its efforts to achieve a variety of social and political goals for nearly seven 
decades, has issued rulings in First Amendment cases that have goaded the press to be more 
ethical. Proceeding from a pragmatic instrumentalism perspective, this study found that in 
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some instances the Supreme Court has intruded into the ethical practice of journalism. At 
times this was done in pursuit of better journalism and sometimes at the expense of better 
journalism while in pursuit of other social objectives. This study also has concluded that the 
courts now seem poised to intervene in the creation of ethical journalism to an even greater 
extent. There is no indication that the Supreme Court has systematically sought to create 
ethical rules of behavior for the press, but this study’s results-based observations – grounded 
in pragmatic instrumentalism – indicate that in deciding cases that involve principles of 
journalism ethics, the Court protected or encouraged some journalism practices while others 
were undermined or punished by being left vulnerable to legal sanctions. 
Pragmatic instrumentalism is a results-based theory that focuses on what the law or a 
court has done as opposed to dwelling on the rationales or processes used to produce any 
particular legal result. For this reason, the aftermath of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s so-
called “Court packing plan” of 1937 is cited as a validating example of the Supreme Court 
using the law as a tool to solve a social problem or attain a social goal.1 The law at issue in 
this example was the Constitution, and, for a portion of the 1930s, the Court was interpreting 
the Constitution in a manner that invalidated some of the most important New Deal 
legislation the Roosevelt administration had created to deal with catastrophic unemployment 
and provide a financial safety net for retired workers. Not long after he proposed increasing 
the number of justices to create a new majority that would find his social-remedy legislation 
constitutional, the Court actually began finding this type of legislation constitutional. 
Pragmatic instrumentalism is not concerned with the fact that the Court-packing legislation 
                                                 
1 See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995); G. Edward White, Constitutional Change and the New Deal: 
The Internalist/Externalist Debate, 110 AM. HIST. REV. 1094 (2005). 
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failed to become law, or that there were personnel changes at the Court, or that the four 
justices who most consistently found New Deal legislation unconstitutional did not waver 
from those legal principles and precedents.2 It focuses on the result – the New Deal 
legislation abruptly was being found constitutional even though the Constitution itself had 
not changed. The Constitution had been crafted into an instrumentalist tool to solve the 
pressing social problems of the time. 
In a similar manner, according to the findings of this dissertation, the Court’s 
interpretation of the law – primarily the First Amendment – has been tailored to achieve just 
results in cases that involved pressing social issues. These pressing issues were not always 
issues of journalism ethics. Sometimes, as in the landmark New York Times v. Sullivan case,3 
the social issue that controlled the First Amendment and the ethical issues raised by the case 
was racial inequality. Here, as in other social issues cases, the Court can be seen reaching a 
morally just decision and an equitable decision grounded in notions of basic fairness and 
morality. The litigants in Sullivan were on opposite sides of a moral divide – the Civil Rights 
Movement of the 1960s – even though the case was ostensibly about whether a newspaper 
should be held legally accountable for publishing false and libelous statements about a 
government official in Alabama. Truth, or the failure to tell the truth, was the journalism 
ethics issue addressed by the case. To resolve the dispute, the Court interpreted the First 
Amendment in a manner that undermined the ethical value of truth telling by providing legal 
protection for the failure to tell the truth in some circumstances. In so doing, the newspaper’s 
failure to tell the truth was protected because it was so important to the progress of the Civil 
                                                 
2 See BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTION (1998). 
 
3 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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Rights Movement that the movement’s opponents sought to punish the newspaper by suing it 
out of existence. Amici curiae briefs filed in the case made precisely this argument. This 
dissertation concluded that in crafting a moral, equitable and just solution to a social problem 
– racial inequality – the Court weakened the support that the law of libel had provided for the 
ethical value of truth. 
When viewed as a case that hinged on moral choice and moral justice,  Sullivan has 
the earmarks of a case in equity. Jurisprudence in the United States is administered primarily 
in courts of law and courts of equity, but the distinction between the two is rarely made 
because they have been merged. The U.S. Constitution gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction 
in law and equity and later legislation achieved full merger. Historically, judges have used 
their equity powers when there is no adequate remedy at law or when strict adherence to law 
would produce a morally wrong or unjust result. In this sense, the letter of libel law, as 
interpreted by the Alabama Supreme Court provided a victory for L.B. Sullivan. The U.S. 
Supreme Court, however, apparently considered that to be an unjust result and found or 
crafted a rationale in the First Amendment for a judgment for the newspaper. Equity seeks 
justice notwithstanding the letter of the law; it is known as the court of conscience. This 
dissertation found equity to be a nearly perfect tool of pragmatic instrumentalism because the 
resolution of social issues in a court room arena is virtually always a matter of justice and 
morality. Not every case examined in this study can be identified as a case in equity, but 
some clearly are susceptible to such an interpretation. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,4 the last 
major case examined in this study, plainly opens the door to equitable resolutions in cases 
involving journalism ethics. 
                                                 
4 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
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Cowles Media Co. involved the journalists’ ethical obligation to protect confidential 
sources from exposure. It also involved the moral obligation to honor a promise and the legal 
obligation to comply with contracts. In this case, the journalists broke the ethical rule, 
shirked moral obligation, but did not violate the contract because under the law, there was no 
contract. Here was a perfect scenario for invoking equity jurisdiction because there was no 
adequate remedy available at law. Morally and ethically, the journalists appeared to be on the 
wrong side of the divide. The Supreme Court ruled that the First Amendment did not prevent 
the resolution of the case in a state court using promissory estoppel, a doctrine created and 
administered in courts of equity. The door to equitable and moral resolutions of legal 
conflicts involving journalism ethics had been thrown open. Further study is needed to 
determine whether or to what extent state courts have begun applying this or other equitable 
doctrines to cases involving ethical principles of journalism. 
Has the Court Imposed Ethical Standards? 
When the United States Supreme Court had occasion to address the five fundamental 
ethical principles and directives of journalism in cases it decided from 1947 through 2005, its 
rulings were generally supportive of them, but not universally so. This study has found no 
wholesale conversion of ethical standards into legal imperatives. This study has found, 
however, that in deciding cases that implicated these principles, the Court created a legal 
basis for rendering some of these principles practical nullities and undermined others so 
significantly that in some areas judicial edicts are at odds with journalists’ own ethical 
prescriptions. In some instances, the Court denigrated some of journalism’s most cherished 
principles in deference to other ideals it deemed more important. These Court rulings raise 
concerns that professional practices of journalists in the 21st century and beyond may be 
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guided by legal edicts to a greater extent than ethical principles and, in some respects, the 
judicial standard strays from the standard journalists had set for themselves.  
Once a Court ruling backs an ethical principle, or penalizes, or allows penalties for 
compliance with others, this judicial standard is logically likely to become the standard that 
is most often followed. Compliance with the judicial standard seems particularly likely when 
the ethical decision making and professional policy making are done in corporate news 
media offices where compliance with the law is a matter of company policy that may 
override ethical considerations. Court rulings that addressed the ethical standards of 
journalism sometimes imposed penalties or provided no protection for compliance with 
standards journalists had set for themselves. Standards of professionalism set by journalists 
themselves are almost exclusively hortatory and not mandatory. There are no significant 
penalties for deviance or rewards for compliance. 
Journalists historically have rejected compulsory ethics as contrary to their First 
Amendment interests even when the compulsion was self-administered through voluntary 
press associations. But when the compulsion is self-administered by the news media 
corporations, their individual journalist employees may have scant ability to resist or reject 
those ethical standards. From the inception of ethics codes in the United States, the only 
codes that issued orders instead of mere suggestions were those developed for individual 
newsrooms as conditions of employment. When the National News Council was formed in 
1971 in the hope of using public disclosure of ethical wrongdoing and peer pressure to 
establish ethical parameters for journalism, major news organizations resisted even this level 
of coercion and the council eventually failed. As a result, there was reason to fear legal 
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intervention might well occur by default because criticism of journalists’ professional 
practices remained fairly constant. 
 
Have Court Rulings Affirmed or Undermined Ethics? 
This study identified five ethical principles and directives that journalists themselves 
established as fundamental to journalism: tell the truth, respect privacy, report the news, 
protect sources, and maintain independence. The study then sought to identify cases in which 
the Court addressed these principles pursuant to resolving related legal issues. One of the 
goals of the study was to determine the Court supported or undermined these principles.  
When the Court addressed the truth principle during the time frame of this study, its 
rulings broadly affirmed and supported the value of truth and truth telling by usually 
forbidding or sharply limiting the imposition of criminal or civil penalties against journalists 
for the dissemination of truthful information. Truth came before the Court most prominently 
in libel cases, and it was in these that the Court came closest in matching the value 
journalism ethics codes ascribed to truth telling. The Court valued truth so highly it remained 
an absolute defense to libel.  
In the codes, truth telling is the prime directive and arguably the highest value. But 
this value was deflated and undermined to a significant degree by the Court’s creation, 
application, and extension of the actual malice rule in libel cases. This rule, if explained 
simply, says if a journalist does not intentionally misstate the truth or is not wholly reckless 
in seeking the truth, the law will provide some significant measure of protection against some 
libel claims. The Court seemed to be saying truth is valuable, but if journalists do not 
intentionally lie or recklessly misstate the truth, the law will protect the published results of 
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that effort as if they actually were true even if they are wholly false. Protecting falsity based 
on such a basis actually undervalues and undermines truth telling as heralded in the codes.  
In formulations compatible with the Court’s, the codes also indicated that journalists 
should not lie, which is the act of intentionally misstating the truth. But the codes drew a 
harder line early on and insisted there was no excuse for falsity, even by mistake. The 
Canons of Journalism, for example, stated, “By every consideration of good faith a 
newspaper is constrained to be truthful. It is not to be excused for lack of thoroughness or 
accuracy within its control or failure to obtain command of these essential qualities.”5  
While the Court provided the greatest protection for libelous falsity published about 
the powerful and famous – public officials and public figures, the codes made no such 
distinctions. Nonetheless, the Court’s actual malice rule affirms the value of truth by 
providing no protection to intentional and reckless falsehoods and even allowing extra 
penalties in the form of punitive damages.  
The Court’s two major libel rulings that devalued truth telling were New York Times 
v. Sullivan6 and Gertz v. Welch.7 Both cases were entangled in crucial social issues such as 
racial inequality and civil rights which implicated other important values. These values led to 
rulings in which the news media defendant prevailed in Sullivan, but lost in Gertz, the Court 
apparently preferring these other social values over pure truth. Some of the amici curiae 
briefs submitted in these cases capitalized on these social issues and used them as well as 
their legal arguments to press for favorable rulings. 
                                                 
5 Canons of Journalism, reprinted in NELSON ANTRIM CRAWFORD, THE ETHICS OF JOURNALISM, 184 (1924). 
 
6 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 
7 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 285 
 
In crafting the actual malice rule and extending legal protection to journalists who 
published news and other information about matters of legitimate public concern, the Court 
has supported the ethical values and directives that compel journalists to report the news 
independently despite restraints posed by law or public policy. “Matters of legitimate public 
concern” has been employed in Court opinions with nearly talismanic effect to exonerate or 
protect journalists acting in contravention of law or public policy. This is particularly evident 
in matters of privacy, where the Court has found newsworthiness and truth to be broadly 
protective of journalist defendants in civil cases. In these, the Court’s valuation of privacy 
interests has been lower than the value ascribed to it in journalism ethics codes. For example, 
the Court has protected journalists who publicly identify sexual assault victims while 
journalism codes generally say such exposure is unethical. In other areas, particularly outside 
the invasion of privacy torts, the Court has valued privacy higher than the codes have and has 
defined it much more broadly, as well. 
 
Has the Court Eroded the Distinction Between Law and Ethics? 
Perhaps the most disturbing finding of this study is that judge-made law may be 
affecting the practice of journalism practices by setting benchmarks indicating where First 
Amendment protection of ethics-directed practices begins and ends. Judicial determinations 
function indirectly as a carrot and a stick by nourishing and protecting or by inflicting or 
allowing punishment for value-based journalism practices. Ethics codes guide journalists 
using a carrot of peer approval and stick no thicker than a finger wagged in disapproval. 
Absent countervailing influences such as individual idealism and personal integrity, judicial 
determinations may well have the greatest influence on the efficacy of the principles that 
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mainstream journalists will actually follow. It appears that the ethical practices that have the 
greatest legal protection or affirmation are the most influential. Those lacking such protection 
or that invoke legal penalties appear less likely to guide behavior. As such, the distinction 
between what is ethical and what is legal becomes almost moot when they coincide; or the 
ethics nearly become moot when they don’t coincide with the law. 
It seems apparent that this is becoming the case in some corporate journalism firms 
where the largest carrot is profit and the thickest stick is the threat of legal penalties that 
would diminish profits. Legal considerations are being included in revised and updated 
ethical guidelines and rules of professional practice for the major journalism companies. 
Supreme Court precedents on First Amendment issues are virtually certain to be among the 
considerations. Efforts are therefore necessary to guide the law into line with the ethics as 
determined by journalists or the perimeter of ethical practice will be established by the 
cumulative effects of judicial fiats. A federal press shield law is one such guide because 
journalists can have input legislatively that would be denied to them in judicial decision 
making. 
What are the Ramifications of Court-Created Ethics?  
 When journalists create ethical guidelines for themselves, they are focused virtually 
exclusively on the specific role they have to play to make their proper contribution to society. 
When the Supreme Court or any other agency creates an ethics codes for any other entity, 
particularly the press, it lacks that narrow specialized focus because it has its own broader set 
of values and directives that may render it incapable of defining the ethical role of others. 
Although the Court has proved to be highly respectful of the First Amendment, it has to be 
respectful of every other provision of the Constitution as well. Journalists derive much of 
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their mandate from the First Amendment’s scheme for maintaining a properly functioning 
democracy. As a result, it is not likely that the other provisions of the Constitution are given 
as much weight when journalists decide what is ethical. A Court-created ethics code for 
journalists would almost necessarily be something other than what journalists would create 
for themselves. It would destroy the check and balance the Fourth Estate provides for the 
other three. 
 Since the Supreme Court opened the door in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. for equity 
adjudication of conflicts related to journalism practices, value-driven court judgments may 
speed up the process of government-imposed social responsibility. But that is not necessarily 
the case. Journalists must enter the battle for the hearts and minds of the American public and 
the courts. They need to explain the important values they uphold in their professional 
practices so the people, in whose interest journalists ultimately serve, will understand. They 
have to make it clear that when they stand in the court of conscience, they are the good guys. 
 Further study is essential to monitor the state courts when they apply equitable 
principles in First Amendment cases. More research also needs to be done to determine if 
corporations can or do function as journalists driven by professional ethics or whether they 
are guided more by fear of legal retribution in the form of damages that threaten profits. 
 Perhaps the most important contribution this dissertation can make is to help foster a 
better understanding of the distinctions among morality, ethics, and law. Such an 
understanding is essential to maintaining those distinctions and allowing journalists to create 
the ethical principles that will guide their practice and allow them to fulfill their 
constitutionally mandated responsibilities to American democracy. 
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